

85¢ a Copy

No Advertising

\$7 a Year

Phillips University Library
Enid, Oklahoma

16 FEB 1961

Current History

61
FEBRUARY, 1961

FOR READING TODAY . . . FOR REFERENCE TOMORROW

CHANGING AFRICA

IS THERE AN AFRO-ASIAN BLOC?	<i>Rayford W. Logan</i>	65
TOWARD MAJORITY RULE IN EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA	<i>R. C. Pratt</i>	70
FRENCH TROPICAL AFRICA: TODAY AND TOMORROW	<i>Carroll Quigley</i>	77
GHANA: THE BLACK STAR STATE	<i>Keith Irvine</i>	88
NIGERIA: POTENTIAL FOR STABILITY	<i>Thomas P. Melady</i>	93
CHAOS IN THE CONGO	<i>Harry R. Rudin</i>	98
APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA	<i>Joan L. Barkon</i>	104
AFRICA: A MAP		73
RECEIVED AT OUR DESK		111
CURRENT DOCUMENTS		
The Nato Ministers Communiqué, December, 1960		115
THE MONTH IN REVIEW		117

Current History

Founded in 1914 by
The New York Times

Published by
Current History, Inc.

Editor, 1943-1955:
D. G. REDMOND

FEBRUARY, 1961
Volume 40 Number 234

Publisher:
DANIEL G. REDMOND, JR.

Editor:
CAROL L. THOMPSON

Assistant Editor:
JOAN L. BARKON

Promotion Consultant:
MARY A. MEEHAN

Contributing Editors

ROSS N. BERKES
University of Southern California

SIDNEY B. FAY
Harvard University

MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY
Columbia University

HANS W. GATZKE
The Johns Hopkins University

NORMAN A. GRAEBNER
University of Illinois

OSCAR HANDLIN
Harvard University

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ
University of Notre Dame

HANS KOHN
City College of New York

NORMAN D. PALMER
University of Pennsylvania

CARROLL QUIGLEY
Georgetown University

JOHN P. ROCHE
Brandeis University

A. L. ROWSE
All Souls College, Oxford

HARRY R. RUDIN
Yale University

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN
Williams College

RICHARD VAN ALSTYNE
University of Southern California

COLSTON E. WARNE
Amherst College

Book Review Editor:
ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN
University of Pennsylvania

85 cents a copy; 7 dollars a year. Canada 7 dollars twenty-five cents a year. Foreign including the Philippines 7 dollars seventy-five cents a year.

Coming Next Month...

SOUTH ASIA'S CONTINUING UNREST

March, 1961

Our March, 1961, issue is a study of the nations of Southeast Asia with special reference to political and economic conditions. Articles include:

THE U.S. STAKE IN SOUTH ASIA by *Frank N. Trager*, Professor of International Affairs, New York University, and author of "Marxism in Southeast Asia";

INDIA'S WORLD POSITION by *Norman D. Palmer*, Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, and co-author of "International Relations: The World Community in Transition";

REVOLUTION IN LAOS by *Thomas E. Ennis*, Professor of Modern European and Asian History, West Virginia University, and author of "French Policy and Development in Indochina";

THE PHILIPPINES IN THE MODERN WORLD by *Carlos P. Romulo*, Philippine Ambassador to the U.S.;

TIBET AND THE CHINESE CHALLENGE by *Sudershan Chawla*, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Muskingum College;

CAMBODIA by *Bernard B. Fall*, Associate Professor of Government, Howard University, and author of "Laos"; and

PAKISTAN by *G. W. Choudhury*, Reader in Political Science, Dacca University.

Published monthly by Current History, Inc., Publication Office, 1822 Ludlow St., Phila. 3, Pa. Editorial Office, Wolpit Rd., Norwalk, Conn. Entered as second class matter May 12, 1943, at the post office at Philadelphia, Pa., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. Individual copies may be secured by writing to the publication office. No responsibility is assumed for the return of unsolicited manuscripts. Copyright, 1961, by Current History, Inc.

Current History

Vol. 40

February, 1961

No. 234

Sixteen African nations joined the United Nations in the fall of 1960. What forces are shaping the "new" Africa? Will the new states be friendly to the West? In this issue specialists evaluate the strengths of the African bloc and the specific problems faced by some African nations. At the United Nations, the Afro-Asian states ". . . should be neither spoiled nor treated as second class member states. The intelligent leaders of these states want neither kind of "preferential" treatment." The author of our first article warns that "the United States must not try to use the African states as pawns in the cold war."

Is There an Afro-Asian Bloc?

By RAYFORD W. LOGAN

Professor of History, Howard University

THE spectre of an Afro-Asian bloc haunts the United Nations halls. Between September, 1960, and mid-December sixteen "black"¹ African nations joined five others. These twenty-one plus four "white" North African states and twenty Asian states constituted almost one-half of the ninety-nine member states. They may therefore prevent the Western-oriented nations from maintaining their so-called "automatic" two thirds majority in the General Assembly on "important" questions.

Important questions include recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security; the election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, of the members of the Economic and Social Council and of the Trusteeship Council; and the admission of new members of the United Nations. These and a few other questions enumerated in Article 18 of the Charter are usually called substantive; others which are generally called procedural require only a majority vote. On

both substantive and procedural questions the majority is determined on the basis of the number of votes for or against a resolution. It should further be noted that any one of the permanent members of the Security Council—the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and Nationalist China—has the right to veto the admission of new member states and *any* amendment to the Charter.

The black ghost is all the more awesome because its shadow may lengthen in the near future. Mauritania proclaimed independence on November 28, 1960, but a Soviet veto delayed, temporarily at least, its admission to the United Nations. The Soviet delegate vetoed the admission of Mauritania because the Security Council had denied admission to Outer Mongolia. Perhaps the Soviet Union will veto also the admission of other black African nations. But this veto would diminish the fear of an Afro-Asian-Soviet bloc.

Nine other black African nations may soon seek admission to the United Nations. Sierra Leone is scheduled to gain independence as of April 27, 1961. Tanganyika, Uganda, Kenya and Ruanda-Urundi may soon be waiting in the wings. One should not rule

¹ This term is inaccurate. The inhabitants encompass practically the entire spectrum from blue-black to white. Most of them, however, are black, dark brown, and brown. Hereafter, black without the quotation marks is to be understood in this sense. Almost equally inaccurate is the term "white" African states. The ruling classes are white or near-white, but many of the peasants and urban workers are brown or black.

out the possibility that the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland may break up and that black Northern Rhodesia and black Nyasaland may secede and proclaim independence. "The wind of change" that is sweeping through Africa may even blow into the Portuguese Overseas Provinces of Angola and Mozambique. To these nine—ten including Mauritania—potential new African member states should be added the (British) West Indies.

To offset these eleven there appears to be only Southern Rhodesia if the Federation were to break up. The crystal ball does not reveal how much longer the white minority there and in the Union of South Africa, which is of course already a member state, will be able to maintain white supremacy.

The sixteen new black African member states plus five that were already members constituted in mid-December, 1960, the largest potential bloc—one more than the Asian bloc, six more than the Arab League, and twelve more than the Soviet bloc. But four of the members of the Arab League are white North African states. Hence, many writers contend that the African bloc consists of twenty-five members.

The African "Bloc" Divided

But was there an African bloc as of mid-December, 1960? Significant votes during the fifteenth General Assembly reveal clearly that this bloc was at times a figment of the imagination of scaremongers. What is perhaps more important is the fact that the so-called bloc did not automatically support the Soviet bloc.

On November 9, the delegate from Ghana moved to postpone the seating of President Kasavubu of the Congo (Léopoldville) until the United Nations Conciliation Commission, which had sent troops to the former Belgian Congo, had made its report. It was expected that the Commission would recommend that Prime Minister Lumumba be seated. The Ghana motion carried with forty-eight votes for, thirty against and eighteen abstentions. Supporting the Ghana resolution were the nine Communist members and twenty-nine African and Asian members. The thirty votes in opposition included Western nations, eight French Community African states and three Asian countries. The eighteen abstentions

were scattered throughout the non-Communist world.

Most significant is the fact that eight of the thirteen French Community African states voted against the Ghana resolution. Thus, there was not only no black African solidarity; there was also no black French African solidarity.

On November 10, the Credentials Committee voted, six to one, with two abstentions that Mr. Kasavubu be seated. The six votes were cast by pro-Western countries. Russia was opposed, and the two North African states, the United Arab Republic and Morocco, abstained.

After this vote by the Credentials Committee, Ghana, on November 18, made a second attempt to have the Assembly postpone action on the seating of President Kasavubu until the African Conciliation Commission had submitted its report. On this occasion the vote was fifty-one against, thirty-six in favor, and eleven abstentions. The Western-oriented nations had gained twenty-one votes; the Eastern-oriented bloc had lost twelve of the votes cast. Clearly, the United States had almost re-established its "automatic" majority in the General Assembly.

Once more the Afro-Asian bloc divided. Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Sudan and Togo voted in the affirmative with the Soviet bloc. Ten of the thirteen French Community black member states voted against the resolution and Upper Volta abstained. Somalia also abstained. Ethiopia opposed the resolution and Liberia abstained. All four of the North African states and ten Asian states voted for it; four Asian states voted against it and five abstained. It is not surprising that Castro's Cuba voted with the Soviet bloc, but it is rather strange to find Mexico in this camp. Seventeen Latin American states voted with the West, and Venezuela abstained.

Even more significant was the final vote on November 22, since it gave the necessary two thirds majority of votes cast for what amounted to the admission of Congo (Léopoldville). Fifty-three member states voted in favor of seating President Kasavubu, twenty-four voted against, nineteen abstained; Nigeria and Upper Volta did not vote.

Only four black African countries—

Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Togo—voted against the resolution. Voting to seat President Kasavubu were nine former French Overseas Territories—Cameroun, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Niger, and Senegal. Five black African member states—Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Liberia, Somalia and Sudan abstained. The North African states also revealed a rift. None voted with the majority. The United Arab Republic and Morocco aligned themselves with the opposition; Libya and Tunisia abstained.

While recognizing the multiplicity of reasons—openly expressed and discreetly hidden—of votes in the United Nations, one may make informed guesses about many of these votes. Ghana had stoutly supported Prime Minister Lumumba, and its Chargé d'Affaires, Nathaniel Welbeck, had been expelled from Léopoldville by pro-Kasavubu troops the day before Ghana introduced its second resolution to postpone action on the seating of a Congo (Léopoldville) representative. Perhaps the principal reason for the support that Ghana had given to Prime Minister Lumumba is the fact that a unitary Congo would facilitate the realization of President Nkrumah's dream of a United States of Africa. Once this visionary dream were achieved, he might emerge as the President of the United States of Africa.

Guinea, joined in an ill-defined union with Ghana, has received and accepted more aid from the Soviet bloc than from the United States. Whether Sékou Touré's pro-Soviet orientation derives from his predilection for a planned economy, from the abrupt withdrawal of French aid and from the unconscionable delay of the United States in filling the vacuum is largely an academic question. Perhaps France and the United States may recover the fumbled ball. But in mid-December Guinea was probably more definitely veering toward the Soviet Union than any other black African state. In any event, since France had supported the United States on the Congo-Léopoldville question, it is not surprising that Guinea voted against the seating of President Kasavubu.

On the other hand, the affirmative votes of nine French Community African member states probably indicated the success of President de Gaulle in holding their allegiance.

The Nigerian delegate refused to participate in the vote because it revealed a split in the African group which would destroy "the very essence of peace-making efforts" in Congo (Léopoldville). Nigeria, moreover, had frequently made it clear that it would not necessarily follow Ghana's lead. Many Nigerians believe that, since it is the largest of the black African states, it should lead rather than follow. On the other hand, Nigeria can ill afford to be bracketed with the "imperialist" powers if it is to assume that leadership.

Liberia's abstention may seem somewhat surprising, for President Tubman has generally supported the United States. But he also resists President Nkrumah's self-appointed role as the spokesman for Black Africa: Tubman's rather vague proposal for an Associated States of Africa was probably motivated by his opposition to Nkrumah's equally amorphous concept of a United States of Africa. But Liberia, like Nigeria, must avoid the stigma of a "lackey" of the imperialists and capitalists.

Afghanistan, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen voted against the West. Afghanistan is most vulnerable to a Russian attack, and the economic aid from the U.S.S.R. has been more concrete, evident and productive of immediate results than that from the United States. But did India, supposedly leaning toward the West after the Communist China invasion of Tibet, also fear a Communist Chinese invasion, supported by Russia despite growing signs of a rift between Mao Tse-tung and Khrushchev? Indonesia has generally supported Russia. Two oil-rich states in which Western capital has provided most of the know-how voted against the West. The unusually warm welcome given by President Eisenhower and the American people to King Saud and his crippled son a few years ago almost vanished when sharp criticisms were voiced in the United States against his country's policy of refusing to employ Jews—even American Jews. On the other hand, the friendship between Iraq and Russia which led to a barrage of rocks and similar missiles against Assistant Secretary of State William M. Rountree at Baghdad on December 15, 1958, seemed two years later to be holding firm.

Three other members of the Arab League, Morocco, the United Arab Republic, and Yemen, voted against Kasavubu. Morocco usually opposes what France approves—and Morocco knew that France would soon recognize Mauritania. The United Arab Republic continued to align itself against the West as did Yemen. Libya and Tunisia; two white North African countries, abstained.

Bloc Unity

The Afro-Asian-Eastern bloc prevailed, however, on procedural proposals to increase the number of members of the Security Council from eleven to thirteen and of the Economic and Social Council from eighteen to twenty-four. Nigeria on November 11 moved to postpone elections pending assurances that Asia and Africa would each receive one seat on the Security Council. The Western nations opposed postponement on these terms since a Special Political Committee was debating the enlargement of both Councils. James J. Wadsworth, the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, charged that the Soviet Union had "threatened to veto enlargement of the Councils if Communist China is not admitted to the U.N." The Nigerian motion carried, fifty-one for, thirty-eight against and nine abstentions. In the light of other votes, it is probable that many of the Afro-Asian member states were voting for representation on the Security Council rather than for the admission of Communist China. The real test of Afro-Asian-Eastern solidarity on this latter question may not come until an amendment is voted upon to increase membership especially in the Security Council or on a new vote to admit Communist China.

The Afro-Asian bloc did coalesce, however, in November and December, against Portugal, the last of the large colonial powers in Africa. Portugal had sought, prior to its admission to the United Nations in 1955, to evade responsibility for submitting annual reports on its colonies by designating them as Overseas Provinces, hence, integral parts of the Metropole. Spain had at first adopted the Portuguese thesis but in 1959 signified willingness to transmit to the United Nations information on all the "provinces" of Spain which could be of interest to the U.N.

Despite Portugal's refusal to submit annual reports to the United Nations, information from reliable sources had increasingly revealed prior to the beginning of the fifteenth General Assembly that a crisis was brewing in Mozambique and even more so in Angola. Forced labor was a common practice, the standard of living was low even by African standards, and a very small number of Africans went to even primary schools. Portugal, like Belgium, believed that it could best control its colonies by denying participation in government to even the whites. But neither Portugal nor its colonies possessed the resources which enabled Belgium to dole out education and jobs in the hope of damping political aspirations. Recent reports gave circumstantial evidence of troop movements from Portugal into Angola, of political refugees crossing into Congo (Léopoldville) and going on to Ghana. Many Portuguese merchants have fled from Congo (Léopoldville) to Angola; one may only guess how many African and other revolutionaries have followed in their wake. In this connection I recall a conversation a few years ago with one of the few Congolese who had been permitted to come to the United States. Was there, I asked, a nationalist movement in the Belgian Congo? Yes. What prompted it? Mau Mau.

The General Assembly's Trusteeship Council on November 12, 1960, by a vote of forty-five in favor, six against and twenty-four abstentions, adopted a resolution calling upon Portugal to submit information on economic, social and cultural conditions in her Overseas Provinces. No black African nation voted against the resolution and none abstained. No member of the Asian bloc voted against it and only Pakistan abstained.

The six negative votes are understandable, especially Portugal's. Franco supported his neighbor dictator, Salazar. Brazil is the only cultural heir of Portugal in the Latin American bloc. Belgium was still angry because of the United Nations action in Congo (Léopoldville). France, in effect, served notice that it would continue to oppose U.N. action on Algeria; similarly, the Union of South Africa warned that it would not permit effective U.N. action on its mandated territory of South-West Africa.

The United States abstained because it did

not wish to alienate either the African nations or its Nato ally, Portugal. The U.S.S.R. abstained because a negative vote would have been construed as unfriendly to the new African nations which it is wooing; it did not vote in the affirmative because it wished to specify Spain as well as Portugal. None of the Latin American nations except Brazil voted against the resolution; only Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic and Panama, in this bloc abstained.

Afro-Asian solidarity against Portugal manifested itself again on December 9. The so-called London gentlemen's agreement of 1946 provided for the distribution of the six non-permanent members of the Security Council as follows: two to Latin America, one each to Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and the British Commonwealth. On December 9, 1960, the United Arab Republic and Chile were elected for two-year terms to succeed Tunisia and Argentina. Each received seventy-four votes, a safe majority above the required two-thirds majority of those present and voting. In accordance with a gentlemen's agreement at the Fourteenth General Assembly, Turkey was chosen to succeed Poland for one-half of a two-year term. Turkey also received seventy-four votes. But the selection of Portugal for the Western European seat under the London agreement of 1946 again led to an Afro-Asian united front.

This election did not involve an increase in the number of members of the Security Council. It did, however, provide a possible opportunity of placing an Asian or African member on the Council. The Afro-Asian group pitted Liberia against Portugal. On the first ballot Portugal led fifty to thirty-two, with scattering votes for other nations. Portugal thus failed by a considerable margin

Rayford W. Logan, head of the history department at Howard University, has studied African affairs for over 30 years. As a Fulbright Research Fellow, he did research in Paris on the French administration of overseas territories. His books include *The African Mandates in World Politics* and *The Negro and the Post-War World*.

to obtain the required two-thirds majority. The Assembly then restricted the voting to Portugal and Liberia. In this direct test between the one remaining important colonial power and the one-time "ward of the United States," Portugal led on the first ballot; forty-nine to forty-seven. On the second ballot, Liberia slipped ahead, fifty-one to forty-six.

Finally the Afro-Asians, aided by the Soviet bloc, won a divided two year term for Liberia and Ireland.

On this occasion the Afro-Asian bloc is largely on the side of the angels although Liberia is not the most advanced of the black African nations. The London gentlemen's agreement of 1946 was made when there were only two black African member states in the U.N. Now that there are twenty-two, even the staunchest advocate of the binding obligation of gentlemen's agreements in general must concede that this particular one no longer makes sense.

A rigid adherence to this 1946 agreement would rightly be interpreted, I believe, as support of a new kind of imperialism—U.N. imperialism. It is this sort of anachronistic policy which is most likely to keep alive the most potent unifying ties of an Afro-Asian bloc, namely, the condemnation of colonialism and imperialism, the distrust and even the hatred of white men. An added cohesive force would come from an attempt to change the concept of one vote for each member state. Proposals for weighted representation, which would determine the number of each member state's voting delegates on the basis of such factors as population, per capita wealth, gross national product and contributions to the budget of the U.N., have been made before. To revive them now would almost certainly tend to solidify what is clearly a fluid alignment of the Afro-Asian states and push them into the arms of those nations who appear to support the bloc. Weighted representation would require an amendment to the Charter. Russia would probably be delighted to find that it had cast the only veto against such an amendment. I do not believe that the West is stupid enough to make such a blunder.

This is not to say that the West must tailor its policies in and out of the U.N. to

(Continued on p. 110)

"Tribal divisions, racial tensions and the scarcity of experienced Africans . . . pose for policy makers in East and Central Africa problems so varied and so complex that they appear to defy successful resolution."

Toward Majority Rule in East and Central Africa

By R. C. PRATT

Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Toronto

EST and Central Africa are the last major colonial areas over which Britain still has a continuing ultimate authority. In these areas Britain is now seeking the constitutional formulae that will permit a rapid British withdrawal. This decision made, one might have thought the rest would be relatively straightforward. After all Britain has had a certain experience in graceful withdrawals. However as the objective is not a scuttle but a successful transition to a stable and just self government, the difficulties involved are in fact enormous.

These difficulties stem from three factors: the serious divisions among the African peoples in at least two of the territories; the presence of settled and politically ambitious communities of Europeans in three of the territories; and, throughout the whole area, a lack of trained Africans, a lack more serious than in many of the British territories in West Africa. Not since India has the withdrawal

of British rule involved problems so complex and so apparently insoluble as in East and Central Africa today.

Tribalism is at its most disruptive in Uganda. There, no nationalist movement has succeeded in submerging tribal loyalties within a new national loyalty or within an aggressive and momentarily uniting anti-colonialism. Nationalists have not been able to convince Africans to sink their differences in a common effort to win independence, for no one in fact doubts that Uganda will soon be self governing. Even the nationalists are more concerned to maneuver for place and position once self government is granted than to unite in a common struggle for it.

Today after much intergroup bargaining two main parties have emerged, the Uganda Peoples Congress and the Democratic Party. Neither of them has yet an organization that extends with any effectiveness into the rural areas; neither is much more than a coterie of politicians. They are weak and ineffective compared to West African parties. The present rapid advance towards self government in Uganda is not a concession wrung from the British by a well-organized nationalist movement. There are in consequence no leaders to whom power can be granted with any confidence that they have sufficient authority throughout the territory to hold the country together without resort to force. The recent Committee on Constitutional Development recognized this. Among the most important of its arguments for the major advances which it recommended was that a dramatic move towards independence

R. C. Pratt was a Research Officer at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1958-1960 and prior to that taught at McGill University in Montreal. From 1954 to 1956 he taught at Makerere College, the University College of East Africa, in Uganda. He is co-author, with Anthony Kow, of *Buganda and British Overrule* (Oxford University Press, 1960) and co-editor, with Colin Leys, of *A New Deal in Central Africa* (Praeger, 1960).

might stimulate the growth of strong national parties. This recommendation is a useful measure of how the character of political activity in Uganda differs from that of West Africa ten years ago. A major political advance is advocated in Uganda not because of the presence of nationalism but as a stimulus to its growth.

The Continued Strength of Tribal Loyalties

The main obstacle to the growth of effective nationalism in Uganda has been the continued strength of tribal loyalties within Buganda, the large tribal kingdom in southern Uganda. The people of Buganda have always regarded their tribal kingdom rather than Uganda as their nation. "We are not," said Amos Sempa, the Treasurer of the Buganda Government, "a tribe like the Welsh or the Scots. We are a nation." The British through the decades had never directly challenged this tribal state view of Buganda and from 1900 to 1955 they had kept their relations with Buganda within the terms of the agreement of 1900 between the British and the Buganda Government.

In 1955, a new agreement was negotiated between the British and the Buganda Government which attempted a unified settlement of several crucial constitutional problems. The tribal ruler, the Kabaka, became in theory a constitutional monarch; the tribal government became responsible to a tribal council (the Lukiiko) on which there was an elected majority; powers of this government and its relations to the superior Uganda Government were carefully defined. Finally, Ganda participation in the central legislature was promised. The constitutional path to power in both tribal and national government was thus opened up for the nationalists.

But the nationalists were unable to exploit these possibilities. In the crucial four years after the 1955 agreement the neo-traditional politicians in command of the Buganda Government eliminated the influence of the nationalists in Uganda and since 1958 they have also succeeded in blocking the election of any Ganda representative members to the Legislative Council. More recently they have organized a most effective boycott of the voters' registration in Buganda.

The British Government is nevertheless

determined to go ahead with major constitutional changes in the central government which will involve African elected majorities in both the Legislative and Executive Councils. In addition to this, the British are willing to establish a commission to recommend the constitutional arrangements that ought to exist between Buganda and the future independent Uganda. But they have rejected a Buganda demand that constitutional progress in the central government must wait upon a settlement of the relationship question. It is not at all certain that the British, supported though they are by the nationalists, will be able to bring Buganda into line without major concessions to meet the present Buganda fear that an independent Uganda would attempt to override her traditional autonomy and ignore her tribal institutions. Nor is it clear that such concessions could be made without destroying the unity of the larger Uganda.

Tribalism also threatens the orderly transfer of power in Kenya. Kenya Africans have almost a surfeit of political talent in their present leaders but none (save Jomo Kenyatta) have a preeminence accepted by the rest. At the time of the recent Constitutional Conference the Africans managed to put up a united front, but once the conference was over and it was clear that power was to be transferred to a predominantly African Government in the not too distant future the divisions and rivalries among the leaders became only too apparent.

From their maneuvering finally emerged two political parties, the Kenya African National Union and the Kenya African Democratic Union. The leaders of each now draw their support from a different cluster of tribes. K.A.N.U. is hopeful that it may yet become a truly national movement but it is still in effect a Kikuyu-Luo alliance resting on the ability of James Gichura and Tom Mboya to work in harmony. K.A.D.U. is in origin and purpose an alliance of the smaller and less developed tribes who fear a possible Kikuyu-Luo domination. In Western societies whose underlying unity is secure, a two party system is a major political asset. In Kenya, the present political-cum-tribal divisions threaten the very tenuous unity of Kenya Africans. Thus in Kenya as in Uganda tribalism is a major barrier to any

peaceful transition to effective and stable self government.

The Future of the Non-African Communities

In Kenya, Tanganyika and in Central Africa there are communities of settled Europeans which in all of these territories are of some economic importance and in most are of the greatest economic importance. Until very recently at least, this importance has been more than adequately reflected in their political power. An all-European government in Southern Rhodesia has had virtual internal self government since 1923. In Kenya, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland the European minority has provided a majority of the representative members on the Legislative Council. In Kenya and Northern Rhodesia, European political leaders were also extremely influential within the Executive Councils.

Despite consistent European pressure, Britain refused to concede an elected European majority in these territories during the period from 1923 to 1951. More recently, and until 1959, as African nationalist agitation has mounted, Britain has also refused to concede an elected African majority. The political needs of East and Central Africa, so ran the official view, are fundamentally different from those of West Africa and rule out an African elected majority. Britain and the colonial governments instead attempted to maintain a balanced ratio between the representatives of each race on the legislatures and to keep as well a substantial official element to hold the balance between them. Only after racial politics had disappeared could Britain abandon her role as the arbitrator and deciding authority in these territories.


African nationalism had developed extensively by 1959 and had everywhere refused to accept the claim that the presence of non-African minorities justified any extended denial of the right of the large African majorities to control their governments. By late 1959 the inevitability if not the ethical validity of these assertions seems to have been accepted by Prime Minister Macmillan and Iain MacLeod, the new Secretary of State for the Colonies. British policy in East and Central Africa has shifted decisively since

then. In one territory after another it has become clear that majority rule is rapidly on its way and that though she will seek safeguards for the minorities Britain will not support any effort to entrench white control or a permanent and vastly disproportionate white representation.

The first break came in Tanganyika, where Julius Nyerere, head of the Tanganyika African National Union, had already demonstrated his unquestioned political mastery of the Tanganyikan electorate, his essential moderation and his quite remarkable skills of political leadership. Not only did the ratios of Africans to non-Africans in Tanganyika and the strength of T.A.N.U. both make nonsense of any attempt to deny a predominantly African character to the future institutions of Tanganyika, but the leadership of Nyerere justified generous and bold political concessions.

These were made in December, 1959, when the Governor announced that the racial parity which was previously required on the elected side of the legislature would be abandoned and that elected African majorities would be granted on both the Legislative and Executive Councils. A minority of seats were still reserved, 10 for Europeans and 11 for Asians, but they were to be elected by a common roll on which there would be a vast African majority. In the new elections which took place in August, 1960, under this new constitution, T.A.N.U. won 58 of the 71 elected seats unopposed and won 12 of the 13 contested seats. The Executive Council, now headed by Nyerere, includes 9 elected members and 2 British officials. In this territory, Tanganyika, without incident and in an atmosphere of hope and high expectation, majority rule has come to stay.

Inevitably it was more difficult to introduce a similar change in British policy towards Kenya. Kenya Europeans have for decades hoped to make a white Dominion of Kenya. They have long enjoyed a very powerful position on the Executive and Legislative Councils. There was very little if anything in British policy towards Kenya until this year to suggest that Britain would attempt rapidly to upset and transform the established social and economic pattern within which the privileges of the settlers were so well entrenched.



U. S. Dept. of State Bulletin, Aug. 22, 1960

Yet at the Lancaster House Conference in February, 1960, MacLeod made it clear that Britain would not underwrite the privileged powers of the Europeans and he used all of his impressive negotiating skills to win agreement for major concessions to the African nationalists. Out of this Conference came the proposals on which the new Constitution of Kenya will be based. It will not involve quite so rapid or straightforward an advance as in Tanganyika but the direction of the changes is undeniable. There is to be a Legislative Council of 65, of whom 53 will be elected by common roll, the qualifications for which are comparatively low (literacy or £75 p.a. are the two main alternative qualifi-

cations.) Ten of these 53 seats are reserved for Europeans, 8 for Asians and 2 for Arabs. In the case of these reserved seats, there will first be communal primaries and only candidates who secure at least 25 per cent of the vote in these primaries will be allowed to stand for election in the common roll election. There are also to be 12 further members elected by the elected members and an unstated number of nominated members.

The transition to majority rule in Kenya is thus clearly under way. But it is unlikely to be an easy or peaceful transition. The European settlers, led by Sir Ferdinand Cavendish Bentnick, who resigned as Speaker of the Kenya Legislative Council in protest

against the new Constitution, argue that an African majority on the legislature will quickly and drastically affect their way of life. They are surely right. At present Europeans have a monopoly on the purchase of land in the Kenya highlands.¹ They have their own schools and hospitals and control their own local governments. An African government would tolerate none of these for long. No doubt, as MacLeod injudiciously commented, some Kenyans live in a dream world. Their exclusive island of privilege cannot continue much longer. But a rapid and large-scale exodus of Europeans would be unfortunate not only because of the hardships it would entail but because of the serious economic consequences that would follow any sudden disruption of European agriculture.

Unfortunately, two additional factors lessen further the chances of a smooth transition to majority rule. Europeans have legitimate cause to fear that their existing property rights may be threatened in the years following independence. The highlands have been for so long a focus of African resentment and the pressure on land in the African reserves is so great that only firm and moderate African leadership will be able to promote a controlled and planned introduction of Africans into the highlands rather than a gigantic and economically disastrous land grab. The rivalries that at present divide African nationalists are likely to make moderation of this order a relatively scarce commodity.

The second factor concerns Jomo Kenyatta, convicted head of the Mau Mau, who has served his sentence and is now being held in preventive detention in Northern Kenya. Both African political parties acclaim him as their spiritual leader, both urge his immediate release and both promise that he must be the first leader of an independent Kenya. His connections with Mau Mau are denied or forgotten and he is seen only as the first great nationalist.

In understandable contrast to this, Kenyatta is feared and hated by Europeans and, whether justifiably or not, is inexorably connected in their minds with the bestial savagery of Mau Mau. It would, I am sure, be morally repugnant to a very large number of settlers and government civil servants to

remain in Kenya under a government led by Kenyatta or a government that would pay him high honor.

Central Africa

A peaceful transition to majority rule is even less likely in Central Africa than in Kenya. In 1953, a nearly independent Southern Rhodesia ruled by an all-European government joined together in a federation with the two British Protectorates of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. The Federation was presented and accepted in Britain as a necessary prelude to the growth of a racial partnership in Central Africa that would be a genuine liberal alternative to white minority rule and to black domination. Britain accepted the Federation on these terms. But she was not willing completely to transfer her responsibilities in the Protectorates to a European-dominated Federal Government. Under the federal arrangements, Britain retained in the two Protectorates an ultimate control over such matters as local courts and administration, education and land, which affect ordinary Africans most immediately. Moreover there were written into the constitution several additional constitutional safeguards to protect African interests. The main protection for Africans however was expected to be the racial partnership which was the declared objective of the Federation.

The meaning of this partnership as it has been interpreted by the Federal Government is clearer now than it was in 1953. Some minor evidences of discrimination have been removed but the basic framework of discrimination that sustains the present privileges of the European community continues. Land apportionment, urban segregation, job reservation, separate hospitals and separate schools continue. Africans whose income and education have reached European standards now receive equal political rights with the Europeans. There is however no suggestion that these Africans will in any foreseeable future outnumber the European voters and it is presumed that these Africans will accept the social and political status quo rather than lead a wider African protest

¹ Sessional Paper #10 of 1958-59 proposes a carefully controlled abandonment of this European monopoly.

against it. As in Kenya, so in the Rhodesias, the Europeans face a difficult dilemma. Their whole pattern of life rests on discriminatory legislation which no African-elected majority would accept. Therefore to hold what they have, they must continue to dominate. However disastrous may be the ultimate results of an attempt to maintain white supremacy, most Europeans are likely to view the immediate results of African rule with the gravest misgivings and fears. It is part of the present tragedy of Central Africa that these misgivings and fears are now quite likely justified.

African opposition to the Federation especially in the two Protectorates has always been strong. In recent years able leaders and better organization have given this opposition focus and force. Africans are more convinced than ever, and with good cause, that so long as they are ruled by the present Federal Government they will not win the same political rights which Africans are enjoying in most of the rest of British Africa. In consequence hostility to the Federation has become, in the words of the Monckton Commission, almost pathological.

By the end of 1958, African nationalism had begun to threaten the whole constitutional structure. Either African participation in the legislatures would have to be sharply increased or a policy of repression would be necessary to contain the disruptive impact of nationalism. But an important shift of constitutional power to Africans would involve consequences which the governments of Central Africa were unwilling to contemplate. The events of February and March, 1959, when 56 Africans lost their lives in police and military action against nationalists, marked the choice of the second alternative, political repression, by the governments of Central Africa.

Until recently it appeared likely that the British Government, reluctantly or not, would support the Federal Government and would be agreeable to a further and perhaps decisive transfer of power to the European-dominated governments in the Federation. However this is clearly no longer true. The British Government in recent months has used its remaining powers in Central Africa with great vigor. MacLeod has won the

cooperation of Dr. Banda in Nyasaland by conceding an African majority on the Nyasaland Legislative Council. A similar advance is to be negotiated for Northern Rhodesia as soon as possible. These advances will shift the balance of power within the Federation. It is hard to imagine how African elected majorities in either of these legislatures would long cooperate in a white dominated federation.

The Monckton Commission which recently advised on the review of the Constitution is a fair guide to the present attitude of the British Government. The Commission, in its most crucial section, ruled out any constitution that has to be imposed on Africans by force. It recommended major liberal reforms to win their cooperation—African majorities on the legislatures of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, parity in the Federal Assembly, legal action against the colour bar, and an important transfer of power from the Federal Government to the territorial governments. Seven years ago a federation along those lines might have won African cooperation. Today it is unlikely that anything save a categorical recognition of the right to majority rule in the near future will change the present African determination that the Federation must be broken up.

It is even more unlikely that the very powerfully placed Europeans, controlling as they do the Federal and the Southern Rhodesian Governments, will be willing to contemplate the reforms suggested by the Monckton Report. The right to secede, so long demanded by the nationalists of the northern territories, may in fact be asserted by Europeans in Southern Rhodesia. Even if MacLeod is able to win an agreement now, this is bound to be a temporary truce in a continuing struggle for control. It would be foolhardy to predict a tranquil resolution of the conflict between Africans and Europeans in Central Africa.

The Lack of Trained Africans

In each of the territories of East and Central Africa the scarcity of experienced Africans is so intense that this problem is qualitatively different from the similar difficulties faced in the West African territories. There is for example only one African District Commissioner in the whole of the six terri-

tories and in the more specialized services there is not only a preponderance of Europeans but there is also no likelihood in the near future of Africans being trained sufficiently to replace them.

Assuming that the new African governments wish to continue to employ the present European officials, will these officials in fact choose to stay in sufficient numbers? The Secretary of State has recently announced that Britain will pay British officers who do stay their full extra allowances over and above their local salary and will guarantee their pensions. This will be a financial incentive to the independent governments to retain their present officials and it will remove some of the risks which otherwise an officer takes if he transfers to the civil service of a newly independent state.

But much subtler factors than those covered by the new proposals are likely to be

more important in determining whether enough British officials will in fact choose to stay in the East and Central African territories as they become independent. Their view of the nationalist leaders, the extent to which they associate their interests with the settlers, their judgment of the risks of nepotism and corruption which will be beyond their control—these will be the factors that will be decisive for most officers. There is certainly a risk, and in some territories a very serious risk, that many officers will choose to leave once independence is granted and that the administrative and social services will suffer a severe initial setback in the critical first years of independence.

Tribal divisions, racial tensions and the scarcity of experienced Africans thus pose for policy makers in East and Central Africa problems so varied and so complex that they appear to defy successful resolution.

"Much has been said in this debate regarding the Congo, its problems and the United Nations effort in support of the independence, integrity, peace and progress of the Congo. Much has been said which has been ill-founded. Whether this has been the result of misinformation, of an emotional engagement or of tactical considerations but flimsily related to the interests of the Congo, I leave to others to consider. . . . I . . . wish to fill out the picture of the General Assembly by talking about what has not been mentioned: the needs of the people of the Congo and the work of the United Nations in assistance of the authorities whose responsibility it is to meet those needs.

"In the confusing fights and conflicts which have now been going on for more than three months in the Congo among political dignitaries of that country, an impression has grown that few have realized that to lead and govern is not a privilege to be sought for but a burden of responsibility to be assumed.

"It is not those names which we read about in the papers which are tied to the painstaking daily efforts to maintain a minimum of order, to keep an administration—on a minimum level—running, to forestall epidemics and cure disease, to keep the transport system working, to feed the hungriest, to see to it that the many workers for the state are in a position to pay for the necessities of their families. No, that work has been undertaken by many who are nameless, by Congolese officials who are never mentioned and whose names will probably never be known to the world. They have chosen to serve instead of to rule, they have chosen to subordinate themselves instead of searching for power. May I pay tribute to these men and to what they have done to give life and sense to the independence of the Congo? It is those with whom the United Nations has had to work, it is those we have been able to consult, and those we have tried to assist.

"In doing so, we have been accused of serving the interest of foreign elements, of working hand in hand with imperialists, and of impeding the legitimate authorities. We have been accused of substituting ourselves for those authorities, of seeking power for the United Nations in the Congo and of reinstituting some kind of colonialism."—*United Nations Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, October 17, 1960.*

If one takes a pessimistic view, this author notes that "In education, in agriculture, in the use of leisure, in communications, in industrialization, in medicine, or in general culture a very great French achievement was not quite great enough nor sufficiently long applied when the sudden arrival of independence placed the whole achievement in jeopardy." Yet the French in Africa have traveled in the right direction "so that future progress can be built on the foundations which already exist." Here is a detailed look at . . .

French Tropical Africa: Today and Tomorrow

By CARROLL QUIGLEY

Professor of European History, School of Foreign Service,
Georgetown University

IN 1941 there were almost thirty thousand cases of African sleeping sickness in French West Africa; by 1955 there were only 4,873 cases. But now, six years later, the number of cases is rising once again. The fluctuating success of the struggle with this dread disease may be taken as a symbol of the recent history of the French civilizing mission in all of Africa.

A recent writer,¹ who is himself engaged in the battle with sleeping sickness, speaks of "the spectacular success achieved by the French, with reductions of 90 to 99 per cent throughout the vast area of the pandemic." This success may be attributed in part to what might be called "the Pasteur tradition,"

but mostly to the fact that General Muraz and Dr. Jamot created in 1939 at Bobo Dioulassa an autonomous "Service de la Maladie du Sommeil" to deal with the whole of French West Africa according to a uniform plan. Such a system is essential to carry on the relentless, dynamic struggle which may eventually conquer this affliction. As is generally known, the microbe causing this disease is spread by tsetse flies. The problem will be overcome only when these flies have been eliminated. French efforts in this direction were advancing toward victory in 1958, when the political secession of Guinea from the French Union ended the effort in that area, leaving it as a focus of re-infection for all of West Africa.

The subsequent political disintegration of tropical Africa has made it difficult to continue the skilled, persistent and uniform attack on this scourge which is essential to its control. It has become clear already that a focus of the disease in northwestern Dahomey cannot be fought successfully since the river along which the infecting flies move is in neighboring Togo.

The sad irony of all this is that just as political conditions in Africa have changed so as to make the successful elimination of sleeping sickness almost impossible, a new Ameri-

Carroll Quigley has held his present position since 1941. Previously, he taught history at Princeton and at Harvard Universities, and spent a year in France and Italy doing archival research in administrative history. His chief field of interest is the comparative history of civilizations; he has written a number of articles on anthropological subjects and is a contributing editor of *Current History*. Frequently he lectures to agencies of the United States government.

¹ K. R. S. Morris, "New Frontiers of Health in Africa," *Science*, CXXXII (9 September 1960), 652-658.

can technique has been invented which might well have given total victory over sleeping sickness in all of West Africa. In 1959, this new method achieved the total eradication of screw-worm fly from the southeastern United States. In this technique billions of male flies which had been made sterile through exposure to radioactive cobalt-60 were released throughout the countryside, swamping the outnumbered fertile wild flies and driving the species to extinction in three fly generations.² No newly-independent African nation has the resources, skills, or knowledge to use this new technique for control of the tsetse fly.

In this single example we can see the difficulties facing the newly independent nations of Africa. The problem is similar in all aspects of society. In education, in agriculture, in the use of leisure, in communications, in industrialization, in medicine, or in general culture a very great French achievement was not quite enough nor sufficiently long applied when the sudden arrival of independence placed the whole achievement in jeopardy.

Four Paths to Independence

That, of course, is the pessimistic view of the situation. An optimist might feel that the French areas of Africa are as well off as the British areas and immensely better situated than the chaotic Congo or the quiescent Portuguese territories. These four colonial powers have acted quite differently toward their African wards, and the evidence as viewed from 1961 would seem to indicate that the French way was more successful than the others.

No colonial power has had the wealth, the time, the trained personnel, or the wisdom to try to modernize the lives of its colonial subjects in all their aspects, as preparation for eventual self-government. The British, because their own ruling class at home looked at life from the political and legal points of view, trained their colonial subjects along these lines and, accordingly, are leaving them with a promising foundation (and at least some qualified native personnel) in government and administration.

The French, because they looked at life from a Francocentric and cultural point of

view, did what they could to export French language and culture to their African subjects with full cultural and political assimilation as their ultimate (and remote) goal.

The Belgians, in an effort to avoid any future social disturbances or demands for political rights, tried to provide economic betterment and docile religious training to natives who would be kept deliberately ignorant of all disturbing ideas, above all, political ideas. This effort to provide prosperity based on modern technology for millions of natives who remained illiterate and satisfied within their traditional tribal structures has now exploded.

The Portuguese, from natural lassitude rather than as deliberate policy, have kept the natives in their territories as unchanged as possible except for the elimination of crimes or inhuman customs, and have made available to them their own rather flexible religious practices. As a safety valve they have been prepared to assimilate into their own group the few individual natives whom chance, energy, or ambition have raised above the tribal masses.

In a much over-simplified summary we might say that the French approach to African colonization was cultural, the British was political, the Belgian economic, and the Portuguese static. That these four different approaches form a rough hierarchy is evident from a consideration of the effects they have produced on the basic tribalism of African life. Such tribalism is largely intact in Portuguese areas and is still largely prevalent in the former Belgian Congo; in British territories, because of the practice of indirect rule and especially the utilization of tribal judicial practices at the base of the legal system, there are considerable areas of tribal structure yet surviving; while in French territories tribalism is moving rapidly toward unregretted elimination.

The significant contrast among these varied approaches to colonialism is between the French and the Belgian. The latter were willing to advance their native peoples in any material way, training them where necessary in advanced technological skills and providing them where possible with surprisingly high standards of material living. But they

² E. F. Knipling, "The Eradication of the Screw-Worm Fly," *Scientific American* CCIII (October 1960), 54-61.

did this in a way which an unfriendly critic might well compare to the treatment of highly prized livestock. Almost nothing was provided for their intellectual or spiritual life; they were left almost completely illiterate, were forbidden to travel abroad, even to Belgium, and were segregated from the small minority of whites who governed them.

French colonialism was different. The French were inflexibly convinced of the superiority—indeed, of the supremacy—of French culture. This term included the French language and its literature, French music, food, uniforms, cities, social customs and women. These to the average Frenchman were not only the best; they were exportable items which could (and should) be carried, as gifts from heaven, to all mankind. This point of view was the foundation for the famous "*mission civilatrice française*" whose history goes back through Napoleon and the French Revolution to Louis XIV and before.

Because of their "*mission civilatrice*" the French were eager to extend to natives a knowledge of French language and culture, to welcome them to France and, above all, to Paris, to expose them to French higher education, to introduce them to French girls, and to make them members of the central governing assemblies of the Republic. To be sure, the desire to extend the blessings of French culture in this way was considerably hampered by the costs, above all by the costs of providing a French educational system as well as a French administrative and judicial system for all natives. The costs were high, and the available resources were severely limited, especially in the last 30 years, during which economic depression, Nazi threats, war and political crises have followed one another almost without interruption through French history.

The significant point is not that the French failed to provide French education and justice for all natives, but that they wanted to provide them. The native peoples recognized French willingness to share French life with them and were realistic enough to see the gigantic size of the task. Together these facts established an atmosphere of mutual good will which has continued to prevail even as the French Union in Africa broke into independent areas.

The "Forgotten Factor"

The value of the French approach to colonialism and the weakness of the Belgian approach rest together on an element of African native life which is largely ignored by Europeans and Americans. This "forgotten factor" is the powerful spiritual element in the African native outlook. Although there are, of course, notable exceptions from tribe to tribe, the African native generally has a profound thirst for spiritual or religious experience. To be sure, like all men, he can be driven to desperation by economic want and even more by economic insecurity, but he is reluctant to give economic goods a paramount or even a major place in his way of life, and is easily satisfied by sufficient without yearning for more. This is recognized by those who are working in African economic development to the extent that they all list, as one of the essential needs of African industrial growth, an expansion of demand and an intensification of native material ambitions.

This "native" point of view is most prevalent among the agricultural and animistic peoples of Africa and finds its chief exceptions among the Muslim intruders from the north and the Hamitic cattle cultists of the east. For this reason the French approach to native peoples was notably unsuccessful in dealing with the Muslim peoples of the Levant and the Magreb and had relatively little success with the Bantu or Hamitic cattle peoples which they were called upon to govern in the Somali Coast and elsewhere. But in *l'Afrique noire* the French came in contact with great masses of animistic agricultural peoples for whom their colonial methods were generally well adapted.

Dealing with people of the same general type as the French, the Belgians were, it now seems clear, notably unsuccessful, not only because they left them in illiteracy, untrained for self-government, but because they offered them bread and bicycles when they were hungering for something less tangible. This hunger has been a significant element in many of the crises of British Africa also, even in those, such as Mau Mau or Sharpeville, where its presence is not immediately obvious.

Even today the real desires of many natives

of Africa are social and cultural rather than political or material. These desires focus on a kind of emotional participation in a common fellowship and ceremonial, exactly of the type which the old tribal life used to provide. The great challenge of Africa today is not, as in Asia, an economic one (although obviously economic expansion is necessary) but the problem of detribalization. And to this problem there are only two possible solutions. On the one hand, the tribal way of life might be kept as intact as possible, which clearly implies an impossible insulation from the outside world. Or some substitute for the satisfying emotional companionship of tribal life might be provided within the framework of European acculturation. The Portuguese have tried the former alternative, while the French tried the latter. Neither quite succeeded, although disaster such as has occurred in the Belgian or British areas has not yet struck and may, we hope, be permanently avoided.

This distinctive character of the French colonial policy in Africa is one of the reasons (though perhaps not the chief one) why the African territories won independence from France without violence. The blacks of Africa are not, basically, a violent people, but more significant than this was the fact that the struggle for the independence of Black Africa was fought (and won) in the steaming jungles of Indo-China and in the dusty gullies of Algeria. The weakness of France shown in those distant struggles was the reason why the demand for independence was made at that time and why it was so graciously conceded in all cases but one (and that one the earliest: Guinea).

That independence was, on the whole, yielded graciously is of the greatest importance, because it makes it possible to get past that largely irrelevant issue and to come to grips with the real problems of Africa which still remain, and are, indeed, more acute than ever. Whoever may "rule" in Africa, the great problems, which were crying to be solved at the time of the French Union and later under the French Community, are still crying to be solved.

Of these problems the more tangible are the economic and political, while the more significant are the social and psychological.

The economic problems are so numerous as to discourage the observer, but in French Africa, as in most "backward" areas, the basic problem is to be found in the relationship between growing population and available food supply. Until 1950 this relationship was largely ignored, especially in French Africa. There the "Pasteur tradition" provided somewhat better medical care than in other colonial areas and, accordingly, provided a falling death rate (especially in infant mortality) and, thus, an increasing population of a higher median age level. This process was already well begun in 1950 at a time when French economic policy toward its dependent areas was still in its "colonial" stage.

By "colonial stage" in economic policy we mean the effort to increase production of exportable staples and raw materials which can produce monetary exchange in world, or metropolitan, markets. Such a policy has many pervasive consequences including the following: (1) it ties the colonial area to mono-culture or at least to production of a very few products which enter into foreign trade, and thus it neglects local food production or the establishment of a balanced local economy; (2) it builds up a transportation system orientated for export with a few harbors serviced by feeder rivers, railroads or highways designed to tap the hinterland to the neglect of local transportation facilities for local exchange purposes; (3) it greatly increases economic insecurity by linking increasing numbers of native peoples to the widely fluctuating prices of world market quotations, as has been seen, in recent years, in regard to coffee, cocoa, sugar, sisal, copper, bauxite, and other products; and (4) it exploits native peoples by treating them as "hands" rather than as persons. Interest in peoples focuses on their labor services, usually on a seasonal basis, giving rise to social instability, migratory labor, and personal frustrations on a large scale.

Emphasis on such a colonial economic policy is universal in all colonial areas, but began to shift in French Africa about a decade ago toward a slowly increasing emphasis on a more balanced economy. Such a balanced economy has involved (1) increased emphasis on local food production

and a diversification of productive efforts, (2) growing emphasis on light industry which could process locally the various locally produced staple commodities, (3) improvement in local transportation, (4) growing emphasis on community development which treats natives as persons rather than as "hands" and seeks to provide a more rounded life in permanent residences under more stable conditions.

This shift in emphasis in economic development has come not a moment too early and was, indeed, unduly delayed during the last decade by the natural desire of the French, who were providing the money, to see some of it at least go into colonial production of staple commodities whose earned foreign exchange might offer some hope of eventual repayment to the French. The new approach, which gives up this hope, can be seen in the new Thirty-Year Plan for Chad (1960-1990) which aims to double Chad's standard of living by investing steadily increasing funds, rising from \$16.2 million this year to \$60.7 million in the thirtieth year, for an aggregate amount of \$342.8 million over the thirty years. The most significant point is the order of priorities in investment which goes from formation of rural cooperatives, through improved agricultural and livestock production to educational, local transport, and internal market developments.

Expansion of medical services and reduced native (especially infant) mortality has provided an accelerating growth of population in all parts of French Africa. As an example, Madagascar, with a population growth rate of about 2.5 per cent per annum, had about 3.8 million population in 1938 and has some 5.4 million today. Fortunately, French Africa was somewhat underpopulated when it came under French influence, and the shift from colonial to welfare economics began to occur before the population pressures became acute. Nevertheless, food production (or agricultural development generally) remains one of the two basic problems of French Africa.

Food Production

In agriculture, as in other kinds of economic growth, the two great problems are lack of know-how and lack of capital. In spite of the general belief that capital is the

great desideratum in the economic development of backward areas, it is very likely that lack of know-how is of much greater importance. If we knew what to do, it is possible that capital could be found, but the history of this subject in Africa shows that capital is easier to obtain than knowledge of how to use it. This was shown clearly by the fiasco of the "ground-nut" scheme in British East Africa, where close to \$100 million was lost in a vain effort to apply large scale agricultural methods to production of peanuts on about 3 million acres of arid Tanganyika soil in a four year period (1947-1951).³

The sad fact is that European and, above all, American agricultural practices have little to offer to Africa. American large scale agriculture, however productive here, is a disaster in most of Africa, while European methods are almost as bad and equally unattainable. Both of these are based on clean, weedless, one crop, plowed fields, cultivated on a strictly seasonal basis, with sharply marked planting and harvest periods, which leave the fields exposed to wind, rain and sun between seasons. The chief distinction between the two is that the American system uses power cultivation, with chemical fertilizers and pesticides, while the European system is generally based on mixed farming, animal power and animal-manure fertilizer.

American agriculture seeks profits through high output per man-day of labor, while European agriculture is a way of life, rather than a commercial enterprise, and seeks high output per unit area of land. The one is adapted to a society with plenty of land worked by scarce and expensive labor, while the other is adapted to a situation providing plenty of labor for scarce and expensive land. In Africa, where traditionally land has been of great quantity but poor quality while labor has been cheap, an entirely different type of agriculture has grown up. This native agriculture is a way of life, on a largely non-commercial basis, measuring success in terms of output per consumer.

African agriculture must operate in conditions entirely different from Europe or America. In Africa rain is often erratic and

³ John Phillips, *Agriculture and Ecology in Africa* (Frederick Praeger, New York, 1960), pp. 339-358.

usually torrential, winds are frequently strong, and sun is destructive to fertility because it oxidizes humus.⁴ To avoid erosion and insolation, fields must be under a vegetative cover as much as possible, not exposed between or during the growing seasons. In fact, the seasonal dichotomy of planting and harvesting must be blurred as much as possible to avoid this and also avoid the need to store harvested crop in an area without storage facilities, where decay is immediate, and destructive pests are endemic.

African soil was not produced by glacial rolling, water erosion, frost and humus formation such as created American or European soils, but by temperature changes, wind erosion and leaching. As a result, soil particles, frequently rounded in the northern hemisphere, may well be angular in Africa. In the latter soil, particles are often so sharp that plowing compacts them, rain turns the surface to semi-concrete, and their sharpness will abrade a heavy 30 or 36-inch disk plow up to six inches of its diameter for each 80 acres worked.⁵ Thus plowing is as useless as weed cultivation in Africa, and both these principal elements of northern agriculture must be largely eliminated from African horticulture.

Moreover, Africa cannot afford America's power equipment, fertilizers, or pesticides and cannot use Europe's draft animals or manure because animal keeping and crop raising in Africa are practiced in different areas by different peoples with different religious, social and historical backgrounds.

Traditional African agriculture uses hand labor with mixed crops on crowded, often weedy, fields worked with hoes and operated on a slash-and-burn method of shifting cultivation. This system is still better adapted to African conditions than any other methods, as was shown by careful tests in the Belgian Congo since 1940. There, using European methods, yields invariably fell over an eight-year rotation to one-fifth for rice, one-sixth for peanuts, and two-thirds for manioc (with root-rot rising from 10 per cent to 50 per cent). The same experiments showed that manioc, even without intensive cultivation, would yield 22 million calories of food per hectare compared to 5 million for rice and 4 million for maize. Moreover, with careful management, manioc yields could

be increased tenfold over the normal amounts. Merely placing wood ashes on the fields increased yields about 30 per cent.⁶

Manioc, an immigrant from Brazil known to Americans in the form of tapioca, may become the central core or staff of life of the tropical African agricultural system. Its spreading leaves, standing five to twelve feet high, provide ideal cover, especially as its roots are edible from the age of six months to at least thirty months before they begin to get woody. Unlike small grains, no part of the crop is needed for seeding, root tubers may be removed while the plant continues to grow, and when the whole plant is cut down, at twenty to thirty months, a broken shoot thrust into the ground will start a new plant. Young leaves provide a good vitamin food.

In the shade of manioc or bananas can be grown peanuts, small grains, soy, vegetables, beans, cotton, peppers or maize. These can be used to supplement the purely carbohydrate diet provided by cassava (manioc). Since the latter is an excellent feed for fowl, swine, or cattle some of it can be transformed into protein in this way, while eggs can provide one of the chief deficiencies of manioc, its lack of sulfur. Since manioc is labor consuming only in the processing stage, mechanical or power processes need be applied only to this stage to provide starch, tapioca, manioc flour or other forms of energy food.

The French had made substantial movements toward the agricultural development just described when independence struck in 1960. As early as 1931, when others were still depreciating manioc as an injurious crop, the French had taken steps to extend its cultivation, mostly through the *Sociétés de prévoyance*. Introduction of mechanical graters and processing, especially in Togo, culminated in the establishment of a plant near Anécho in 1952 with an annual capacity of 3000 tons of starch a year. Exports of starch

⁴ P. W. Richards, *The Tropical Rain Forest: an ecological study* (Cambridge, 1952), 401-402.

⁵ John Phillips, *Agriculture and Ecology in Africa: a study of actual and potential development south of the Sahara* (New York, 1960), 68.

⁶ On this whole paragraph see William O. Jones, *Manioc in Africa* (Stanford University Press, 1959), ch. 4 (with references). See also Bruce F. Johnston, *The Staple Food Economies of Western Tropical Africa* (Stanford University Press, 1958).

and tapioca from Togo were 4000 tons in 1957. Another example of the official encouragement of manioc may be seen in the rise in production of this crop in Niger from less than 8000 tons in 1946 to 20,500 tons in 1950 to 104,000 tons in 1955.

No very reliable figures can be given for larger geographic areas since so much of the crop is used for subsistence, but the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa gives figures showing increased production of cassava in French Equatorial Africa from 550,000 tons in 1950 to 1,659,000 tons in 1955 and for French West Africa from 1,124,000 tons in 1950 to over two million tons in 1953.⁷

Any successful attack on the problem of increasing the supply of energy foods at once gives rise to the parallel problem of increasing the supply of protective foods, notably proteins and vitamins. Here again advance has been made but further progress is vitally needed. Increase in proteins does not mean, as it would in America, an increased meat supply. To be sure the whole subject of livestock care in French Africa needs re-study and improvement in a most urgent way, but the need for protein must be attacked simultaneously in at least three other directions.

Firstly, the great potential fishing grounds off the coasts of Africa need to be exploited with new methods and new energies, with the catch being dried (for lack of refrigeration) for distribution to consumers. The French have already established such fisheries at Gorée (near Dakar) and at Pointe Noire (French Congo) with a refrigeration plant at Dakar (1954), but much more needs to be done. An excellent possibility would be the extension of fish-farming in ponds, as the supply of fresh water fish is large and inadequately utilized; the farming of fish has already been studied with very hopeful results.⁸

Secondly, the utilization of native African wild animals as a protein source must be considered. Our Western domestic animals are poorly adapted to African conditions, for many reasons. They fail to thrive, destroy the African native plants (especially grasses), overstock the range while still scanty in numbers, and initiate destructive soil erosion. The native African ungulates formerly thrived in enormous herds in an

ecological balance with African conditions and might well be restored to some approximation of those earlier conditions as a protein source.⁹ Such meat, when smoked, keeps for several weeks.

Thirdly, considerable study is needed of possible supplies of vegetable proteins, not only such imported exotics as soybeans but also into many local plants of a similar character. Africa possesses a large number of protein producing leguminous plants, shrubs and trees whose economic value has never been studied, although their ability to flourish under African conditions is obvious.¹⁰

Movements along the lines indicated here were already being made before the political disruption of the French Community in 1958-1960. As early as 1956 per capita incomes in French areas were higher than in any other part of tropical Africa except Ghana. The latter had a per capita income of \$194 compared to \$133 in French West Africa and \$126 in French Equatorial Africa. Only the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, at \$132, could approach the French figures, while Kenya at \$78, Belgian Congo at \$76, and Nigeria at \$69 trailed far behind.⁷

If per capita incomes in French Africa can continue to increase, especially with a larger and more balanced output of food, these areas can contribute much more to their own betterment through increased economic and social capitalization. In order to maximize this contribution, increased output must not be dissipated in immediately increased local consumption. This means that French Africa must have strong governments able to resist consumers' pressures, and it must deal with its problems on a large areal basis and not, as now seems likely, on local territorial bases.

These two needs, for strong government (or enlightened restrained consumers) and for wide areal policies, hardly seem very

⁷ United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Economic Survey of Africa since 1950* (United Nations, New York, 1959).

⁸ Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *French West Africa* (London, 1958), 340-341, 397-399, 489-490. G. H. T. Kimble, *Tropical Africa: Land and Livelihood* (2 vol., New York, 1960) I, 282-285.

⁹ F. F. Darling, "Wildlife Husbandry in Africa," *Scientific American*, CIII (November 1960), 123-134.

¹⁰ B. F. Johnston, *Staple Food Economies of Western Tropical Africa*, 159-169.

hopeful at the moment, but without them any significant progress seems dubious. If each of the new states of Africa seeks to go it alone apart from its African neighbors and seeks, as a primary aim, to satisfy the narrowly envisaged consumption demands of its own citizens, all will be lost in one final African catastrophe.

Even with very strong government and very great individual self-restraint, Africa can provide only a small portion of its capital needs. The major part of these needs must be met out of (1) exchange from continued export of staple commodities; (2) continued investment funds from France and from its European associates, especially from the European Economic Community; (3) worldwide private investment attracted by drastically modified investment conditions; and (4) from wider public sources of international investment including the United States, Soviet Russia and the United Nations. All of these were on the fire (but far from cooked) when the French Community began to disintegrate.

The French experienced considerable success in increasing production of some staple export crops (output of peanuts and coffee more than doubled in 1950-1957) but much of the advantage from this was reduced by declining commodity prices. Many such crops are produced in Africa at such high costs that they are not competitive in the world market and find a market in France under the protection of tariffs or subsidies.

The very considerable economic aid which French Africa received from Metropolitan France through FIDES (\$2.14 billion in the twelve years 1947-1958) still continues to flow through a somewhat different institutional arrangement known as FAC (*Funds d'Aide at Cooperation*); this is a French Government Agency for economic and technical assistance to the newly independent states of French Africa which have signed agreements of cooperation with France. A substantial supplement to FAC is now available through the European Development Fund, a cooperative effort financed by the European Common Market.

The third method for raising development funds for French Africa, namely by encouragement of foreign private investors, has not been a great success. Until a relatively few

years ago, the French neo-mercantilist economic regulations discouraged this source; the task of revising these regulations to encourage private investment had just been initiated in a hopeful way when the disruption of the French Community, closely followed by chaos in the Belgian Congo, frightened many foreign investors away.

The fourth source of capital for French African development has also been limited. The Soviet Union has granted its assistance in significant amounts only to states like Guinea or Ethiopia where it believes it can reap political benefits. The United States and the various international agencies have generally had the feeling that French and European sources of funds were sufficiently available to French Africa and have funnelled their assistance to areas whose need seemed more urgent.¹¹

Political Mechanisms

No investment will be very effective in Africa without political stability or coordinated direction. The political question in French Africa seems, at first glance, to be less acute than in some other areas, since it has had fewer open violations of security or public order. Nevertheless, these vast areas have been subjected to grave uncertainties, and there is no assurance that these conditions are over. It is clear that there must be co-operation in political and reconstruction activities on as wide a geographic base as possible and that some mechanisms similar to the former federal structures of French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa must be established.

The French constitutional law of June 4, 1960, changed the French Community into a contractual association. Accordingly, 14 French African states obtained independence, in most cases by signing an agreement establishing full international sovereignty and a subsequent agreement of cooperation to regulate their economic, financial, cultural

¹¹ A United States economic aid agreement to the dissident Guinea Republic was signed secretly on 30 September, 1960. Earlier a twelve-year \$7.5 million loan for railway modernization went to French West Africa (1954); the World Bank \$35 million to Gabon for a manganese mining operation (June, 1959) followed by \$66 million to Mauretania (March, 1960) for iron-ore exploitation, while the European Common Market, September, 1959, divided a loan of about \$3 million among Ivory Coast, Dahomey, and Togo. See Edward & M. R. Marcus, *Investment and Development Possibilities in Tropical Africa* (Bookman Associates, New York, 1960).

and other relationships with France. These agreements have granted each territory independence, the right to establish legations in foreign countries, to hold a seat in the United Nations, to regulate customs against other states, and other attributes of sovereignty but have also, by agreement, retained much of the *status quo*, including French control of higher education, free trade with France, a "coordinated" foreign policy, French training of the new states' diplomatic corps with continued French representation in all capitals to which the new state does not send its own diplomatic agents (this covered more than 90 per cent of the countries of the world), membership in a common defense committee, a common monetary system, a common system of maritime and air communications and a continuance of French economic aid.

Although efforts were made, during the last two years, to reunite in political federations the seven states (without Guinea) of former French West Africa and the four states of former French Equatorial Africa,¹² the only concrete achievements in this direction were the customs unions established in June and January, 1959. The wealthiest state in each group (Ivory Coast and Gabon) objected, in each case, to being tied in too close a union with its poorer neighbors. In addition, Ivory Coast, under its pro-French leader, Dr. Felix Houphouet-Boigny, resisted a West African federation organized from Dakar. Efforts to form such a federation without Ivory Coast commenced at Bamako in 1958, but Ivory Coast's economic pressure forced Dahomey and Volta to withdraw, and the truncated result, known as the Mali Federation (of Senegal and Soudan) had only a brief life, from April, 1959, to August 19, 1960. As a consequence of Senegal's opposition to Soudan's Leftish and authoritarian trend, the Federation was disrupted, and Soudan, having taken the name Mali Republic, withdrew from the French Community on September 23, 1960, and began to drift toward Sékou Touré's Guinea.

In the meantime, at the turn of the year 1959-1960, Houphouet-Boigny took advantage of the anti-Mali sentiments of Volta, Dahomey and Niger to join these states, with his own Ivory Coast, into a weak common

front known as the Council of the Entente. A somewhat similar front of Chad, French Congo and the Central African Republic (former Ubangi-Shari) was formed in February, 1960, under the name, Union of Central Africa.

Pan Africanism

It seems probable that the movement toward federation of French tropical Africa would have stalled at this point had it not been for two cross-currents flowing out of Nkrumah's headquarters in Accra, Ghana. These currents were known as the "Union of Independent African States" and the "All African Peoples' Conference."

The Union of Independent African States arose from the Pan-African dreams of the late George Padmore and was organized by him on behalf of Nkrumah. Its first meeting, at Accra in April, 1958, had representatives of the eight independent states then in Africa, including Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and the United Arab Republic. They demanded independence for all African states and called on France to stop its military operations in Algeria.

Subsequent conferences of the independent African states at Monrovia in August, 1959, at Accra again in April, 1960, and at Addis Ababa in June, 1960, advanced no further toward Nkrumah's goal of a United States of Africa. Condemnations of apartheid in South Africa or of France in Algeria were passed easily enough, but no real agreement could be reached with the United Arab Republic over Israel or over closing the Suez Canal to South African trade, and Nigeria led the opposition to immediate steps toward a United States of Africa (June, 1960).

The All African Peoples' Conferences, also sponsored by Nkrumah, were great mass conventions which included delegations from the non-independent territories in Africa. The first, at Accra, in December, 1958, had about 300 delegates of labor unions, youth groups, political parties, and other organizations. It set up a permanent steering committee and staff at Accra, but achieved little beyond the usual denunciations of colonialism, apart-

¹² The basic books on these two areas are the Thompson and Adloff, *French West Africa* mentioned in note 8, and the same authors recent, *Emerging States of French Equatorial Africa* (Stanford University Press, 1960).

theid, and the French activities in North Africa. The second Congress, at Tunis in January, 1960, and the somewhat similar, but greatly expanded, meeting of the Afro-Asian bloc at Conakry, Guinea, in April, 1960, heard repetitions of these speeches.

Nkrumah's Pan-African agitations obtained little support in French Tropical Africa outside of Guinea and, more recently, Mali, and were openly opposed by Houphouet-Boigny, especially after Ghana provided a refuge in Accra for a government-in-exile of Sanmi tribesmen from Ivory Coast (February, 1960). As the critical year 1960 drew to its close, Houphouet-Boigny took steps to organize a formal French-African bloc of 11, and possibly 12, powers. Representatives of these states met, on Houphouet-Boigny's invitation, at Abidjan, Ivory Coast, in the last week of October and adopted a series of resolutions which have not yet been published completely. Two subsequent meetings were arranged, at Brazzaville in December, 1960, and at Yaunde, Cameroons, in 1961, to complete arrangements for the projected loose, primarily economic, confederation of Latin Africa. Ten United Nations delegations were ordered to vote as a bloc from the end of October.

Present at the Abidjan meeting were leaders of all the French states of sub-Saharan Africa except Sékou Touré of Guinea, who was not invited, and Keita of Mali, Olympio of Togo, and Tsiranana of Madagascar, who did not come. The published resolutions show full support for President Kasavubu in the former Belgian Congo against Ghana-supported Lumumba; full support of the newly independent Islamic Republic of Mauritania against the ambitions of Morocco; and encouragement to de Gaulle to order a cease fire in Algeria preliminary to peace negotiations with the rebels and a possible U.N. supervised referendum.

Even without political unity or some degree of federation, the technical work of reconstruction must be coordinated and must be directed along the right channels in fields where we still do not have answers to many questions. Thus, it is clear, research must accompany development, and coordination must be topical as well as geographic. For these, and for other more complex reasons, it seems likely that this research and develop-

ment work might well be carried out under the auspices of the international agencies which are available and can do the job.¹³

Among these agencies, on the economic and scientific side, are C.T.C.A., S.C.A. and F.M.A.A. C.T.C.A. (the Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara) is an agency of governments who have interests in the area. An operating agency, with its head office in London, it is advised by S.C.A. (Scientific Council for Africa South of the Sahara), an assembly of experts which meets annually within Africa to establish programs as policy guidance for C.T.C.A.; the latter's head office is at Bukavu, Belgian Congo. More recent (1958) than those two is F.M.A.A. (Foundation for Mutual Assistance in Africa South of the Sahara) which functions as a clearing house of information and reconstruction plans through its central office in Accra. In general, all significant activities in this area or money grants to finance such activities should register with F.M.A.A. and operate under its guidance.¹⁴

More narrowly economic are two organizations of the United Nations. The Food and Agricultural Organization, with a head office in Rome, now has local centers in Africa and is an excellent source of technical information and statistics, some of it going back to its predecessor, the International Institute of Agriculture (1905). A somewhat similar agency for over-all economic information is the new (1958) U.N. Economic Commission for Africa.

Similar organizations are also available on the social side. At the top is the familiar UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization) with a central office in Paris. In the same city, dependent on C.T.C.A., is the Inter-African Committee for the Social Sciences.

In Africa itself there are a number of regional organizations such as the excellent IFAN (Institut Français d'Afrique Noire, 1938) at Dakar which, under the direction of Theodore Monod, organizes all scholarly work in the social sciences concerned with Black Africa, and the I.E.C. (Institut

¹³ G. H. T. Kimble, *Tropical Africa* (1960), II, 418-430, for a list of such agencies.

¹⁴ E. B. Worthington, *Science in the Development of Africa* (London, 1958).

d'Études Centrafricaine) at Brazzaville. Several of the regional organizations in Belgian Congo have done excellent work which is fully applicable to French Africa. Among these are the Institut Pour la Recherche Scientifique en Afrique Centrale (IRSAC) at Bukavu, the Centre d'Études des Problèmes Sociaux Indigènes (CEPSI) at Elisabethville, and the Centre d'Études Sociologiques, also at Elisabethville, a branch of the Institut de Sociologie Solvay of the Université Libre of Brussels. Most of these organizations are members of the International African Institute in London, which works in close co-operation with UNESCO. The technical work of the U.N. in Africa is coordinated through the Technical Assistance Board Survey in the Bureau of Social Affairs of the United Nations in New York.

A number of more specialized and more local agencies have been operating in French Africa to provide research, finance, or co-ordination of special tasks. These include, for example, (1) the Inter-African Rural Economy and Soils Bureau at Paris (1950) with various dependent experimental stations in Africa; (2) the Locust Research Center in London with its subordinate Office, Anti-Acridien, in Paris and various bases and mobile teams in Africa; (3) the Office de la Recherche Scientifique Coloniale (1943) in Paris with a research training center at Adiopodoune, Ivory Coast, and subsidiary agricultural research stations, notably at Bambey; (4) numerous research agencies for special products including the Office Scientifique et Technique de la Peche for fishing research, the Institut de Recherches du Coton et des Textiles, the Institut de Recherche des Huiles et Oléagineux, and numerous others; (5) on a more operational level are such agencies as the Compagnie Générale des Oléagineux Tropicaux (1948, peanuts) the Office du Niger (1932, rice and cotton), and the Mission pour l'Amenagement du Sénégal (1945, a T.V.A. for the Senegal River); (6) on the local level, during the late 1940's and early 1950's, there was a considerable reorganization of cooperative and agricultural credit agencies, including the old (1910) Sociétés Indigènes de Prévoyance and the new (1952) Sociétés Mutuelles de Production Rurale.

The importance of coordination in development work should be obvious. The experience of the Belgian Congo shows clearly the dangers which arise when political independence or democracy arrive before there is a trained native bureaucracy or even literacy. It is equally dangerous to conquer disease and reduce the native death rate before the production of food has increased sufficiently to feed the increased population.¹⁵

In general, the French have handled this vital problem of coordination of developmental projects well. It is a task where disaster lies waiting if hard-headed realism is subordinated to emotional, nationalistic or even humanitarian considerations. Efforts to increase agricultural output must precede efforts to reduce infant mortality. Light industry to process local raw materials should precede grandiose projects to increase output of exportable raw materials. Literacy should precede urbanization, with female literacy given a higher priority than male literacy.¹⁶ The final extermination of the tsetse fly should be delayed until there is full knowledge and plans to exploit the forest areas thus opened to settlement without deforestation, erosion and soil exhaustion. On a minor point, the teaching of reading should precede the building of elementary school-houses and the training of a native élite through the university level should take precedence over any efforts to provide elementary education for everyone.

As we look at these few suggestions regarding the coordination of development and realize the extent of our ignorance, the gigantic size of the tasks, the moderate compass of our resources, and the urgency of the problems (even without Soviet interference) a feeling of helplessness is almost unavoidable. Yet the effort must be made. In this effort our chief consolation must be that the French achievement to the point of independence was made in the right directions and on a sufficiently diverse front so that future progress can be built on the foundations which already exist.

¹⁵ For a general historical orientation of this problem, see Carroll Quigley, "Comparative Cultural Development" in U.S. International Cooperation Administration, *Community Development Review*, No. 7 (December 1957), 5-11.

¹⁶ See Brussels, International Institute of Differing Civilizations, *Women's Role in the Development of Tropical and Sub-Tropical Countries* (Brussels, 1959). On the educational problem, see C. Quigley, "Education in Overseas France," *Current History*, XXV (August 1958), 102-111.

Can Ghana remain neutral in the cold war? The question, according to this author, "has continental implications." "Ghana has taken the view that the interests of either Moscow or Washington have little relation to those of Africa." "If Africa is permitted by the West to develop in terms of its own interests, then Africa will emerge between West and East as a factor in favor of peace."

Ghana: The Black Star State

By KEITH IRVINE
Editor, Africa Weekly

FROM the moment of her national birth on March 6, 1957, Ghana has lived in the light of international publicity. Relatively small, with an area of 92,000 square miles, and a population that in 1960 numbered 6,690,730, Ghana's demonstrable ability to adopt bold economic and political initiatives has led many, although not all, to look to Accra as a center symbolizing African aspirations for independence and unity, and as one of the places from which policy decisions affecting Africa originate, as they once originated from London, Paris or Berlin.

Ghana is, of course, merely one of the centers on the African continent at which such decisions are now beginning to be shaped. Ghana is in a position to take independent decisions and to act upon them because the Ghana government has to a great extent unified the country, and consolidated its political position. The revolution conducted by the leaders of the Convention People's Party was not completed when, on March 6,

1957, the Gold Coast Colony became the Independent State of Ghana. The 1957 constitution with which the British endowed Ghana was, in fact, an Order in Council of Queen Elizabeth II. Consequently Ghana's basic constitutional document derived its power from the British Parliament, and not from the people of Ghana. This Order in Council accorded considerably less power to the African administration than the British themselves had required in the colonial period to maintain the Gold Coast as a single administrative unit. The new ship of state in consequence was by no means guaranteed seaworthy enough to traverse the period of storm and stress that has now begun in Africa. The 1957 constitution placed the Ghana Government in a weak position to face the centrifugal forces which every African state has to resist; it was weak also with respect to the type of trouble that neo-colonialist factions, provided with ample funds, have now begun to foment in many parts of Africa, from the Congo to Conakry, and from Nairobi to Nigeria.

On March 6, 1960, three years after independence, President Kwame Nkrumah announced proposals for a new and republican form of constitution to be submitted to the Parliament and people of Ghana. The National Assembly, sitting as a constituent assembly in March, 1960, endorsed the new proposals; it approved the holding of a referendum to submit the proposals in principle to the people of Ghana, and to ask them to name the first President. It was also announced that this referendum would correspond very nearly to the general election

Keith Irvine is editor and publisher of *Africa Weekly*. Formerly editor of *Africa Today*, he has also contributed to the *Washington Post*, *Collier's Encyclopedia*, *The New Leader*, *The Nation*, *CURRENT HISTORY*, and other journals. He has observed at first hand the developments at the United Nations affecting Ghana and other African states since 1954.

that would otherwise have fallen due in 1961.

The referendum was duly held in April, and the result was a clear mandate for the new constitution. Over a million persons voted for the new proposals, and 130,000 opposed them. The vote for Nkrumah for President was 1,016,076, while that for his opponent, Dr. J. B. Danquah, was 124,623. The National Assembly then considered the proposals in detail, and passed them into law. Prime Minister Nkrumah, attending the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, informed Commonwealth leaders in May, 1960, of these developments, and also of Ghana's forthcoming change of status to a Republic, as well as of its intention to remain within the Commonwealth.

The New Republic

Ghana was accordingly proclaimed a republic on July 1, 1960, and at the same time a new cabinet was nominated. The new constitution reaffirmed the principle of one person, one vote, provided for general elections every five years, and established a strong presidential system, with the President as commander in chief of the armed forces and with control over the civil service. A "Declaration of Fundamental Principles," made by the President on his assumption of office, is Ghana's equivalent of a Bill of Rights. Provision is made in the constitution for evolution towards African unity, since Article Two reads: "In the confident expectation of an early surrender of sovereignty to a union of African states and territories, the people now confer on Parliament the power to provide for the surrender of the whole or any part of the sovereignty of Ghana."

This indeed is a somewhat revolutionary provision for a new state to incorporate in its constitution. Perhaps the only precedent is to be found in Article 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of Guinea, adopted in 1958, which reads: "The Republic may conclude with any African State agreements of association or of community, including the partial or total abandonment of Sovereignty in order to achieve African unity." The Declaration of Fundamental Principles in the Ghana Constitution, however, obliges the President to declare "That the union of Africa shall be striven for by every lawful

means and, when attained, should be faithfully preserved; that the Independence of Ghana should not be surrendered or diminished on any grounds other than the furtherance of African Unity."

These statements open up interesting perspectives of future association between the new sovereign states of Africa that are now independent from one another as well as from their former administering authorities. Statements such as President Nkrumah's recent allusion to the prospect of a joint Ghana-Malian parliament, also indicate the probable line of future developments. However, with regard to Ghana's Republican Constitution itself, it is clear that its main importance lies not so much in future developments, important as these may later become, as in the fact that it represents the logical termination of the internal political revolution that began with the establishment of the Convention People's Party on June 12, 1949, with a program to achieve "Self Government Now" for the Gold Coast. The central Government now has the power to assert its authority, and to take action to avoid the creation of the type of situation that the world is witnessing in the Congo, where the neo-colonial forces have successfully been able to exploit African internal differences.

Much of Ghana's international initiative has also been made possible by the fact that the country's economy is fundamentally sound. It is frequently assumed that just because Ghana is situated in the tropics it must of necessity be a poor country that is anxious to obtain financial assistance from the United States. Consequently surprise is often expressed when it is learned that, in fact, as a result of its position as the world's major cocoa-producing country, Ghana earns \$7.00 in the United States for every \$2.00 it spends. Ghana, therefore, has a substantial dollar surplus. With respect to "under-development," if the arbitrary rule is applied that a country is underdeveloped if its annual per capita income is under \$200 a year, then Ghana must still be classified as "under-developed." The average per capita income in 1960 was estimated to be \$169, a figure that may nevertheless be favorably compared with (for example) Ethiopia's per capita average of \$30, or Tanganyika's average of \$48.

Of more significance, however, than the amount of current earnings is the direction that the economy is taking. Ghana's economy over the past decade has shown a most remarkable expansion. The value of exports, for example, has risen from \$139,795,919 in 1949 to \$317,401,672 in 1959. Government revenue has risen from \$71,274,000 in 1950-1951, to an estimated total of \$194,074,608 for 1960-1961. (The financial year in Ghana begins in July to fit in with the cocoa crop season.) When the first United States trade mission to visit West Africa traveled to Ghana in February, 1960, it reported in May that Ghana was an "excitingly alive" country, vigorously pursuing economic development programs in both the private and public sectors, and optimistic about the future.

The progress of the economy has been reflected in many ways. In accordance with the President's constitutional declaration of principle "That every citizen of Ghana should receive his fair share of the produce yielded by the development of the country," a minimum wage scale of just under \$1.00 a day was established in August, 1960, at the same time that prices and rents were also pegged.

Much money is also invested in the infrastructure which is preparing the way for a yet more vigorous economic upswing in the future. In September, 1960, the construction of a \$4 million runway, 10,000 feet long, and 200 feet wide, was completed, thus adapting Accra airport to jet traffic. Roads are being reconstructed to facilitate the movement of mine and forest produce down to the coastal ports. Work on the international road route to Nigeria via Togo is approaching completion. New power plants are being built, and work proceeds steadily on the electrification of rural areas. A "Direct Labor" housing campaign has been launched for the benefit of lower income groups, in which the Ghana Housing Corporation lays the foundations, and the owners build the remainder.

With regard to port facilities, Ghana profited from the far-sightedness of the most famous Governor of Gold Coast colonial days, Sir Gordon Guggisberg, as a result of whose insistence an artificial harbor was opened at Takoradi in 1928. Accra has long

been a lighterage port but without deep water facilities. Today, however, work has far advanced on a second artificial harbor at Tema, which, situated in the Accra vicinity, and costing \$70 million, is due to be completed in November, 1961.

Tema will be the largest artificial harbor in Africa, and will not only handle merchant shipping, but will also accommodate a modern fishing fleet, and will serve as the base for Ghana's nascent Navy, which at the moment consists of two minesweepers. Tema will also serve as the headquarters for the Black Star Line, Ghana's national shipping line, which—originally founded in conjunction with an Israeli shipping firm—has now been bought completely by the Ghana Government, and is in the process of moving its headquarters from Haifa to Ghana. On the shoreward side a new town has been planned and is being built at Tema (originally a fishing village), the total population of which is expected to rise to over 100,000. As the population of Tema rose from 8,700 in 1958 to about 27,000 in 1960, it is felt that its future expansion may be taken for granted. It may, indeed, justly be viewed as a symbol of Ghana's economic development in the 1960's.

It is, of course, to the Volta River Project that the hopes and aspirations for Ghana's future industrialization are directed. The "V.R.P.," as it is colloquially referred to, involves the construction of a dam at Akosombo to provide electricity for an aluminum industry, depending upon local deposits, to provide enough surplus electricity to relieve the country of the present necessity of importing diesel oil for generating electricity. Preliminary work on the project has begun, feeder roads to the dam site are completed, and houses for the workers have been built. A consortium of companies is to be involved in the project, and the Ghana Government has received assurances for loans totalling \$84 million for financing the power plant, of which \$40 million is to be provided by the World Bank, \$30 million by the United States Development Fund, and \$14 million by the United Kingdom.

There can be no doubt that the rapid pace of progress in Ghana is in part due to the fact that the country has a relatively homogeneous African population, thus avoiding

the fears and tensions which have bedevilled the progress and prosperity of so many East, Central and Southern African territories. There are no white settlers nor deep-seated fears or rivalries between black and white. Race relations are good, although developments and tragedies elsewhere on the continent have done much to drive the lesson firmly home to Ghanaians that their present prosperity is in large degree due to the fact the land of Ghana is African-owned and its administration is African-controlled. While European help is therefore welcomed it is nevertheless made plain that it is Ghana's destiny to be an African state, and only in so far as this is understood will cooperation prove successful.

A Militant Foreign Policy

Ghana's firm political and economic base has permitted the young republic to conduct a militant foreign policy favoring the emergence of an independent and united Africa. Whereas there are many, particularly among those who view African developments from a European standpoint, who consider that Ghana is thus "interfering" with matters beyond her jurisdiction, seen from the African standpoint this policy is in fact logical for any truly independent African state. Africa's interest is to be free of direct European influence, just as America's interest in the eighteenth century was to be free of European influence. This is not always clearly understood in the outside world, where it is sometimes judged to be convenient to have Africa divided against herself, rather than free and united.

It is therefore felt that statements such as that of United States Secretary of State Herter on September 23, 1960, that President Nkrumah "has very definitely marked himself as leaning toward the Soviet bloc" exhibit a total lack of understanding of the aims of the entire African liberation movement. In this respect the statement of the British Foreign Secretary, the Earl of Home, on October 2 that President Nkrumah is not leaning toward the Communist bloc, and that he was "quite certain that President Nkrumah of Ghana does not want to see the Communists in Africa" are viewed as showing a far greater degree of insight into the true goals of African nationalism,

as well as into the realities of the present world situation.

For, in the view of Accra, the world is not simply a field of combat between two rival ideologies. That there exists a power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union is all too evident. What is not evident to all as yet is that this conflict is of no interest or benefit to Africa, and that it is in Africa's interest to unify not only its political systems but also its economies, in order that the populations of the continent may advance in health, understanding and material welfare to the point at which the continent may prove a stable and stabilizing force in international affairs, rather than a convenient arena for fighting the "Cold War." Substituting "America" for "Europe" President Nkrumah might well echo the words of George Washington when, in his Farewell Address, he said "Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. . . . Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. . . ."

Ghana has, indeed, pursued a different course. She has done so actively and on many levels. On the Pan-African level the convocation of the First Conference of Independent African States in Accra in April, 1958, has had far-reaching effects, and has started a chain of events of which the end is by no means yet in sight. Not the least significant result, however, has been the emergence into the consciousness of independent African states of the need for closer association and regular consultation, not only with respect to political developments, but also with respect to the coordination of the various national economies. The 1961 conference which will consider the economic and financial integration of independent African states will merely be one further chain in a series of developments that will eventually result in the establishment of a communications network between the different regions of Africa, the standardization of technical and communications equipment, and—perhaps it is not too early to hope—the ultimate creation of a common currency.

Ghana from the outset has upheld the

principles and purposes of the United Nations, to which it was admitted on March 8, 1957—two days after independence. In his major policy speech to the General Assembly on September 23, 1960, President Nkrumah reaffirmed Ghana's fundamental position when he stated categorically: "I look upon the United Nations as the only organization that holds out any hope for the future of mankind." He then proceeded to outline one after another the immediate steps which must be taken if Africa's liberation is to continue: South Africa's surrender of its mandate over South West Africa to an inter-African administration established under United Nations auspices; the implementation of the Addis Ababa resolution of the Conference of Independent African States calling on states to act against apartheid by severing diplomatic relations with South Africa, boycotting its goods, and refusing landing or passage facilities to South African aircraft and port facilities to South African vessels; calling on Nato powers to bring pressure to bear on Portugal to grant independence to her African colonies; calling for negotiations to end the war in Algeria.

Turning to the world situation as a whole he recommended a positive approach to disarmament, proposing the formation of a United Nations team of "scientists, technicians, and administrators" to study the redeployment of the capital resources of the countries that disarm. He opposed the formation of military alliances between African states and any outside powers, advocated the establishment of Africa as a nuclear free zone, and called for the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations on the grounds that "any attempt to impose a form of tactical isolation . . . is bound to prove abortive in the long run."

The Congo Crisis

Ghana's position as a state committed to the struggle for African freedom, as well as

the friendly relations established between Leopoldville and Accra when Lumumba held undisputed title to the premiership of the Congo, closely involved Ghana in the Congolese crisis which began on July 7, 1960. When the crisis came, it was to Ghana, among others, that the Congolese Central Government turned for military help. On July 16, Ghana troops were flown to the Congo, being among the first of the United Nations contingents to arrive, and gaining praise from many sources for their exemplary conduct in maintaining order during the earlier phases of the evolving crisis. The United Nations' failure to implement fully the Security Council resolutions, and the resulting chaos, in the course of which troops of the Force Publique, led by Colonel Mobutu, were sent against the Ghana residency in Leopoldville on November 21, were further developments in a tragedy that has surpassed national and even continental bounds, and has still not fully unfolded.

Particularly in the light of recent developments, the question is frequently asked: can Ghana remain neutral? In the first place the question cannot be put, as it were, in a vacuum. Ghana is an African state in an African setting. Such a question therefore cannot apply merely to Ghana alone; it has continental implications. Secondly, with respect to the question itself, Ghana has taken the view that the interests of either Moscow or Washington have little relation to those of Africa.

If the West cannot accept this declaration of political independence, and should show hostility towards any step that may be at variance with some short term and limited Western interests, the final result of this lack of comprehension may be to foster closer links between African states and the East. If, on the other hand, Africa is permitted to develop in terms of its own interests, then Africa will emerge between West and East as a factor in favor of peace.

" . . . Education must underlie all our foreign aid efforts if they are to succeed. The program of education dare not be thought of as one comparable segment of the total. It must relate to and seek to advance and make permanent every other type of activity such as agricultural and industrial improvement."

—Hollis I. Caswell, President, Teachers College, Columbia University, Nov. 18, 1960.

"Creating unity in a nation built up out of three separate sections filled with as many as 250 different groups of people, Nigeria will have a number of factors that are working in its favor."

Nigeria: Potential for Stability

By THOMAS PATRICK MELADY

President, Consultants for Overseas Relations

NIGERIA, whose population of 36 million makes it Africa's largest nation, entered the stage of world politics with its admission to the United Nations on October 1, 1960. The new nation, with its relative wealth in both natural resources and manpower, gives promise of being a stabilizing influence on the continent not only because of its size and history but because of the personality of its prime minister, Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafewa Balewa.

Unlike some of Africa's smaller states whose very economic life seems in question because of lack of size, transport or trained leaders, Nigeria's economy appears strong. A major advantage is its diversity: it depends on no one crop or even solely on agriculture. Its economy is growing. Important new forms of wealth such as oil, are in process of development. A highly important intangible is that Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafewa Balewa, Nigeria's first prime minister, approaches the problems of his nation's economy not merely with caution but with frankness and honesty.

Like many nations both in Africa and in South America, Nigeria deals in crops that can fluctuate widely in the world market. The country is the third largest producer of

cocoa, said to have been first introduced by the British in the 1870's. Recently the market here has been good. The quality of the crop is such that 99 per cent of the crop is the highest grade. Nigeria is the world's largest source of columbite, an ore used in producing stainless steel. The market for this product has declined very sharply in recent years. Petroleum has been discovered and already some return has been realized on the heavy outside investments made in oil explorations there. A pipe line already brings hundreds of tons of oil to port each year. Coal has long been mined in Nigeria and one of its best customers is nearby Ghana. Nigeria is the world's largest exporter of palm kernels and palm oil.

Another major export product is peanuts. Cotton was introduced by the British over 50 years ago and in some sections high efficiency yields have been obtained. Nigeria has five per cent of the world supply of tin. There are rubber and large supplies of timber in the tropical rain forests. Not all these crops are important every year, because Nigeria's costs of transport and production of some products are high. For local consumption there are citrus fruits and the Sokoto River yields a good supply of fish.

Some industry has shown signs of developing. There are several large cement factories. There are food processing plants and part of the peanut crop is shelled in the country prior to export. Nigeria boasts several large plywood factories. It has weaving and spinning mills and industries devoted to processing such raw materials as palm oil, rice and cotton. There are fruit and fruit juice canneries, plastic manufacturers and breweries.

Thomas P. Melady, founder of the Institute of African Affairs at Duquesne University, is author of numerous articles on Africa and *Profiles of African Leaders* (to be published March 21, 1960 by the Macmillan Company). He visited Nigeria on two occasions in 1960.

As in major parts of both Africa and South America, there are few men with a gift for business or industrial management. In some African nations there are Asian shop owners and businessmen but such a group does not exist in Nigeria. The shortage of small businessmen is probably less significant in Nigeria than elsewhere in Africa because there are broad projects such as the improvement of transportation and communication, the extension of present agricultural efforts and industry and the expansion of education that will profitably engage the nation's efforts.

There is a hangover from the British economic system that gives a strong flavor of monopoly and cartelization to the development of basic industries and agricultural activities. The free operation of the laws of supply and demand are inhibited by crop control and marketing associations. This has the effect of holding prices high but it also prevents the greater use of the product at lower prices and, perhaps even more important, the abandonment of the particular crop or product for others or even for industry itself where there may be a greater chance for profit and for national gain.

Geography

Nigeria is a wholly tropical nation. Almost bisecting its 373,250 square miles are two great rivers, the Niger and the Benue, which form a gigantic Y in almost the center. The mouth of the Niger spreads over 25,000 miles.

The country can be considered as divided into four horizontal zones. The first, in the south, is washed by that section of the Atlantic known as the Gulf of Guinea or the Bight of Benin. This southern belt includes wide stretches of mangrove swamp. There are also sandy beaches. The Guinea current flows eastward from Lagos, the federal capital and first area controlled by the British. Then come Sapele, site of large plywood mills, Port Harcourt where shipping has undergone huge increases in recent years, and Calabar.

The next zone is the tropical rain forest, source of rich timber resources. Third, is a strip of open woodlands and grass savannah with a few peaks near Jos as high as 6,000 feet. At the top lies an undulating plateau,

2,000 feet above sea level. Here at the northeast boundary of the country the river Yobe forms the border with French Niger for over 100 miles, then flows into the waters of Lake Chad at the northeast tip. In the north we approach that vast phenomenon, the Sahara Desert, which stretches across Africa for a greater distance than the breadth of the United States.

The Niger, second longest river in Africa and one of the major waterways of the world, actually has its source 3,000 feet above sea level in the Kong Mountains of French West Africa. It winds northeast from Bamako till it reaches the fabled and once inaccessible Tibuktu where it turns west to Bourem in the Soudan and then begins its long, generally southwestward run to Lokoja in Nigeria whence it flows south to form its delta on the Gulf of Guinea.

As it came to nationhood, Nigeria was a union of three areas dominated by three different tribal groups. In the north, the area is chiefly Muslim, dominated by the Fulani who invaded the land in the 1700's. Southern Nigeria is generally divided into East and West roughly separating the Hausa and the Yorubas.

The country has a number of substantial cities. In the southwest is Ibadan, near the center of the ancient Ife culture and the largest wholly African city with a population of over 600,000. Near the center of the nation is Jos, at an elevation of 6,000 feet. There is tin mining here when the world price makes it possible to bring out the ore at competitive cost.

In the north central portion of the country is Kano, once a major caravan center, now served by regular air service. Other cities with scheduled air service are Gusau and Maiduguri in the North, Kaduna and Yola in central Nigeria and, to the South, Enugu, Lagos, Benin City—capital of the ancient kingdom Port Harcourt and Calabar.

History

Nigeria as a nation has had less than 50 years to develop its capacity to govern itself democratically. While this is nothing in terms of the time allowed the major powers of the West, it is a longer history than has been granted to most of the nations South of the Sahara. The first visitors to the

country were the Portuguese, 20 years before Columbus. In 1472, they came and traded goods for the treasured spices, ivory and gold. Later came the Dutch, the Danes and then the British.

With the opening up of the Americas came a demand for a product with which the early despots of the country had long been familiar—slaves. Some maps still carry the legend "slave coast" along the shores of Nigeria and neighboring Togo and Dahomey. Various British explorers, led by Mungo Park in 1716, went up the Niger and penetrated into the interior. The infamous slave traffic continued until the year 1807, when the British passed laws forbidding the trade. Soon the Royal Navy was intercepting slave ships and setting the cargoes free. Sierra Leone was made a preserve for the freed slaves and adjacent Liberia became a refuge for thousands released by the U.S.

In 1833, the British freed all slaves on British soil. At the time of the United States Civil War in 1861 a local chieftain in Lagos failed to stop the slave traffic and human sacrifice in his domain and the British stepped in and annexed Lagos, placing it under the governor of Sierra Leone—six nations to the west on today's maps.

Various private British companies took a part in the trade with the territory. In 1885, the Berlin Conference recognized British claims to Southern Nigeria and the following year British interests were consolidated in the Royal Niger Company. A few years later the territory was named the Oil Rivers Protectorate in recognition of the large supplies of palm oil and palm kernels that continued to be shipped from its ports.

In 1900 all the territories formerly controlled by the Royal Niger Company were incorporated into the two protectorates of Northern Nigeria and Southern Nigeria, the latter absorbing the area formerly known as the Niger Coast Protectorate. In 1914 both Northern and Southern Nigeria were joined to form the crown colony of Nigeria. The name "Nigeria" was coined by Flora Lugard, wife of the first governor, Sir Frederick Lugard, who became the governor general in 1914 just eight years after Northern Nigeria was finally pacified. And it was only as the first world war was starting that the separate kingdom of Abeokuta was annexed.

In 1922 Governor Sir Hugh Clifford appointed a legislative council with ten Nigerian members. Right after World War II, Sir Anthony Richards, later Lord Milverton, introduced a new constitution creating regional houses of assembly. The pace of self-government now became faster and faster. In 1949, Sir John Macpherson revised the constitution, giving greater autonomy and more ministerial appointments to Nigerians. By 1954, the pre-independence constitution was introduced. By October, 1958, the Nigerians were promised their independence if the parliament to be elected in December, 1959, should ask for it. There was little doubt that the parliament would ask.

At the time of its first election in December, 1959, Nigeria was the largest British colony in the world. There were three candidates for prime minister in this historic election. Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was the protege of the Sardauna of Sokoto, an emir of prominence in the North and a descendant of the first Sultan of Sokoto and of a leader in the Fulani jihad. Balewa was the candidate of the National Council of Nigeria (NCNC). Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe was a one-time labor leader and newspaper publisher who, like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, had been educated in Negro colleges in the United States. Chief Obafemi Awolowo of the Action Group in the Western region was a champion of many small business enterprisers.

Sir Abubaker won the largest number of votes, becoming prime minister. Dr. Azikiwe with the next highest number of seats chose to become president of the senate. Chief Awolowo now constitutes the loyal opposition.

In January, 1960, the federal house unanimously requested independence and on October 1, 1960, just 99 years after the annexation of Lagos, a new sovereign nation was born. The people of Nigeria include at least 250 nations or tribes, each with distinctive customs and traditions and nearly as many different languages. From the standpoint of religion, about 44 per cent are Muslim, another 22 per cent are Christian and the remainder are animists who worship nature and their ancestors.

The now familiar diseases of the African tropics are found in Nigeria. Malaria is

general. There is blindness, leprosy, yaws, yellow fever, encephalitis (sleeping sickness) and smallpox. One hundred thousand lepers are segregated in leprosariums but they are being cured at the rate of 3,000 a year. Leprosy is less virulent than it was in Biblical days. With the use of DDS and DPT, many are cured in five years and some in as little as two years. Filth, the basic causative condition for leprosy, is also being eliminated.

Education

The nation already has in the neighborhood of three million children in the primary school system and each year nearly half a million children are added to the school population. The country is proud of its University College at Ibadan which has well over 1100 enrolled students in courses which include history, medicine, agriculture and the arts. At Zaria, is the Nigerian College of Arts, Science and Technology which has branches at Ibadan and Enugu. This covers such subjects as engineering, surveying, administration, architecture and secretaranship.

As the considerable numbers of Nigerians continue to graduate from this educational system there should be plenty of individuals competent to handle administrative positions in the government. But what has so often been lacking in other nations which view the advanced living standards and other baubles of the more economically advanced nations may also afflict Nigeria. There is need for individuals capable of running and developing small businesses—retail shops, small manufactures, services like cobblers and pharmacists, food stores and entertainment. Nigerians are needed with the skill to develop business and industry to utilize the wide range of agricultural and mineral resources. To put it bluntly, men are needed who can organize self-supporting industry that needs no help from the scanty resources of government and can provide employment, production and profits for the whole community. Such individuals are rare in any society but conditions may be favorable for their development in Nigeria. Should they appear, there are certainly the materials and manpower to make their success possible.

To assess the immediate future prospects of Nigeria as a nation one of the most im-

portant facts is the nature of the man who has been called to be its leader and its representative in the world of free nations. It is important to discover not only what sort of man this Alhaji Sir Abubakar Balewa is but what his election reveals about the millions of his countrymen who chose him to be the first leader of their newly independent nation.

Leadership and the Future

The first thing that strikes one about Balewa is that here one finds none of that easy optimism that so often marks the political demagogue in many Western lands. Nor does he exhibit that arrogant truculence of the dictator who seeks to draw the attention of the populace away from urgent domestic problems by attacking imagined foreign enemies. Willingness to face unpleasant realities and frankly warn his countrymen of the seriousness of impending problems are characteristic of Sir Abubakar. His tone combines simple courage and hope with a level look at the dangers ahead and is reminiscent of some of America's founding fathers.

In moving for the legislation that would make Nigeria free, the prime minister took pains to point out that the change was not that from the position of servant to that of son.

That is not the whole truth [Abubakar insisted]. We are in fact asking to become as a son who has left his father's compound and has now to make his own way in the world. . . . There can be no going back.

I sound this note of warning because . . . the last two subjects which will be handed over to Nigeria's sole control are defense and external affairs. . . . You may say that Nigeria is a peaceful country which has no territorial ambitions and no intention of attacking her neighbors—I agree. You may also say that there is no evidence that we are going to be attacked. Superficially I should say that that view is correct but I must tell the House frankly that in my opinion we are confronted by a very serious situation. Over the past year or so there has been a good deal of trouble going on in some of the countries which border on Nigeria. . . . This could easily lead to border incidents and serious misunderstandings between Nigeria and her neighbors. Our best defense is of course to show that as an independent nation we are united . . . but we must have adequate military forces. . . . It

is my earnest hope that the visible strength of Nigeria will have a stabilizing effect in this part of the world. . . .

Sir Abubakar noted that "In the United Nations, for instance . . . our representative will be able to wield an immense and beneficial influence." He did not hesitate to warn that it would not be enough for a successful foreign policy simply to be honest and well-intentioned. His conclusion demonstrated his habit of honest facing of difficulties mingled with firm self-confidence: "I do not for one moment underestimate the difficulties which lie ahead, and I have felt compelled to underline them today, but nevertheless given sincerity of purpose and goodwill we shall not fail."

Sir Abubakar seems to have been a fortunate choice not only on the basis of his ability but because, politically, he combines a number of fortunate characteristics. Although sponsored by the Sardauna of Sokoto, Sir Abubakar is a commoner, a "man of the people." Though a Northerner, he is widely traveled and speaks with authority on matters affecting the South, the East and Western regions of his country. Though a nationalist, he speaks often in praise of the British and colonial officials both past and present who have given so much to the advancement of Nigeria. Entrusted with showing many new things to his countrymen, it is significant that he spent many years as a teacher.

Sir Abubakar is also widely traveled having visited in Ghana, North Africa, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. He seems older than his present age of 45. He speaks with the great eloquence that has won him the sobriquet of "the silver tongued voice of the North," yet in conversation he is skillful in avoiding statements that might give offense to various groups or opinions in his country.

Creating unity in a nation built up out of three separate sections filled with as many as 250 different groups of people, Nigeria

will have a number of factors that are working in its favor. Roads are being built at a rapid rate. Airports with regular service dot the country. The nation is blessed with a number of good ports. Education is advancing and the trade of the nation will call for greater and greater exchange of goods—and ideas—among the various areas. There is not the deadly color problem that exists in the Union of South Africa and plagues Algeria for the simple reason that the number of whites is far too small.

The prime minister admits (and this is typical of his personality) that he originally had difficulty in talking with legislators from the South but he tells how his travels and experience have given him wider views; he implies that the same thing will happen slowly but surely to men throughout the country as "we grow together." Sir Abubakar has been described as sane and sensible, sincere and honest but clever enough to avoid the pitfalls of the post of great responsibility which he holds. He gives the impression of one who sees clearly the great difficulties which a new nation can face but who can say:

Potentially we think we are a great nation. We have rich resources in agriculture, in minerals, in groundnuts [peanuts] and cocoa, in palm oil and palm kernels, in timber, in tin and columbite and now, it seems, in oil. We have large numbers of people and manpower should not be a problem if our people are properly trained.

The first leader of this independent nation is a salesman whose enthusiasm is very infectious.

Nigeria has the leadership; it has the assets, material and human, to become possibly the most dynamic nation on the continent. It has its problems. There may even be times of crisis. Yet Nigeria should achieve the momentum of a free people operating under a free system of economics that should carry it to the forefront of prosperous and stable nations.

"I believe that as of 1960 we have nuclear strength superior to the Russians. . . . I believe that the massive power of our Strategic Air Command, plus our nuclear strength on overseas bases, plus our seaborne strength in two fleets and our Polaris submarines, is an adequate deterrent against full-scale wars."—James P. Baxter, President, Williams College, October 14, 1960.

"... It cannot be questioned that the Belgians did much in the last 50 years to improve the material lot of the people whose destinies they controlled," writes this specialist, but he notes that in the Congo "No real élite had been created to which the Belgians were willing to entrust serious responsibilities of government." In 1961 this was only one of the difficulties causing . . .

Chaos in the Congo

By HARRY R. RUDIN

Professor of History, Yale University

THE grant of independence to the Belgian Congo on June 30, 1960, was the end of a most unusual colonial experiment in Africa. Since 1908, when the Belgian Government assumed responsibility for the Congo after the publicized horrors of its exploitation under Leopold II, the guiding principle of administration was that of improving the lot of the Congolese by raising their standard of living. It was an often stated principle of officials in colonial administration that political rights should come only after the standard of living had been greatly improved. And so the emphasis had been on economic development of the colony's resources and peoples. Neither European settler nor Congolese native had any say as to how the colony should be governed. This denial of political rights to white and black was justified by saying that neither race should be placed at the political mercy of the other. In any case, it cannot be questioned that the Belgians did much in the last 50 years to improve the material lot of the people whose destinies they controlled.

The abundant resources of the Congo were the primary interest of the Belgians. Minerals made it one of the richest areas of the

world and constituted the larger part of the colony's export trade—copper, industrial diamonds, cobalt, zinc, manganese, tin, cadmium and others. In addition to minerals, the Congo exported cotton, coffee, precious woods, pyrethrum, palmoil products and so on. The exploitation of this wealth was the chief concern of the five great corporations and holding companies that participated in over 200 groups developing the colony's resources. The *Société Générale* and the *Union Minière* were the most important corporations in the colony, the former a gigantic Belgian holding company controlling over 50 per cent of the capital in the colony through its participation in many colonial enterprises. In 1955, the *Union Minière* had gross profits of \$125 million, of which \$54 million could be distributed to stockholders after taxes and other obligations had been met. A large part of colonial revenue was derived from the government's participation in these numerous enterprises as successor to the rights that Leopold II had retained for himself in the concessions he had granted.

Since 1920 the exploitation of the colony has been going on at very high speed. The year 1950 saw the start of a 10-year development plan calling for the expenditure of nearly one billion dollars. Roads and communications took 50 per cent of these funds while lesser sums went into the fight against disease, the improvement of housing, the creation of educational facilities, the provision of drinking water, and general social betterment. In the late 1950's plans were made for the development of the potential hydroelectric power of the falls on the lower Congo that had been so great an obstacle to H. M.

Harry R. Rudin is Colgate Professor of History and Chairman of the Department at Yale University. In 1931-1932, he was fellow of the Social Science Research Council, working in England, Germany, France and West Africa. His works include *Germany in the Cameroons, 1884-1914* and *Armistice—1918*.

Stanley's early efforts to get into the interior. The goal of this Inga project is the production of 25 millions kw. in an area rich in bauxite and of such industrial potential that people have referred to it as an African Ruhr.

The supply of labor has been one of the chief concerns of the men developing the Congo's land and resources. The labor force that numbered 125,000 in 1920 was 420,000 in 1929 and over 528,000 in 1938. Workers had to be recruited from areas far from the place of work. To keep the turnover to a minimum, workers were provided with homes and gardens so that they could bring families with them. Facilities for health, education, social life and for the government of the many tribes living side by side in a small area were provided by the companies and the government.

Great credit for achieving a high degree of success in such matters is due the Belgians. By 1954, over 21 per cent of the native population of the Congo was living outside the area of their tribal homes. During the last two decades the influx of workers and others from the bush into the cities occurred so rapidly that municipalities could not provide these Africans with the amenities needed for good health and decent living conditions. Leopoldville had an African population of 4000 in 1919; by 1960 the number had reached an estimated 300,000. Other cities in the Congo also experienced a rapid growth of their African populations.

In recent years white settlers in the Congo have been increasing at the rate of nearly 10,000 a year, the increase being exclusively by immigration. Whites of the second generation in the Congo are rare; most Europeans never intended to become permanent residents of the colony, a fact of importance in the relations of Europeans with Congolese. The Belgian Government screened immigrants into the colony most carefully, to make sure that they were people who could make a positive contribution to the area's well-being and economy. Stiff regulations were laid down as to the amount of land a European could acquire.

After 1908, control of the colony lay in Belgium. Although provision had been made for the Belgian parliament to control policy, actual authority was placed in the hands of

the king and rule was largely by royal decree. As a matter of fact, the work was handled by a colonial minister assisted by a colonial council possessed of advisory powers only. No representative of the colony participated in these functions. The colonial minister issued instructions to the governor general in the colony, and the latter, in turn, instructed the governors of the six provinces. The governor general and the provincial governors were assisted by local councils that had no powers beyond that of giving advice.

A few significant changes were made in the 1950's. Since 1951 eight appointed Africans have sat on the advisory council assisting the governor general in Leopoldville. In 1954, the government established the first university in the colony, Lovanium, not far from Leopoldville, from which the first five students graduated in 1958. In 1955 a second university was founded in Elizabethville.

No real *élite* had been created to which the Belgians were willing to entrust serious responsibilities of government. When independence came, there were about 15 university graduates in the colony, roughly one for each million of population. While more and more Africans were being admitted into government service, there were only 500 Congolese in the civil service at the beginning of 1959. No African participated in those levels of administration where policies were formulated and decisions were taken. The Congolese Army, the *force publique*, numbered 24,000 in 1960, but no Congolese was to be found among its 1,000 officers, all of whom were Belgian. It should be said, however, that some Africans had been sent to Brussels for the training that would qualify them for commissions with a few years.

In great contrast to other areas of Africa, there had been surprisingly little political agitation among the Congolese. Here and there movements had appeared; but they were more religious and messianic in character than political, like the Jehovah's Witnesses who had caused some anxiety in the early 1940's. The Belgians boasted of the political calm generally prevailing in the colony. "If the Belgian Congo is not politically restless," stated a document of the Congo Information Center in a *Herald-Tribune* advertisement on March 20, 1957, "it is simply because there is no reason for unrest." The peace

was due to the colony's social and economic development; the Congolese were pictured as grateful for the civilization that had been "introduced for 50 years in a confident, wise, and level-headed way by men animated by a great ideal, but extremely realistic." "Belgium," continued the document, "has never put any obstacle in the way of the expression of African nationalism in the Congo; it simply waited for this to be expressed."

On July 1, 1955, the king, who had just returned from a trip to the Congo, talked vaguely of a time when a share in the government of the country would be given to blacks and whites living there. There was no intimation of a target date by which this promise would be fulfilled. While many people in the West argued that democracy should be attained in the shortest possible time, the Belgians made it clear to the Congolese that democracy was not possible until the colony had an *élite* capable of governing and a population capable of knowing what it wanted. To that end the two universities had been founded and general education was being expanded.

The year 1956 saw the first expression of political demands in a manifesto published in a Roman Catholic periodical in Leopoldville, *Conscience Africaine*. It was a moderate demand—*independence within 30 years*. Its author was Joseph Ileo, the man appointed prime minister in the place of Patrice Lumumba in the fall of 1960. The present turmoil in the Congo had its start with this modest request. The first reaction was that of the Abako group in the lower Congo, which demanded immediate independence. The president of this group was Joseph Kasavubu, now president of the Republic of the Congo. The Abako had been founded in 1950; it started as a cultural, non-political association of intellectuals among the Bakongo people, who live in the lower Belgian Congo and in nearby French Congo and Portuguese Angola.

Official reaction to the manifesto showed the governor general to be more sympathetic than hostile. He told Ileo and others that his government hoped eventually to create a nation in the Congo by training an *élite* and by raising the level of mass education while also improving their economic and social condition.

The first step toward giving resident Belgians and Africans a share in the administration of the Congo was taken in March, 1957, in a measure giving the larger municipalities a bit of self-rule. The first application of the elective principle came on December 8, 1957, when Europeans and Africans were allowed to nominate panels of urban councillors to advise local Belgian authorities in Leopoldville, Elizabethville, and Jadotville.

For the Belgians this was a major concession; but it stood in sharp contrast to the political gains being made elsewhere in Africa. Since 1945 France had been extending the franchise to Africans and giving the latter an increasing share in the conduct of affairs. Tunisia, Morocco, Libya and the Sudan had already acquired independence. Somalia was assured of independence in 1960 after ten years of Italian trusteeship. The French Community organized by de Gaulle in 1958 offered Africans in French territories an opportunity to opt for complete independence from France. African intellectuals in Leopoldville were well aware of all this when the plebiscite in French territories occurred on September 28, 1959, and Guinea chose separation from France.

Other forces were at work in 1958 to create discontent with Belgian rule in the Congo. A depression had set in in 1958 after seven years of an economic boom in which the gross national product of the Congo increased at the rate of 7.6 per cent a year. Now, the budget was unbalanced, and 50,000 people in Leopoldville alone were unemployed. Communist propaganda made much of this misery. Not without influence was the all-African conference at Accra in December, 1958, with its demand that all Africa be granted independence. Patrice Lumumba had been one of the three Congolese delegates to that conference. When a meeting was called in Leopoldville on January 4, 1959, to tell the people about Accra, the police dispersed it because the required permit for the meeting had not been sought or granted. Three days of rioting resulted: 71 people were killed, many were injured, much looting occurred. The violence spread to other parts of the colony. Paratroopers were called in to establish order. Responsibility for the trouble was placed on Kas-

vubu and his Abako group. Although he was mayor of one of the seven African districts of Leopoldville, Kasavubu was arrested and imprisoned. In the Belgian parliament, demands were made for an official inquiry into the situation.

On January 13, 1959, King Baudouin made a formal announcement concerning eventual self-rule for the Congo, a decision he is said to have contemplated before the rioting took place. Local councils would be elected by universal suffrage in the 137 districts of the colony; they would be constituted by March 1, 1960. Later at a date not specified, there would be an elected house of representatives. Racial discrimination in the Congo was to end. These political promises were accompanied by the promise of large sums of money for the continued economic development of the Congo. Actually, a second ten-year plan for the decade of the 1960's was being considered. Assistance was being given to help balance the budget. These plans received the approval of the Belgian parliament in May.

Credit for these innovations must go to the minister for the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, Maurice van Hemelrijck, who favored speedy reforms in order to prevent further violence. European residents of the colony were alarmed by the rioting and also by the concessions made to the Congolese. They procured arms to defend themselves against the rioters; they demonstrated against van Hemelrijck when the latter toured the Congo and threatened to punish Europeans who treated Africans as inferiors. Fear of change was not confined to Belgians; foreigners invested less money in the Congo in the spring and summer of 1959, just when capital was needed because of the recession.

Talk of elections and of eventual independence led to the formation of political parties without number, most of them essentially tribal. It was clear that the Belgian government had not made the Congolese aware of any political unity despite the use of French in the schools and despite the large number of Africans living in urban and industrial centers. In Katanga Province the Conakat party, headed by Moise Tshombe, favored a political development of that province separate from the rest of the Congo.

The Abako party of the lower Congo was the organ of the tribal group in that region and in border territories. Of all the political parties only one could be regarded as a national party, that of Patrice Lumumba, the *Mouvement National Congolais*, founded in 1958. Its center of power was actually Stanleyville, the capital of Oriental Province and Lumumba's home. This party was the only one with a program for the entire Congo, for which he sought a unitary state rather than a federal one. According to Tshombe of Katanga, the Belgians favored a united Congo and powerful corporations assured Lumumba of victory by generous moral and material support.

In preparation for the elections it was necessary to guarantee freedom of the press, of assembly, and of association. These concessions were made by royal decree in August, 1959; on September 27 it was announced that elections would be held in December, when all men over 21 would elect local and provincial councils, to which greater powers were to be given than had been originally intended.

Opposition to van Hemelrijck in Belgium and in the Congo led to his resignation in early September, 1959, and to the selection of Auguste de Schryver as his successor. The tide of sweeping change could not be stopped, however. On October 16, 1959, the government announced the stages by which eventual independence would come to the Congo, but no date was set for the attainment of this goal. The final stage would be the organization of a central government in 1960 charged with the responsibility of drafting a constitution within its parliamentary life of four years. The government again assured the nationalists of considerable financial aid and even appointed a special minister for economics and finance to assist in preparing the way for the new state. While Belgium was putting the date for independence in the far future, at Stanleyville on October 30, Lumumba was demanding "total independence—now, now, now." The disturbance resulting from his agitation led to his arrest and imprisonment.

The local and provincial elections were held in December, 1959, and the results were interpreted by nationalists as a victory for their cause. They demanded "complete,

immediate, and unconditional independence" for their country in January, 1960. The Belgians were not surrendering to these demands; they had called a round-table conference of Belgians and Congolese in Brussels on January 20. During its month-long sessions Belgian efforts to tell the Congolese that they were not ready for immediate self-government and that gradual transition from Belgian rule to African rule was necessary were shouted down, according to one Belgian official delegate. Unable to keep African demands within bounds and fearing widespread violence from the excitable peoples of the Congo if no definite date were fixed, the government decided to grant independence on June 30. The 16 resolutions of the conference were aimed at effecting the transition. A second round-table conference met in Brussels from April 26 to May 16 to provide for economic aid on the theory that "independence will have its deep significance only if it is accompanied by prosperity."

In May, the fateful elections were held to choose 137 members of the lower house of parliament. The party of Lumumba won the largest number of seats in the chamber, 33 in all. This support was raised to 40 by means of an alliance with three minor parties. Tshombe has claimed that Lumumba won because of the moral and material support given him in Belgium. The 84 members of the Senate were to be designated by the provincial assemblies, 14 from each province. The Senate and the lower house, sitting together as a constituent assembly, were to draft a constitution for the Republic of the Congo.

There were difficulties in organizing the new government. Finally, on June 24, Lumumba was chosen premier and Kasavubu, who had sought the premiership, was elected president. Although the latter's party, the Abako, had with its 12 seats the third largest representation in the lower chamber, it got only one post in the cabinet of 23 ministries that was created. Lumumba's party got 8 of the ministries, the remaining posts being divided among 12 other parties. A treaty of friendship, assistance, and cooperation with Belgium was signed, but it was never ratified by the two states because of the difficulties that soon arose.

For some time trouble had been simmer-

ing within the *force publique*, where the enlisted men saw themselves getting nothing from independence while African politicians seemed to get everything. They demanded that their Belgian officers be replaced by Congolese. Before Lumumba could arrange the change, a revolt of African enlisted men against their Belgian officers occurred in Thysville, 85 miles from Leopoldville. News of the revolt and frightening rumors of attacks on white women and children threw Belgians in Leopoldville and elsewhere into a panic and led to the hasty flight of thousands from the Congo. Shattered by the flight were the arrangements that had been made for ten thousand Belgians to remain in the Congo to help the new state with essential technical aid. The result was the sudden breakdown of transportation, communications, electric power and water systems. With the disappearance of their Belgian employers Africans found themselves without jobs and without the means to provide for their families. This was the opposite of what had been expected to come from independence. By early October, of a normal male labor force of 125,000 in Leopoldville 80,000 men were idle.

To protect their harassed nationals, the Belgian government sent paratroopers from Europe into the Congo on July 8. This move was interpreted as aiming at the reconquest of the Congo. Lumumba turned to the United Nations for help, against the Belgians and against local disorder. The first United Nations troops arrived July 15 under an arrangement that kept the major powers out of the Congo. When these troops declined to drive out the Belgians or to force Katanga (which Tshombe had declared independent) back under his rule, Lumumba turned against the United Nations and threatened to turn to the Soviet Union for aid.

After the Security Council voted on July 22 to ask Belgium to withdraw her troops "speedily," Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld went to the Congo, where he was confronted with demands to send his blue-helmeted troops into Katanga. The Soviet Union shared the views of Lumumba and demanded that the Belgians be expelled from the country. The Communists even supplied Lumumba with airplanes and other military equipment. Guinea and Ghana, also sup-

porters of Lumumba, demanded that the United Nations enter Katanga or get out of the Congo. A new problem arose for Lumumba when a former henchman, Kalonji, announced the secession of the "mining state" of southern Kasai.

In mid-August Lumumba declared his lack of confidence in Secretary General Hammarskjöld. The situation became most complicated when President Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba as premier September 5 and appointed Joseph Ileo to the vacant post. Lumumba retaliated by firing Kasavubu as president. The Congolese parliament accomplished nothing by cancelling the premier's and the president's dismissal of each other. Colonel Mobutu, who had been appointed Chief of Staff by Kasavubu, suspended the president and both opposing premiers on September 14 and established himself as the head of a "care-taker government" with the aid of a commission of 15 young university students. Attacking Lumumba as pro-Communist, Mobutu drove Soviet and Czech representatives from the Congo in a move that gained him the sympathy of the Western powers, who saw the Soviet Union trying to establish a satellite state in Africa. Lumumba was a virtual prisoner under house arrest, guarded by United Nations troops.

Differences concerning Lumumba now became a leading issue in the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union and threatened to split the United Nations. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Sékou Touré of Guinea had been saying for a long time that Lumumba was the only legitimate ruler in the Congo because of his election to the premiership by the Congolese parliament. Ghanaian United Nations troops guarding the deposed premier in Leopoldville blocked efforts of Mobutu to arrest him. Mobutu became convinced that Ghana was interfering in the internal affairs of the new republic and turned more and more against the U.N. forces in his country. Ghana felt, on the other hand, that the United Nations should have a new command in the Congo, that the organization's functions should be turned over to independent African states, many of whom favored Lumumba. The discovery of secret correspondence between Nkrumah and Lumumba led

eventually to the expulsion of Ghana's representative from the Congo. Charges of interference were also made against the United Arab Republic. Diplomatic relations with both countries were broken off.

The demands of Mobutu on the United Nations and the violence committed by his uncontrolled army resulted in a report of the United Nations representative in the country, who criticized Mobutu and his army for violence and for permitting the return to influence of a large number of Belgians. The report recommended a fresh political start in the Congo and could be interpreted as favoring the return of Lumumba to the exercise of power. The report appeared to support Soviet demands that Lumumba be restored, that Mobutu's army be disarmed, and that all Belgians be expelled. It was too much for the United States, which rejected the report and came to the defense of the Belgians.

To keep the United Nations from now going over to the side of Lumumba, Kasavubu rushed to New York, where he persuaded the Western bloc of powers to seat his delegation in the United Nations rather than that of Lumumba. Kasavubu also opposed the sending of a "good offices commission" of African and Asian states to the Congo for the purpose of effecting a reconciliation of the rival political factions. Many members of the commission favored Lumumba.

The Soviet Union could now argue with greater force that the United States was seeking to re-impose Belgian rule over the Congolese. In a letter to President Eisenhower, Nkrumah of Ghana went so far as to charge that the United States was supporting the enemies of African independence. The opposition of the Soviet bloc and others to U.N. policy stiffened. The outlook for the international organization darkened when the Communists made it clear that they would refuse to pay their share of the cost of maintaining U.N. forces in the Congo. The Soviet Union even recommended the withdrawal of those forces to save the organization from bankruptcy! African and Asian supporters of Lumumba started to withdraw or threatened to withdraw their U.N. contingents from the Congo—the United Arab

(Continued on p. 109)

Can apartheid be reconciled with pan-Africanism? This analysis of South Africa's racial policies discusses the history of apartheid and its implications for an Africa inspired by the new nationalism.

Apartheid in South Africa

By JOAN L. BARKON

Assistant Editor, Current History

BAASKAP, Bantu,¹ Boer and Briton form the four sides of the South African dice. Unfortunately, the white South African is playing with a loaded pair. His luck depends on his ability to maintain the rule of an "armed minority."² Although the black man has yet to roll a win, his fortune is rising on the wave of the industrial revolution that is just coming to all of Africa.

Apartheid, which has grown out of Afrikaner nationalism, infects South Africa's social, political and economic life. Designed to make white and black independent of one another, apartheid in effect has come to mean the economic, social and political domination of white over black. The Afrikaner, or Boer, a descendant of the Dutch settlers who came to South Africa over 300 years ago, feels that his existence is threatened by both the English-speaking South African and the Bantu. The Boers' forefathers settled and civilized the empty land now South Africa. Later, the Boers, moving north into the interior, collided with Bantu tribes moving south. In 1838, at the Battle of Blood River, the trekkers routed Zulu Chief Dingaan's armies and asserted their supremacy. The Afrikaner today remains militant in defending his culture from absorption by the Bantu as well as the British.

The enmity between Boer and Britisher dates back to 1795, when the British took over the Cape Colony. After the Napoleonic

wars, British settlers began to migrate to South Africa. To avoid British domination and British liberal ideas concerning the emancipation of slaves, in 1836 the Voortrekkers began the Great Trek into Orange Free State and the Transvaal. With the discovery of rich deposits of gold and diamonds in the 1860's, the two republics appeared more inviting and were eventually annexed by the British. Boer discontent because of annexation resulted in the Boer War, 1899-1902. The Boers have never forgiven the British for their defeat or for the 26,000 Afrikaner women and children who died in British prison camps during the war.

Half of Africa's white population is concentrated in the Union, giving the whites there a sense of group solidarity. Because there are only three black men for every white, a "manageable" proportion, the Afrikaner is hopeful that he can keep the Bantu in subordination. There are 14.5 million people in the Union, 3 million of whom are white, 10 million of whom are Bantu. Roughly two million are Coloreds or Indians. Of the white population, 60 per cent are Afrikaners. Elsewhere in Africa there are 50 natives for each white man.

The problem for South Africa "is basically one of nationalities,"³ black and Afrikaner. The white South African not only recognizes this problem, but also offers a solution. As he sees it, there are in effect two South Africas. The theory of two South Africas dates back to General Barry Hertzog, founder of the National party in 1912, and creator of much of the extreme Afrikaner-nationalist policy. Hertzog believed that "the irresistible force and the immovable object must

¹ Bantu in this article refers to the African of tribal descent. Actually, Bantu is a language.

² Thomas R. Adam, *Government and Politics in Africa, South of the Sahara*, N. Y., Random House, p. 4.

³ S. Pienaar and Anthony Sampson, *South Africa, Two Views of Separate Development*, N. Y., Oxford University Press, 1960, pp. 8-9.

not meet. White nationalism and black nationalism must be diverted into confluent channels. There must be a White South Africa and a Black South Africa politically divided but peacefully and co-operatively co-existent.¹⁴ This is in effect apartheid.

Structure of Apartheid

Prior to World War II, segregation and color discrimination were widely practiced; yet there was little legislation making apartheid the rule of law. In 1913 African land holdings were frozen; further purchases or renting of lands outside of these reserves were outlawed. During the 1920's the pass laws were enacted. A pass enables an African to leave his reserve, and live and work in an area outside; it also serves "as part of the machinery of keeping the natives under control in the white areas."¹⁵ In 1936, Hertzog secured the necessary two-thirds majority in parliament to remove Africans from a common roll and to make them vote separately. Henceforth four Europeans in the Senate and three in the House were elected on a separate roll to represent African voters. In 1960, their three white representatives in the House of Assembly were removed as part of the program for dual, separate development.

In 1948, campaigning on a program of apartheid and *baaskap* (white supremacy), Nationalist party leader Daniel Malan defeated General Jan Smuts and the United party. Smuts, who believed in an integrated European society of Boer and Briton, was replaced by South Africa's first all-Afrikaner government. Malan immediately set out to implement his policies. The next 12 years witnessed the organized growth of a legal complexity to outlaw all social intercourse between white and black. Thus was instituted a Jim Crow system which, unlike that of the American South, did not need to circumvent the law to accomplish its purpose.

In 1949, the Mixed Marriages Act prohibited unions between white and black. In 1950 the Population Registration Act classified people on the basis of being white, col-

ored or black. The Group Areas Act, 1950, divided the Union into urban racial areas. Under this Act and the subsequent Natives Resettlement Act of 1954, Sophiatown, the African suburb outside of Johannesburg, was declared a white area. Some 70,000 Africans including native landowners, were evicted to Meadowlands, a location far outside the city. Furthermore, no Africans were allowed land-owning rights there. In redistrictings such as this, few if any whites are ever uprooted.

The Suppression of Communism Act, also in 1950, defined communism so loosely that it could be applied to anyone who disagreed with the government. The Bantu Authorities Act, 1951, gave the government control over the tribal reserves' administration, and served to increase the power of the tribal chiefs, subject as always to the central government. In 1953, the Criminal Law Amendment Act was passed in reaction to a passive resistance campaign that had grown up in 1952-1953 to protest a government attempt to place Colored voters on a separate roll. The 1.5 million Coloreds, who consider themselves a step above the Bantus, suffer from almost as much discrimination. The one-half million Indians in South Africa enjoy no political rights, and must also live apart from the whites.

The Criminal Law Amendment Act imposed severe fines and prison terms and lashings for anyone guilty of protesting or of "incitement to protest" the government's policies.⁶ The complementary 1953 Public Safety Act empowered the government to impose emergency regulations under which the authorities detain a person at will. A Separate Amenities Act made lawful separate but unequal facilities for the two races. A white restaurant could refuse to serve a black man; segregation on public buses was also introduced. The 1954 Industrial Conciliation Act outlawed trade unionism for black workers. This Act also introduced another severe hardship; a breach of contract was a criminal act.

To override the "entrenched clauses" in the Constitution allowing Coloreds to vote on a common roll, an act in 1955 increased Senate membership from 48 to 89 seats. Seventy-seven of these "packed" seats were received by the Nationalists, giving Prime

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ T. Walter Wallbank, *Contemporary Africa*, Princeton, D. Van Nostrand Co., 1956, p. 81.

⁶ Alan Paton, *Hope for South Africa*, N. Y., Frederick A. Praeger, 1959, p. 44.

Minister J. S. Strijdom the necessary two-thirds vote to amend the Constitution and to pass a Separate Representation of Colored Voters Act. On an appeal verdict, a packed Appellate Court, which under the Appellate Court Act was enlarged from 5 to 11 members, approved the removal of Colored voters from the common rolls (1956). The Coloreds too, after 30 years, were disenfranchised in the white elections.

The Prohibition of Interdicts Act prohibited courts from granting injunctions to Bantus ordered from urban areas. Now the black man must first take himself to an out-lying area; only then may he press his suit. No other recourse is open, even in cases of mistaken identity. The Native Laws Amendment Act, 1958, made it possible for a minister, with local support on his side, to bar Africans from white churches.

Bantu education has come under greater government control in the last decade. By the Bantu Education Act, 1954, native education was taken out of the hands of the mission schools with the government assuming the responsibility. While the government insists that the education of Bantus be limited to keep these people in a secondary position, yet the government also claims that "in five years, every African child will be in school" ⁷ and will learn to read. The native will be taught only enough English and Afrikaans to enable him to carry out orders. Now that the government has to pay all the bills, a ceiling has been placed on expenditures. The school feeding program has been curtailed. Capping the government's limitation of Bantu education was the 1959 Extension of University Education Act, under which non-white institutions are to be set up and blacks are barred from white universities.

The Bantustans

These are some of the laws which provide the structural framework of apartheid. There are other new laws, new applications and interpretations of this legal frankenstein to plug up any leaks. The Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959, estab-

lishing eight self-governing Bantustans, adds a new superstructure to apartheid policies and to Hertzog's ideal of separate development of the white and black communities. The Bantustans are to be pieced together from the "264 parcels of native reserve territories" forming a northeasterly horseshoe round the Union. The reserve system originated to provide homelands for the Bantu tribes being dispossessed by the Boer settlers. The consolidation of the Bantustans is expected to produce "eight ethnically-oriented territories with their own hierarchy of African authority."⁸ Meanwhile, the chiefs are still paid by the national government; they may be hired and fired.

Theoretically, leaving out the question of the Cape Coloreds and Asians, South Africa plans to create a system of dual autonomy; two sovereign, equal governments will rule over the black and white areas. Their relations with each other will be conducted through the formal channels of exchanging ambassadors. South Africa is to become a collectivity of nations.

The Bantustans are extremely poor unarable lands where 3.5 million blacks now live in destitution. It is inconceivable that these areas, 12 per cent of the total land, could support more than two-thirds of the Union's populace. Unfortunately, the eight Bantustans are scattered at random throughout the Union. Since Sharpeville, the government has accelerated its Bantustan program; however, only \$3.5 million of the \$100 million estimated as necessary for developing them has been allotted.

Disregarding the barrenness of these lands, the Afrikaner views them as further proof that he can make apartheid work. Although the urban Bantus are considered the most westernized, detribalized Africans, the Afrikaner clings to the "convenient fiction that the Bantu can choose to return to his customary, relatively autonomous tribal life if dissatisfied with his place in European society. . . ."⁹ Prime Minister Hendrik F. Verwoerd has even voiced the possibility that if the states of black South Africa prefer, they can become as free "as Ghana is today."¹⁰ In reality, however, the government's concept of independence for the Bantustans includes the "proviso of no 'actual

⁷ Gwendolen M. Carter, *Independence for Africa*, N. Y., Frederick A. Praeger, 1960, p. 64.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

⁹ Adam, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

¹⁰ Pienaar and Sampson, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

surrender of sovereignty”¹¹ by the national government.

Economics and Apartheid

Afrikaners insist that when apartheid is fully effected the white man will have to work harder and perform his own unskilled, manual labor needs. Verwoerd himself has no Bantu servants in his home, an exception rather than the rule. Nonetheless, total apartheid is impractical because white and black in South Africa need each other. To exist, the African must sell his labor. To exist, white South Africa must buy his labor.

South Africa's rural economy is based on a limitless supply of cheap, unskilled native labor. The Afrikaner farmers love their farms. However, without cheap native labor, the Afrikaner farmer could not make his farm pay. The Afrikaner farmer must rely on convict labor or natives. A convict laborer earns \$8.40 monthly in cash and kind. A native laborer is paid from \$25 to \$40 monthly in cash and kind. This system might be tenable in an agrarian society, but not in a modern industrial state. Yet South Africa must industrialize because its land is not rich enough to support an agricultural society. Eighty-five per cent of South Africa's land is not arable: “. . . rural South Africa is incapable of building modern prosperity on the soil. The greatest continuous area of sand in the world is South Africa's Kalahari Desert. . . . Rural poverty is the whip that drives South Africa towards ever greater industrialization.”¹²

South Africa has long been an industrial center with its multi-million gold and diamond mining enterprises. Its continuing industrial expansion aids the Bantus because there is a “coercion implicitly exercised by investments, science, technology and the market place.”¹³ The Bantus in turn help speed up this process by spending some \$1,-

100,000,000 annually in the Union. This represents one-third of the country's purchasing power.

Black South Africa also provides a large labor force, with a growing exodus from the rural to the urban areas. Presently, there are two blacks for every white in the urban areas. It is estimated that even when the Bantustan program has been completed, there will still be two blacks for every white in the white areas.¹⁴ One of the reasons for the continuing urbanization of the Bantu is that he is the highest paid urban African on the continent, with an average monthly income of \$39. However, his living expenses far exceed this amount, estimated at approximately \$69 monthly for a family of five.

Religion and Apartheid

The relentless drive by the Afrikaner to strengthen apartheid is partly due to his Calvinist teachings and his Dutch Reformed Church, which have led the Afrikaner to believe that he is carrying out God's mission. The Voortrekkers carried their bibles with them as they pushed north and found justification in the Old Testament for believing that the Bantus were naturally inferior. To the Afrikaner, whose politics also received the support of the British-speaking whites, “. . . there is an organic truth to the shape of South African society.”¹⁵ For him, apartheid is his politics and his morality.¹⁶ Prime Minister Strijdom, who succeeded Malan in 1955, proclaimed a policy of “‘white supremacy with justice for all.’” Strijdom's successor, incumbent Prime Minister Verwoerd, made his solution stronger yet: “baaskap and an Afrikaner republic, with a president ‘responsible only to God.’”¹⁷

The Commonwealth and Apartheid

By the South Africa Act of 1909, a constitutional government and dominion status were given South Africa. Partly to compensate for the severities of the Boer War, partly in the belief that the British would anglicize the Boers, the Afrikaners were made equal partners in the new government. In 1910, the British colonies of Cape and Natal were united with the two Boer republics, Transvaal and Orange Free State. Ever since,

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

¹² C. W. de Kiewiet, *The Anatomy of South African Misery*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1956, p. 38.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 70-71.

¹⁴ *The Reporter*, September 1, 1960, p. 20.

¹⁵ James Morris, *South African Winter*, N. Y., Pantheon Books, 1958, p. 53.

¹⁶ Paton, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

under the leadership of Botha, Smuts, Hertzog, Malan, Strijdom and Verwoerd, the Afrikaner has been relentless in his effort to protect his culture, his language, his government from both Briton and Bantu.

In 1931 the Statute of Westminster assured all Commonwealth parliaments of non-interference by the Crown. Yet the Afrikaners remained anti-British and adamant in their desire to preserve their way of life. There has never been a British prime minister of South Africa. Afrikaans, the dialect of the Afrikaners, was made equal to English as the official language; the Queen's picture was removed from postage stamps; the union jack was replaced by a South African flag.

These measures were taken in the face of the British South Africans' support of apartheid. The United party, leading opposition group consisting primarily of the English-speaking electorate, sides with the Nationalist government on apartheid issues. With half the popular vote, the United party holds only one-third of the parliamentary seats. A constitutional provision allowing for up to 15 per cent over-representation for rural areas (largely inhabited by Afrikaner farmers), and a 15 per cent under-representation for urban areas, assures the Nationalists a majority.

In 1939, by a bare majority of 13 votes, General Smuts won a vote to take South Africa into the second world war on the side of the British. However, in 1940, Malan and Strijdom had approved a "Nationalist draft constitution for an Afrikaner-dominated republic outside the Commonwealth."¹⁸ In office, Malan and Strijdom did not take steps to accelerate secession from the Commonwealth, or attempt to create a republic within the Commonwealth.

A New Republic

It was Verwoerd who on January 20, 1960, announced that he would shortly introduce legislation to the parliament on the holding of a referendum on whether South Africa should become a republic with a president replacing the Queen. Before assuming the prime ministership in 1958, Verwoerd

had served since 1950 as minister of native affairs, a job that won him the accolade, "architect of apartheid."

When announcing the referendum bill, Verwoerd declared that all South African legislation had been heading "in the direction of a republic," particularly "the Status Acts, the Flag Act, the abandoning of *God Save the Queen* as an anthem, the Citizenship Act. He might have added the whole weight of oppressive and apartheid legislation, which has given South Africa a *de facto* constitution not very far removed from the famous Nazi-oriented republican constitution he published when editor of *Die Transvaler* in 1942."¹⁹

In May, the House of Assembly approved the bill to hold a referendum on republic status for South Africa. Following the conflict in the Belgium Congo in July, 1960, Verwoerd announced that the referendum would be held on October 5. On that day, 52 per cent of the white electorate (a majority of 74,000) voted "yes" for a republic. Verwoerd announced a waiting period before formal proclamation of the *Republiek van Suid-Afrika*, scheduled for May 31, 1961.

Although it is willing to remain in the Commonwealth, South Africa's application for membership will probably be rejected; unless Britain is successful in persuading enough Commonwealth states to accept its application. The black African states, led by Commonwealth member Ghana, have imposed an economic boycott on South Africa. Ghana will not permit a white South African to enter the country unless he declares his opposition to apartheid. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, on a visit to the Union in February, 1960, condemned apartheid in a speech to South Africa's parliament. Furthermore, world opinion has tried to pressure South Africa into easing its racial laws. South Africa has been condemned in the United Nations. The U.S. issued a statement criticizing police action at Sharpeville.

Sharpeville, in March, 1960, intensified world opposition, but it also realigned Afrikaner solidarity more firmly behind Verwoerd's apartheid program. A non-violent, protest demonstration against the pass laws had been organized by Robert Sobukwe, leader of the Pan-Africanist Congress.

¹⁸ Colin Lovell, "South Africa in the Commonwealth," *Current History*, June, 1958, p. 337.

¹⁹ *The Economist*, Oct. 15, 1960, p. 218.

Large numbers of unarmed Africans in several black suburbs, or native locations, near white cities, marched without their passes up to South African police. They demanded to be arrested. At the Sharpeville police station, a crowd estimated to be as large as 15,000 persons gathered. Frightened police eventually fired on the mob, killing 67 and wounding 186.

Following Sharpeville there was a temporary easing of the pass laws, but stringent restrictions were put back in force early in April, 1960. Verwoerd himself told the parliament that the anti-pass law riots "can in no way be described as reactions against the Government's Apartheid policy. The disturbances are periodic phenomenon and have got nothing to do with poverty and low wages."²⁰

The Sharpeville tragedy points up clearly the direction that South African politics is taking. Chief Albert Luthuli, President of the 50-year-old African National Congress, has pursued a course of non-violent, passive resistance. In spite of increasing apartheid, Chief Luthuli has maintained his belief in the practicability of a multi-racial society in South Africa. On the other hand, Sobukwe's Pan-Africanist Congress has grown out of the need for more extreme, radical steps to counteract Verwoerd's intensified apartheid program. The P.A.C., which branched off from the A.N.C. in 1959, is dedicated to creating an Africa for the Africans. Thus, South Africa's apartheid policies are moving toward collision with an emerging nationalism. The leadership of a new generation is

²⁰ Norman Phillips, *The Tragedy of Apartheid*, N. Y., David McKay Co., 1960, p. 126.

²¹ Morris, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

²² Carter, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

reducing the possibility of a compromise solution.

Tragically, the problem that the Afrikaners face individually they must also face collectively: where are they going? Neither the Afrikaner nor the Bantu has a place to go if he leaves the Union. South Africa belongs as much to the whites as to the blacks. They are both equally newcomers. The whites are needed as much as the blacks. Indeed, ". . . were it not for European skill, courage and labour the Union simply would not exist."²¹

Recognizing the dilemma, the business community has asked the government to ease its restrictions on the African laborer. In the wake of the Sharpeville massacre, South Africa's gold and foreign reserves dropped \$64 million in a seven week period. There is reason to believe that if a racial crisis should again threaten the Union, Afrikaner and British business interests will speak up "for a relaxation of the restrictions on Africans so that more stable conditions could be developed again."²²

Meanwhile, white and black continue to pull further apart. It seems inevitable that some day the South African blacks, under the impetus of the industrial and political twin revolutions, will sweep into power. Against this day the Afrikaners, who pride themselves on their soldiery and marksmanship, have organized themselves into *skiet-kommandoes* (shooting commandoes). The Afrikaners' readiness for battle stands in sharp contrast to the African National Congress' dedication to non-violence. As long as white and black remain in South Africa, separated yet together, as long as apartheid rules, the possibility of violence persists.

(Continued from p. 103)

Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Ceylon, Morocco and Tunisia. The costly effort of the United Nations in the Congo might face complete failure.

In the meantime Lumumba escaped from his U.N. guards in Leopoldville (with the aid of those guards, charged Mobutu) and headed for Stanleyville, where supporters had taken control in the city and in Oriental Province and were seeking to establish a

center of power for their thwarted leader. Soldiers of Mobutu captured Lumumba before he could reach his friends. He was brutally treated by his captors and placed under close watch in a cell in Thysville, where Mobutu's men stand guard.

By 1961, the Congo Republic was sinking into an ever more confused political and economic chaos; so great were the divisions within the United Nations that it was hopeless to make any guess as to what lies ahead for that organization or for the Congolese.

(Continued from p. 69)

meet the demands or even the wishes of the Afro-Asian states. These states should be neither spoiled nor treated as second class member states. The intelligent leaders of these states want neither kind of "preferential" treatment. They will continue to defend and pursue what they consider to be the best interest of their respective countries. But, since they are members of a world community, the United Nations, they must abandon the idea, voiced by even some Negro American leaders, that the African nations must be allowed to settle their own problems.

Conclusion

The obvious conclusion to be drawn from this analysis of the votes in the fifteenth General Assembly is that there was in mid-December, 1960, no monolithic Afro-Asian bloc. Due consideration for the aspirations of the member states of that so-called bloc may prevent an automatic vote on their part. But by the same token there must not be an automatic Western-controlled bloc. Neither is needed to offset the one steadfast bloc, the nine member states dominated by the Soviet Union.

It is a commonplace that riots against the desegregation of American schools, especially the current demonstrations in New Orleans, are worth millions of dollars of propaganda for the Soviet Union. The difficulties encountered by some of the new black African nations in finding suitable houses or apartments in Washington for their embassies and chanceries are also grist for the Russian propaganda mill. These difficulties stem in part from a shortage of housing: if sixteen new Scandinavian nations were seeking quarters, they would encounter problems. Washington real estate brokers and others sensitive to the propaganda value of what appears to be—and in some instances probably is—racial discrimination, are actively seeking to assist the new black nations.

The Soviet propagandists, understandably, repeatedly call attention to restrictive covenants but rarely mention the Supreme Court decision, *Shelley v. Kraemer*, 1948. This decision held that state court action to prevent infringement of such restrictive covenants violated the equal protection clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment. When this decision is mentioned, the propagandists attribute it to the realization by the United States government that it must put its house in order after the outbreak of the cold war. In fact, the United States began putting its house in order as early as 1915 when the Supreme Court held the Oklahoma Grandfather Clause unconstitutional. Since 1915 the Supreme Court has almost unremittingly ruled in favor of the civil rights of Negroes, and some of the other crucial decisions antedated 1947.

Further evidence of discrimination against Negroes is documented especially by Henry M. Wriston's chapter in *Goals for Americans*, published in mid-December, 1960. Although his views are his own, the fact that he wrote as Chairman of a Commission on National Goals appointed by President Eisenhower makes clear that many distinguished Americans are acutely aware of the nation's shortcomings and deliberately make them known.

Since I was born in Washington at the turn of the century, I know that we Negro Americans, especially in Washington, have made sturdy strides in the direction of these goals. I am convinced that many Negro Americans agree with this point of view. I believe that, as Africans learn more about these strides, they will increasingly take a close look at Russian propaganda based upon the continuing manifestations of racial discrimination. And I believe this also: Africans will know, as do many Negro Americans in some northern communities, the answer to the Russian boast that there is no racial prejudice in Russia. "Of course, you don't have any Negroes."

Some African leaders also understand the "purity" of Russia's colonial past in Africa—Russia has had no colonies there. These leaders may even hear the pleas for liberation from some of the detention camps in Russia's "contiguous colonies," the Eastern satellite states. Russia can no more buy the friendship, allegiance or positive non-alignment of the black African states than can the West. But the West, headed by the United States, must not try to use the African states as pawns in the cold war. Such stupidity would almost certainly create a solid Afro-Asian bloc.

Received At Our Desk

New Books on Africa . . .

KENYA—THE TENSIONS OF PROGRESS. By SUSAN WOOD. (London: Oxford University Press, 1960. 108 pages, \$80.)

This slender volume is an excellent introduction to the various problems that beset Kenya, written by a "native" who is politically active and who thus is in a position to draw on intimate knowledge of the scene. The treatment is perceptive, and the author does not hesitate to criticize her own, European, community for "blocking the way" to progress. The seven chapters, aside from introduction and conclusion, deal with social, educational, and political problems, one chapter being devoted to Tanganyika and Uganda, and one to the recent Kenya Constitutional Conference in London.

The body of the book develops the theme that the political revolution is moving well ahead of the economic and social revolutions. The impact of nationalism is felt by all three racial groups. The Europeans' *malaise* stems from a lack of confidence and a fear for the future of their way of life, though they realize that some adjustment is required since Africans are not willing to sacrifice political power to attain the Europeans' advantages. Still, Europeans are "living in small and fragile glass houses, out of touch with the forces prevailing outside." The Africans, who prefer to govern badly than not at all, are faced with the problem of creating a basis for unity that transcends tribalism and a nationalism whose chief feature is negative "anti-colonialism." The Asians are in an unhappy middle position, drawn emotionally to the Africans but economically toward the Europeans, while remaining culturally apart.

While the European farmers in the Highlands comprise 3 per cent of the population, they produce 30 per cent of

the nation's revenue, not counting taxation. The Africans want "economically unsound" resettlement, which the Europeans resist on economic and emotional grounds. The fact is that the African is in the majority and moving toward self-government, so that some adjustment must be made.

European opposition, adamant as it sometimes is, is nevertheless not united. Therein the author sees a hope for the future of race relations, for a monolithic European bloc would undoubtedly make matters worse. The concessions made by the British government to the Africans at the London conference, resulting in a common roll and an African majority in the legislature, are viewed only as a stage toward full independence. But, as political power changes hands, economic power remains in the hands of a few, and the author calls on Whitehall to revise what she calls a drifting, *ad hoc*, crisis policy and to take the lead in overcoming these obstacles.

W.E.S.

NIGERIA, NEWEST NATION. By LOIS MITCHISON. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960. 114 pages, bibliography, and index, \$3.00.)

Based upon an extended visit to Nigeria in late 1958, the author penetrates behind such abstractions as the conflicts between tribalism and the new order, native resentment of British superiority, or the jealousies of the three territorial divisions. A political and a separate tribal map are welcome features of the book. The first three chapters are devoted to history and description of people and land. This is done in such a way as to make Africans come alive and to leave the reader with the satisfaction that he has developed a feeling for some of their human aspirations.

Resentment against British patronage, for example, has developed a cocky self-

confidence among the little-educated, leading to inefficiency and reluctance to continue the learning process. To speak to an African in Pidgin English is to insult his English. On the other hand, social pressures provide a strong incentive to acquire knowledge, as evident in pupils' resentment at additional work being assigned as a punishment: the privilege of working harder should be reserved for the ambitious and the industrious. Social prestige resulting from higher living standards has also led to a home-grown version of keeping-up-with-one's-fellow-Yorubas with the accent on cars, new clothes, and refrigerators.

The fourth chapter, on politics, discusses both centrifugal and centripetal trends and personalities. Recognizing that territorial unity and nationalism are purely British creations, the author shows that North and South nevertheless aim toward maintaining this unity in the face of regionalism and tribalism. While the 1959 elections are interpreted as reflecting primarily regional interests, the three regions either oppose or attempt to benefit from the many smaller tribal units' clamor for self-determination. Fears of each others' domination is tempered by compromise and the economic and political advantages of remaining united. The gap will, in the future, be bridged by education.

W.E.S.

TOWARD UNITY IN AFRICA. By DONALD S. ROTHSCHILD. (Washington D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1960. 193 pages and index, \$5.00.)

Rothschild presents a thought-provoking analysis of federalism in British Africa, as indicated in the book's subtitle. Based upon a study in depth of post-war political developments in Nigeria, British East Africa, and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, he considers the chances of success for the federal principle in the three areas. The author assumes that the past record of federalism does not provide sufficient evidence in itself, and that motives must therefore be re-examined before assessing the future. He does accept, however, the *sine qua non* that federalism

must be based upon "freely given consent."

The major theme of the book is that whatever union is in evidence today is based primarily on mutual fears, be they of domination of one group by another or of foreign control. Thus, while a desire for economic rationality and development has led to various nuances of a growing acceptance of union, political union, in contrast, has had greater impact as a quest for safeguards against insecurity. Federalism, the author states, has been adopted in response to international pressures, but at the same time "derives its greatest appeal" from its capability to adjust to internal pressures.

Since the uniform motive is fear, the future is uncertain. The solution is obvious; the bases of mistrust must be minimized for the benefit of a community of interests based on consent; favorable operation of the "balancing mechanism" that is federalism will stand to benefit from the growing drive for African unity.

W.E.S.

THE RELUCTANT AFRICAN. By LOUIS E. LOMAX. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. 117 pages, \$2.95.)

Mr. Lomax has written a fast-moving account of his visit to several African countries (Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, and the Union of South Africa) in the late spring of 1960. As an American Negro who tried to "go behind the emotional facade of freedom," he has had access to information that may have been closed to others. The result is an interesting and readable tale, without any startling addition to general knowledge.

The value of the book consists in the author's forcefully expressed conviction that Africa's feelings must be taken seriously. This is highlighted by the recent boycott against the Union of South Africa, by the training of Algerian troops in the U.A.R., Ghana, and Guinea, and by the "freedom fighters" whose activities are financed locally, but whose headquarters are in Cairo. While at times superficial (e.g., when he calls Kenyatta "the undisputed leader of the Africans in Kenya," or when he says that Kenyatta's house

arrest by the British "gives Kenyatta a charismatic quality"), Lomax's premise is that foreign rule is an irritant which must consequently be removed. He warns that most of the "hot battles" of the cold war will be fought for the next five years on that continent. "The Africans will see to that," he explains, and then the fate of "civilization as we know it" will be determined in South Africa; if conditions do not change there, the future holds a "bloody race war."

W.E.S.

UGANDA. By HAROLD INGRAMS. (London: H.M.S.O., 1960. Illustrated, 345 pages, bibliography, index, maps, \$5.60.)

Another book that contributes vividly to an understanding of African life is this work, written by a British Colonial Official with a long and distinguished record. It consists mostly of stories and vignettes, pieced together to make up a portrait of Uganda. The book covers a wide range of subjects including history, social, economic and political life. Part II, entitled "Thinking about Uganda," presents some of the author's general observations about the future of the country. British rule is termed as "really applied democracy"; and while African sentiment apparently favors a federal state, a unitary structure is emerging from British tutelage.

WALTER E. SKURNIK
University of Pennsylvania

• • •

DE GAULLE'S REPUBLIC. By PHILIP M. WILLIAMS AND MARTIN HARRISON. (New York: Longmans, Greene & Co., 1960. 279 pages, appendix and index, \$4.50.)

President Charles de Gaulle's strong nationalism has created severe difficulties for the Nato alliance. He has sought to make France a nuclear power, which would enhance the French position vis-a-vis the United States and Britain, and to establish close ties with West Germany. In general, he is opposed to European integration, feeling that France must first re-

gain a measure of military strength, particularly in the nuclear and missile fields. Discontent is widespread among former de Gaulle supporters over his military policy and his abandonment of the principle of supra-national organizations for western Europe.

The big question mark remains Algeria. The failure of the Fourth Republic to resolve the Algerian problem led to its overthrow and the establishment of the Fifth Republic. From the beginning de Gaulle insisted "that the constitution, Algeria and the colonies came first." There was constitutional change and a settlement of France's colonial problems, but Algeria remained a festering sore threatening the stability of the regime.

The authors of this solid, analytical book trace the factors leading to the downfall of the Fourth Republic and the rise to power of de Gaulle. They "show how the new regime consolidated itself through the referendum and elections, and how de Gaulle outwitted both his adversaries and his allies; and they discuss the internal struggle for power among the General's followers." They examine the authoritarian character of the present regime, notwithstanding the outward signs of democracy, and speculate on the probable pattern of the future of the Fifth Republic.

A. Z. R.

COLONIAL VIRGINIA. By RICHARD L. MORTON. (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press for the Virginia Historical Society, 1960. Illustrated. 883 pages, bibliography and index, \$15.00.)

This handsome two volume boxed set is an impressive historical narrative of the contribution that Virginia made to American history. Volume I, "The Tidewater Period, 1607-1710," deals with the establishment of this first British colony in the new world and early relations with the mother country. The early rivalry between Virginia Colony and Britain had further reverberations in the eighteenth century.

Volume Two, entitled "Westward Expansion and Prelude to Revolution," picks up this theme. It covers the expansion of

the Colony, the wars with the Indians, and Virginia's development as one of the authors of "the platform for revolution." By 1763, "Virginians [had] pushed their frontiers from Tidewater into Trans-Allegheny. In politics, they developed such leaders as Richard Bland, Peyton Randolph, Robert Carter Nicholas, soldier-Burgess George Washington, and orator Patrick Henry. . . . In preparation for the Revolutionary War, only a dozen years in the future, the eight-year French and Indian War trained such military leaders as Washington and Andrew Lewis. Virginians were ready to take a leading part in the Revolutionary Era just beginning in 1763."

T. H. B.

A WIND FROM THE NORTH. THE LIFE OF HENRY THE NAVIGATOR. By EARLE BRADFORD. (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1960. 256 pages, chronology, notes and index, \$5.00.)

Five hundred years ago, Prince Henry of Portugal died after a lifetime spent encouraging the age of exploration and discovery. Henry the Navigator, as much as any single person, gave impetus to an age that began the colonization of the non-European world. All those interested in history will enjoy this lively account by a British naval specialist.

T. H. B.

LOOK TO THE WILDERNESS. By W. DOUGLAS BURDEN. (Boston: Little Brown, 1960. 251 pages, \$6.50.)

It sometimes happens that current history comes into clearer focus through the lens of a clear-sighted traveller. "Look to the Wilderness" describes travels in the wilds of North America, in the Far East and in Latin America. Fine writing and excellent photography add to the reader's enjoyment of this book.

T. H. B.

HORSEMEN BLUE AND GRAY: A PICTORIAL HISTORY. By JAMES R. JOHNSON AND ALFRED H. BILL. Pictures by Hirst Dillon Milhollen. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960. 236 pages, bibliography, picture source and index, \$10.00.)

This account, accompanied by excellent illustrative material, of Union and Con-

federate cavalry as developed and employed during the Civil War, provides colorful military history. The men, the music, the maneuvers and battles of both sides, as portrayed here, excite the reader's interest.

T. H. B.

THE AMERICAN INDIAN WARS. By JOHN TEBBEL AND KEITH JENNISON. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960. 301 pages, bibliographical notes and index, \$4.95.)

Between 1500 and 1900, in some four hundred years, American Indians were reduced in number from a million to some 400,000. Here in a single dramatically written volume is the story of the white man's victory in North America. Sympathetic to the Amerindian cause, the authors have told their story with clarity and in considerable detail. Even those readers familiar with American history will find this one-volume work a valuable synthesis of material on the Indians of America.

T. H. B.

OUR INCREDIBLE CIVIL WAR. By BURKE DAVIS. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960. 246 pages and bibliography, \$4.95.)

"A compilation of tales, facts, coincidences and oddities," this is a lively addition to the plethora of materials about the War Between the States. A miscellany of facts has been skilfully utilized to provide readers with interesting detail on such topics as "Firsts" of the war, music during the war, the youth of the participants, riots on the home front. "The range of the book is great, from the strictly factual bulk of it . . . to half legend, pure legend—and even high fantasy."

T. H. B.

GOVERNMENT, LAW, AND COURTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE. EDITED BY VLADIMIR GSOVSKI AND KAZIMIERZ GRZYBOWSKI. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960. Two volumes. 2067 pages, appendix, bibliography and index, \$30.00.)

As a result of the efforts of two eminent jurists, we now have available a monumental survey of law and legal systems in

(Continued on p. 116)

Current Documents

THE NATO MINISTERS' COMMUNIQUE

On December 18, 1960, at the conclusion of the Nato ministerial conference in Paris, the following communiqué was issued:

The regular ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council was held in Paris from December 16 to 18, 1960.

The ministers engaged in an extensive review of the international situation—political, military and economic. In pursuance of decisions previously taken, they also considered the question of long-term planning on the basis of a progress report from the Secretary General and suggestions put forward by governments.

The Council reaffirmed the solidarity of the alliance and their dedication to the principle of the settlement of all disputes by peaceful means, without recourse to the use of force or threats.

They declared their determination to work for a lasting improvement in international relations, in which freedom, national independence and law would be respected. This would be true peaceful coexistence free from all idea of world domination.

The Council deplored the lack of progress during the past year on disarmament, resulting from the Communist states' withdrawal from the ten-power conference before even examining the Western proposals.

The Council reaffirmed their support for the principles expressed in those proposals as a basis for attaining their common objective of general and complete disarmament by stages under effective international control. They expressed their hope for the early resumption of negotiations.

The Council regretted the lack of progress on the unification of Germany on the basis of self-determination. With regard to Berlin, the Council reaffirmed their declaration of December 16, 1958. In face of the recent Soviet threats and harassing tactics, they once again declared their determination to protect the freedom of the people of West Berlin.

In order that the Atlantic alliance may pursue its constructive purposes in peace and

without fear, confronted as it is by the menace of growing Communist military strength, the North Atlantic nations must be able to respond to any attack with whatever force might be appropriate. There must be a proper balance in the forces of the alliance of nuclear and conventional strength to provide the required flexibility.

The ministers, in the light of the annual review, took note of the progress which had been made, and expressed their determination to continue their efforts to improve the deterrent and defensive strength of the alliance.

In this connection, the United States Government suggested the concept of an M.R.B.M. [medium-range ballistic missile] multilateral force for consideration by the alliance. The Council took note of the United States suggestion with great interest and instructed the permanent representatives to study the suggestion and related matters in detail.

The Council welcomed the assurance of the United States to maintain in the Nato area United States nuclear weapons made available to Nato.

At the same time, the Council agreed on the equal importance of strengthening the shield forces of Nato in other respects so that there can be no possibility of miscalculation or misunderstanding of the alliance's determination and ability to resist aggression by whatever means are appropriate and necessary.

The ministers noted with satisfaction the steps so far taken in response to the proposals made by Defense Ministers in spring, 1960, in the field of logistics and for cooperation in research, development and production of military equipment. They urged all parties concerned to press on with the projects already selected, and to study what further projects are suitable for cooperative action.

The ministers examined the report sub-

mitted to them on long-term planning, in particular with regard to political consultation and economic problems.

They reaffirmed their determination to pursue within the alliance comprehensive political consultation designed to achieve the closest possible coordination of their views and unity of action. They studied ways and means of achieving this result.

In the economic field, they welcomed the creation of the O.E.C.D. [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], which, by promoting balanced economic growth and the expansion of world trade, will benefit all the nations of the free world.

They emphasized the importance they attach to the development of the less-favored countries of the alliance.

Comprising as they do many of the more industrially developed countries, the Atlantic nations recognize their special responsibility in the field of aid to under-developed countries.

The ministers instructed the permanent representatives to follow up previous studies to enable the countries of the alliance to watch the development of the Communist economic offensive and to concert the necessary defensive measures.

The Secretary General was invited to draw up a report on these various questions which will be examined at the spring ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

This meeting will take place, at the invitation of the Norwegian Government, in Oslo in May, 1961.

(Continued from p. 114)

the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. Comprehensive, analytical, and systematic, the two volumes provide for the first time in English a comparative treatment of law and legal systems in the Soviet orbit. Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia are covered.

The authors' purpose and approach are clearly stated in the introduction: "To analyze the legal system of the countries under consideration and to illustrate its actual application against the background of their political, social, and economic life, the book relies primarily on laws and decrees, court decisions, administrative practices and procedure, and authoritative statements by leading spokesmen and scholarly writers within the Soviet orbit." Since it was impossible "to cover in a single work all the ramifications of governmental, legal and judicial systems of eleven countries," the authors decided to direct their main efforts toward an "elucidation of rights of the individual and their protection within the Soviet orbit."

The material is divided into seven parts. Each part treats a topic in its relationship first to the Soviet Union itself and then to each of the other countries covered. "Part

one deals with the origin and specific features of the Soviet regime in each country; part two is devoted to the Administration of Justice with the aim of ascertaining the characteristic methods by which the law is interpreted and applied, and the judicial machinery set up for this purpose; part three is entitled Judicial Procedure . . . ; part four covers Substantive Criminal Law; part five analyzes the Sovietization of Civil Law and covers the most important selected topics such as protection of private rights, property, contracts, domestic relations, inheritance, and some others; part six deals with Worker and Factory, covering not only labor law but also, to a limited extent, the principles of industrial organization; part seven, entitled Land and Peasant, aims at surveying the present situation with as much background and historical information as is necessary for an understanding of the situation as it is today."

The volumes will long be used as standard reference works. Although they represent the efforts of twenty-nine scholars, the books are clearly written, well-organized, and ably analyzed. The documentation is impressive, and an extensive bibliography adds to the value of an impressive achievement.

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN
University of Pennsylvania

The Month in Review

INTERNATIONAL

Arab League

Dec. 18—The Economic Conference of the League adjourns after a 10-day session, approving "rigorous economic measures" against France because of the Algerian war. Tightening of the Arab boycott of Israel is also approved.

Berlin Crisis

Dec. 23—It is reported that in unpublicized negotiations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the U.S. has asked the Soviet Union to refrain from intensifying the Berlin crisis.

Disarmament

Dec. 5—In Geneva, the nuclear test ban discussions adjourn until after the new U.S. administration takes office.

Nato

Dec. 8—The British Admiralty reveals plans to establish a gasoline and oil base for Nato at Loch Ewe in Scotland.

Dec. 13—German General Adolph Heusinger is named to head Nato's permanent Washington mission.

Dec. 16—U.S. Secretary of State Christian Herter offers to give Nato 5 ballistic missile submarines and a nuclear arsenal, subject to agreement on political controls.

Dec. 17—West Germany urges Nato to make "concrete decisions" soon on the U.S. suggestion to establish Allied control of a Nato nuclear force.

Dec. 18—The Nato Council of Ministers ends a Paris meeting. The U.S. nuclear offer will be studied. (See page 115.)

Dec. 21—British Defense Minister Harold Watkinson says that the Royal Air Force Fighter Command is to be placed under Nato control.

Dec. 27—The U.S. and 4 Nato allies agree to produce F-104G starfighter jets in Europe.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

Dec. 14—Representatives of 20 nations, including the U.S. and Canada, sign the convention establishing the O.E.C.D., to

replace the Organization for European Economic Cooperation.

United Nations

Dec. 5—Switzerland's Felix Schnyder is named unanimously High Commissioner for Refugees.

Dec. 7—Soviet representative Valerian A. Zorin, president of the Security Council, refuses to disqualify himself from presiding on discussion of the Congo crisis. (For further information see *Congo: Leopoldville*.)

Dec. 9—Chile and the United Arab Republic are elected non-permanent members of the Security Council.

Dec. 10—The Steering Committee of the General Assembly recommends an 11-week recess starting December 21.

Dec. 12—The International Atomic Energy Agency tells the General Assembly that cheap nuclear power use is some 10 years in the future.

Dec. 14—The General Assembly approves an Asian-African resolution calling for a "speedy and unconditional end to colonialism."

Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold reports that the spring session of the General Assembly will cost \$57,500 more a week.

Dec. 18—The General Assembly votes to conduct a plebiscite next May in Western Samoa to see whether citizens there want to be independent.

Dec. 19—The Assembly's Budgetary Committee recommends a record budget of \$72,969,300 for 1961.

Dec. 20—The General Assembly elects Liberia to a Security Council seat; it is agreed that Liberia will serve one year and then resign to let Ireland serve the second year of this two year split appointment.

ARGENTINA

Dec. 23—A 138 billion peso budget is approved by the Chamber of Deputies for 1961.

Dec. 24—President Arturo Frondizi appoints Guillermo Acuna Anzorena to be Minister of Labor. Economics Minister Al-

varo C. Alsogaray filled this post in the interim.

BELGIUM

Dec. 15—Belgian King Baudouin weds Doña Fabiola de Mora y Aragon of Spain.

Dec. 23—The House of Representatives meets to consider the reform bill which has caused the four-day old strike, crippling the country. The Chamber adjourns until January 3 after the session today has become unmanageable. The strike by government workers belonging to Socialist unions was called to protest the reform bill which will cut social welfare services and increase taxes.

Dec. 24—The strike enters its fifth day, with railroads, plants, bus lines and gas and electrical services at a standstill. Premier Gaston Eyskens asks the Belgian people to help restore order. He declares that austerity measures are necessary because of the loss of revenues from the Congo. Troops are called in to assist policemen dealing with violence by rioters.

Dec. 26—Socialist and Acting Governor of Hainaut Province René Thone refuses to carry out a government decree enabling provincial governors to use the army to restore order. 102 Socialist mayors in southern and eastern towns refuse to supply the government with the names of municipal workers on strike.

Dec. 28—Police and rioters clash in Brussels and in Ghent.

Dec. 29—King Baudouin and Queen Fabiola return to Brussels because violence is growing.

Dec. 30—One striker is killed and 3 are wounded because of fighting resulting from the Socialist-led strikes.

Dec. 31—Socialist leaders reject King Baudouin's plea to cooperate with the government. They promise to retaliate with strikes and riots if the austerity program is pursued.

Ruanda-Urundi

Dec. 17—The U.N. Trusteeship Committee hears 7 petitioners on the question of independence for Ruanda-Urundi.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, THE

Canada

Dec. 14—The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports the largest November unemployment

figure in 15 years: 429,000.

Dec. 20—Finance Minister Donald Fleming offers a supplementary budget offering tax relief as an incentive to industry and giving Canadian companies a tax advantage over their U.S. competitors.

Ceylon

Dec. 1—The Government nationalizes almost 2,500 church-run schools.

Ghana (See also French Community, Mali.)

Dec. 1—Parliament approves new standing orders providing that political party labels are no longer to be recognized.

Dec. 5—It is announced that Ghana has broken off diplomatic relations with Belgium.

Dec. 19—A conference of the Convention People's party publishes a blueprint for a socialistic economy.

Dec. 23—The Government reveals that 118 persons have been taken into custody following acts of "violence, gangsterism and brigandry."

Dec. 25—A spokesman for the United party protests the recent arrests and says that more than 80 United party officials have been taken into custody.

Great Britain (See also U.S.S.R.)

Dec. 1—The Archbishop of Canterbury pays a "courtesy visit" to Pope John XXIII in Rome.

Dec. 6—Chancellor of the Exchequer Selwyn Lloyd tells Commons that the U.S. Treasury has given assurances that it has "no intentions of intervening" in the Ford Motor Company offer to buy the minority shares in its British subsidiary.

Dec. 8—The government cuts the bank rate to 5 per cent.

Dec. 13—Commons approves British-U.S. cooperation, supporting government defense policies with a vote of 318 to 163.

Dec. 16—The Overseas Migration Board reveals that the total of immigrants into Britain rose to 177,499 in 1959.

Dec. 20—The government reveals plans to reorganize the administration of the nationalized railroad system.

India

Dec. 5—In New Delhi, India and the U.S. sign 5 pacts; a sixth is signed in Washington; all told, they provide \$114 million in loans for India. The loans, for industrial

development, come from the Development Loan Fund.

Dec. 17—Violence erupts in northeastern India, as Naga tribesmen press for independence.

Dec. 22—Parliament gives final approval to a three year extension of the Preventive Detention Act.

Dec. 23—In a meeting in Washington at the State Department, Indian Ambassador Mohamed Ali Currim Chagla voices deep concern about the possibility of major war in Southeast Asia.

South Africa, Union of

Dec. 5—Alan Paton loses his passport; it is seized by the government without explanation.

Dec. 18—The U.N. General Assembly asks the Union of South Africa to abandon racial discrimination in South West Africa.

BRITISH EMPIRE, THE Bechuanaland

Dec. 30—The Commonwealth Relations Office reveals that Bechuanaland has received the Queen's formal approval for a new constitution.

Buganda

Dec. 31—Parliament votes to secede from Uganda at midnight tonight.

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

Dec. 5—A constitutional conference to discuss the Federation's future opens in London; about 70 representatives attend.

Dec. 9—The African nationalist leader of Nyasaland, Dr. Hastings K. Banda, leaves the constitutional conference, charging that white leaders are "evading the political issue" involved in the African demand for Nyasaland secession.

Dec. 12—The three important African leaders walk out of the conference saying that "no useful purpose" can be served by further discussion.

Dec. 17—The constitutional conference adjourns unexpectedly and inconclusively.

BULGARIA

Dec. 21—It is reported that in 1960 industrial production in Bulgaria exceeded its goal by almost 8 per cent.

BURMA

Dec. 29—The government declares that no Communist Chinese troops have crossed

into Burma. (See also *China, Nationalist.*)

CAMBODIA

Dec. 26—Prince Norodom Sihanouk returns from a 3-month world tour. He reports that he has received promises of industrial and technical assistance from Czechoslovakia, Communist China and the U.S.S.R.

CHINA, NATIONALIST

Dec. 28—President Chiang Kai-shek declares that Communist Chinese troops have entered Burma. (See also *Burma.*)

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

Dec. 29—Peking newspapers and radio broadcasts carry reports that some 148 million acres of farm land have been affected during 1960 by disastrous "natural calamities" such as drought and floods.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

Dec. 1—President Joseph Kasavubu orders the removal of U.A.R. diplomats from the Congo Republic. He accuses the U.A.R. of having abetted the deposed Premier, Patrice Lumumba. In retaliation, U.A.R. President Abdel Gamal Nasser orders the nationalization of Belgian assets in the U.A.R.

Dec. 2—Lumumba, who has been missing almost a week, returns to Leopoldville as a prisoner of Colonel Joseph D. Mobutu. It is reported that Lumumba was arrested yesterday.

U.N. Secretary General Hammarskjold, in a telegram to Kasavubu, asks for fair treatment for Lumumba.

Dec. 3—Mobutu announces that Lumumba is being held at Camp Hardy in Thysville, a garrison town 86 miles from Leopoldville.

It is reported that yesterday Mobutu's soldiers slapped and mistreated Lumumba.

Dec. 4—Clashes between pro-Lumumba followers and Congolese soldiers during the last 48 hours, according to reports, have resulted in the death of 9 persons. The clashes took place at Kikwit, a pro-Lumumba enclave in Leopoldville province.

Dec. 5—U.N. Special Representative to the Congo Rajeshwar Dayal reports that Lumumba has received "serious injuries" and is living in a cell under extremely unhealthy conditions.

Dec. 6—The Soviet Union asks the U.N. Security Council to support the release of Lumumba by the Mobutu regime. The Soviet Union also asks that the Security Council consider Russian charges that the U.S. and the Nato powers have been fomenting unrest in the Congo.

Mobutu declares that although his soldiers at first may have mistreated Lumumba, such actions have been halted.

Dec. 7—Yugoslavia announces that it is removing its diplomatic mission to the Congo and a 21-man contingent from the U.N. forces there. Ceylon and the U.A.R. also announce the withdrawal of their troops from the U.N. Congo emergency force.

Oriental Province, a Lumumba stronghold, is placed under martial law.

Dec. 8—The Soviet Union charges that Hammarskjold is helping Mobutu and his "hired assassins."

The U.N. Command in the Congo criticizes the Congo government's act to control transport movements. The Security Department of the Congo regime has prohibited moving strategic materials for the U.N. without authorization. Brigadier Indar Jit Rikhye declares this step is in violation of the Leopoldville-U.N. accord.

Dec. 9—The U.N. offers protection to European settlers in Oriental Province, where supporters of Lumumba threaten violence unless Lumumba is released.

Dec. 12—Morocco and Guinea announce that they will withdraw their troops from the U.N. Congo force.

Dec. 13—Antoine Gizenga, who served as vice-premier under Lumumba, declares that he is now the legal head of government in the Congo. He states that the government's new seat is now in Stanleyville, not Leopoldville.

Dec. 14—The Soviet Union vetoes a Western resolution before the Security Council urging Dag Hammarskjold to continue to work for peace in the Congo. A Soviet proposal that the U.N. restore Lumumba to power is also voted down. India and Yugoslavia request that the General Assembly take up the Congo crisis.

Dec. 15—A conference of 14 African nations opens in Brazzaville to discuss Algeria and the Congo.

Dec. 16—The General Assembly meets to

debate the Congo crisis. Honduras suggests that Hammarskjold be given full powers for 100 days to effect a peace.

Dec. 19—Hammarskjold tells the General Assembly that unless he is given new directives concerning the Congo crisis, conflicts and difficulties there will increase. Hammarskjold also declares that he will have to ask the Security Council to withdraw U.N. forces in the Congo if criticism continues.

Dec. 20—All commercial air traffic to Stanleyville in Oriental Province is prohibited. Earlier this week, a ban on river traffic to Oriental Province was introduced.

Dec. 21—The Assembly debate on the Congo ends. An impasse occurs when the Assembly defeats two resolutions, one sponsored by India, Yugoslavia and six Afro-Asian states, the other by the Western powers. The Assembly agrees to keep the Congo crisis on its agenda when it reconvenes in March, 1961.

Major General Sean McKeown, Chief of Staff of the Irish army, is named commander in chief of the U.N. Congo force. He replaces Major General Carl Carlsson Von Horn of Sweden.

Antoine Gizenga forbids Europeans in Oriental Province to leave.

Dec. 25—It is reported that some 60 pro-Lumumba supporters entered Kivu Province where they captured 3 provincial officials and a Congolese army officer.

Dec. 26—It is announced by the Congolese security chief that two Congolese officials were arrested last week for making illegal contacts with the U.S.S.R.

Dec. 28—It is reported that Baluba tribesmen attacked a train three times on its way from Elisabethville to Kamina in Katanga province. The train was carrying African schoolchildren home for vacation. Some 20 persons are reported killed and many have been injured.

CUBA

Dec. 4—300 students in Havana march on the U.S. embassy to protest the killing of a bull last week by fragments of a satellite launching rocket. The U.S. fired the rocket last week from Cape Canaveral. The launching rocket was destroyed over the Atlantic and pieces probably did fall in Eastern Cuba, according to the U.S. Defense Department.

Dec. 8—The Royal Bank of Canada is nationalized by the Cuban government. Bank officials report that they have accepted the agreement under which the step was taken.

Dec. 9—Cuban Electric Company workers march on the Presidential Palace to demonstrate against Communist attempts to gain control of the union.

Dec. 10—At a rally in Moscow, President of the Cuban National Bank Ernesto Guevara declares that Cuba is ready to serve as a model for all of Latin America.

Dec. 12—It is reported that last night leaflets were dropped over Havana. The leaflets urged the Cuban people to overthrow Premier Fidel Castro.

Dec. 16—Cuba and the U.S.S.R. agree to a \$168 million trade pact, according to the Cuban Ministry of Commerce.

Dec. 17—In a television broadcast Castro attacks the Roman Catholic Church in Cuba. He warns the Church against intervening in political matters.

Dec. 19—Guevara and a Soviet First Deputy Premier, Anastas I. Mikoyan, issue a joint communiqué from Moscow. The communiqué announces that the U.S.S.R. will supply Cuba with oil and will increase purchases of Cuban sugar if the U.S. stops all Cuban sugar purchases. (See *U.S. Foreign Policy*, Dec. 22.)

Dec. 21—The government decrees a judicial reorganization. Last night the Cabinet paved the way for such reorganization by suspending for 45 days a law forbidding the ouster of judges. The removal of 13 judges is announced.

Dec. 31—The Cabinet revokes free entry of U.S. citizens to Cuba. All U.S. citizens must now have visas to enter Cuba.

ECUADOR

Dec. 15—It is reported that President José María Velasco Ibarra yesterday demanded the resignation of the pro-Castro Minister of Government, Manuel Araujo Hidalgo.

Dec. 18—It is disclosed that on December 9, Ecuador reiterated its right to reject the 1942 Rio Protocol. The Protocol settled an Ecuadorian-Peruvian border dispute by granting 77,000 square miles of Ecuadorian territory to Peru.

EL SALVADOR

Dec. 17—The military junta in power since October, 1960, invalidates the elections of

all mayors serving in the towns; new mayors are either to be appointed or elected.

ETHIOPIA

Dec. 14—The U.S. State Department confirms reports that Emperor Haile Selassie I, visiting Brazil, has been ousted by his son, Crown Prince Asfa-Wossen, leading the Imperial Household Guard.

Dec. 15—Reports from London disclose that fighting has erupted in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, between anti-government forces and those loyal to Selassie.

Dec. 16—It is announced that the army and air force, which remained loyal to the Emperor, have regained control of the government from the revolutionary Imperial Household Guard. It is reported that the Crown Prince may have acted in the revolution only "under duress."

Dec. 17—Haile Selassie returns to Ethiopia to regain control of his country.

Dec. 18—Haile Selassie offers to pardon all rebels who lay down their arms excepting their high command leaders.

Dec. 24—The chief leader of the Imperial Guard, Brigadier General Mengestu Newaye, is captured by Ethiopian forces.

FRANCE

Dec. 6—The National Assembly fails to gain the necessary 277 votes to carry a motion of censure against the government led by Premier Michel Debré. Thus, on its third reading in the Assembly, the bill to create a nuclear deterrent striking capability for France is approved.

Dec. 10—The government arrests some 300 Rightist leaders in metropolitan France in order to avert demonstrations such as those bomb at its Reggan base in Algeria.

Dec. 13—President Charles de Gaulle returns to Paris from Algeria.

Dec. 27—France explodes its third atomic bomb at its Reggan base in Algeria.

Dec. 30—A decree published today in the Official Journal reveals that Marshal Alphonse-Pierre Juin has been eliminated from the National Defense Council. Juin is a critic of de Gaulle's Algerian policy.

FRANCE OVERSEAS Algeria

Dec. 2—The Independent party's National Congress rejects de Gaulle's Algerian pol-

icy and issues a resolution calling for a French Algeria.

Dec. 5—France boycotts the U.N. General Assembly's Political Committee, now debating the Algerian question.

Pierre Lagaillarde, on trial before a Paris military court on charges of having led the revolution in January, 1960, in Algeria, flees with 4 other defendants. Lagaillarde breaks his temporary parole.

Dec. 8—The French Cabinet decides on a national referendum on January 6, 7, 8, 1961, to give Algeria home rule at once and later to allow it to choose its own destiny.

Dec. 9—De Gaulle arrives in Algeria. Europeans, demonstrating against de Gaulle's Algerian policy, clash with police.

Dec. 10—De Gaulle tells the French army in Algeria that it must help build an Algerian Algeria which will need the European Algerians and France.

Pro-de Gaulle Muslims demonstrate in Algiers.

Dec. 11—Rightist Europeans and paratroopers clash with Muslims; 61 are killed.

Dec. 12—Violence between Muslims and Europeans in Algeria continues to swell.

Dec. 13—French troops fire on European demonstrators; 2 are killed and some 15 are wounded.

Dec. 15—The Political Committee of the U.N. General Assembly passes a resolution for a referendum on self-determination for Algeria. The resolution stipulates that the plebiscite be U.N.-supervised.

De Gaulle's government takes steps to crack down on French and Algerian extremists.

Dec. 16—Premier Michel Debré tells the National Assembly that Algeria must move toward eventual autonomy in "close union" with France.

Premier Ferhat Abbas of the Algerian Provisional Government in exile urges Muslims to work against the referendum.

Dec. 17—Soviet military supplies for Algerian rebels are unloaded in Morocco.

Dec. 19—The General Assembly approves a resolution calling for eventual independence for Algeria and recognizing some role for the U.N. in settling the Algerian question. The provision for an Algerian referendum sponsored, organized, and supervised by the U.N. is defeated.

Dec. 20—De Gaulle again offers to negotiate a peace with Algerian rebel leaders.

Dec. 22—Ex-Premier Guy Mollet's Socialist party, at a party congress, approves de Gaulle's plan for interim internal autonomy for Algeria to be followed by full autonomy later.

Dec. 31—In a television broadcast, de Gaulle threatens to resign unless his program for Algeria is approved.

FRENCH OVERSEAS COMMUNITY, THE

Dahomey

Dec. 30—President Hubert Maga announces a new cabinet; his government resigned yesterday.

Mali

Dec. 24—The Presidents of Ghana, Guinea and Mali announce that they have agreed on a joint "economic and monetary policy."

Mauritania

Dec. 4—The Soviet Union vetoes Mauritania's application for U.N. membership in the Security Council. Soviet delegate Valerian A. Zorin had threatened to vote Mauritania's membership unless the Security Council agrees to membership for the Mongolian People's Republic (Outer Mongolia).

Morocco, which lays claim to Mauritania, hails the Security Council veto.

Togo

Dec. 29—The U.S. State Department announces an agreement to give technical and economic aid to Togo.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Dec. 2—Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, ill with a cold, cancels his plans to visit London and Paris.

Dec. 12—Negotiations to renew the Soviet-West German trade treaty are reported to have become deadlocked last night. The West German government wishes to have West Berlin included in the treaty.

Dec. 18—Communist party leader Walter Ulbricht declares that East Germany will block West German and Allied military trains to West Berlin unless the West-East Germany trade pact is renewed.

Dec. 20—The last Nazi commandant of the Auschwitz concentration camp, Richard Baer, it is reported, has been arrested.

Dec. 29—East and West Germany agree to extend the trade pact now binding.

Dec. 31—West Germany and the U.S.S.R. sign a new trade pact providing for an eventual increase of 20 per cent in goods exchanged. It is reported that the treaty applies to the Western sector of Berlin as well.

GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (East)

Dec. 4—It is made public that a statement by the Evangelical Church of the Union, the largest Protestant group, was read to the members in all its churches. The Church urges East Germans not to flee to West Germany and West Berlin.

GUINEA (See also *French Community, Mali.*)

Dec. 7—The Portuguese government reports that last September a secret agreement was signed between the Soviet Union and Guinea granting a submarine base in Guinea to the U.S.S.R.

INDONESIA

Dec. 28—Foreign Minister Subandrio leaves for Moscow to negotiate an arms deal to help Indonesia push its fight to gain Netherlands New Guinea.

ISRAEL (See also *U.A.R.*)

Dec. 21—Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Abraham Harman assures the U.S. State Department that Israel is not building an atomic bomb. The construction of a nuclear reactor in Israel is for "peaceful purposes only." It was reported from Washington earlier this week that Israel may be creating a nuclear capability.

Dec. 25—A Cabinet Committee report exonerates ex-Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon of having ordered the army to execute a disastrous act in 1954 (he resigned in 1955). The incident in question is not revealed. The committee report reveals that a document placing the blame on Lavon was forged by a senior army officer.

Dec. 28—Premier David Ben-Gurion plans to take a leave of absence. It is reported that he will take this time to decide whether he will accept the committee report clearing Lavon or resign. The Lavon case has split Ben-Gurion's Mapai party over the question of responsibility for the 1954 episode.

Ben-Gurion tells the Zionist Congress

that all Jews who live outside Israel (since the creation of the new state) are transgressing.

ITALY

Dec. 31—It is reported that during 1960 the Italian government took 3 steps to ease import restrictions on goods from the U.S. Comparative figures reveal that in the first 6 months of 1959 the U.S. paid Italy \$52 million. During the same period in 1960, the U.S. received \$79 million from Italy.

JAPAN

Dec. 7—Premier Hayato Ikeda is re-elected premier by both houses of the Diet.

Dec. 18—Japan and Pakistan sign a trade and friendship treaty.

KOREA, SOUTH

Dec. 7—The Soviet government issues a statement asking the U.N. to effect the withdrawal of U.S. and other foreign troops of the U.N. command from South Korea.

LAOS

Dec. 2—Leftist mobs in Vientiane demonstrate against the efforts of neutralist Premier Souvanna Phouma to form a coalition government including Rightists (proto-Western).

Dec. 5—The Laotian government sends a note to the U.S. ambassador denouncing shipments of U.S. military supplies to the Rightist forces led by General Phoumi Nosavan.

Dec. 8—Phouma's neutral forces round up Leftists who have opposed peace talks with Nosavan.

Dec. 9—Premier Phouma flees to Cambodia. A combination of Leftist (led by Captain Kong Le) and Pathet Lao (Communist) forces now in control of Vientiane face a conflict with Rightist rebels under Nosavan, moving in on Vientiane. Phouma orders neutralist government troops loyal to him to move outside the city limits.

Dec. 10—A committee of neutralist military leaders takes charge in Vientiane.

Dec. 11—The military committee yields control to 4 Cabinet members remaining in Laos. As senior Cabinet member, Quinim Polseña takes over the premiership.

Dec. 12—The Seato Council condemns Soviet arms shipments to Laos.

Dec. 14—Fighting at Vientiane between

Nosavan's Rightist forces and Leftist troops ends in a victory for Leftists.

Dec. 15—The U.S. State Department announces it will support a new government headed by Nosavan's associate, Boun Oum.

Dec. 16—The Rightist forces win the city of Vientiane after continued fighting. Nosavan and Boun Oum enter Vientiane in triumph.

Dec. 17—The U.S. charges the U.S.S.R. with complicity in the Leftist revolt in Laos.

Dec. 18—The new premier, Boun Oum, announces that he and his Cabinet are now operating the government.

Dec. 19—The U.S. announces it will begin to send military supplies again to Laos, halted about 3 weeks ago.

Dec. 30—Laos appeals to the U.N. for help in countering an attack by North Vietnamese troops. North Vietnam denies invasion charges.

NEPAL

Dec. 15—King Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Deva ousts Premier B. P. Koirala and his Cabinet, and dissolves parliament. He takes charge of the government. The King declares that Koirala has been arrested because he acted against Nepal's national interests.

Dec. 16—Political activity in Nepal is outlawed.

Dec. 26—The King announces that he has established a council of ministers, composed of 5 ministers and 4 assistant ministers. The King will head the council.

NETHERLANDS, THE

Dec. 23—The government of Premier Jan E. de Quay resigns after its housing bill is rejected by the lower house of parliament. De Quay had been in power 19 months.

PARAGUAY

Dec. 21—The government reports that it has routed an invasion party of exiles from Argentina.

Dec. 22—Paraguay seals off its border with Argentina.

PERU

Dec. 10—The Peru government asks Ecuador to respect their border treaty. (See also *Ecuador*.)

Dec. 19—The International Bank for Recon-

struction and Development (World Bank) grants a \$5.5 million loan to Peru for building highways connecting the eastern parts of the country with Lima. This will help develop the Amazon area.

Dec. 30—Peru cancels diplomatic relations with Cuba.

POLAND

Dec. 3—It is reported that last night the Polish Five Year Plan was presented to parliament. It is reported that the plan calls for increased austerity for the Poles.

SAUDI ARABIA

Dec. 21—Crown Prince Faisal, who served as Premier and Finance, Foreign and Defense Minister, resigns. His brother, King Saud, assumes complete control of the government.

SPAIN

Dec. 18—It is reported that among the delegates gathering in Madrid for the opening of parliament are the first 3 African representatives. They are from the West African Spanish provinces of Rio Muni and Fernando Po.

SWEDEN

Dec. 10—King Gustaf VI Adolf awards the Nobel Prizes. The prizes go to physicist Donald A. Glaser of the U.S., chemist Willard F. Libby of the U.S., poet Alexis Leger (pseudonym, Saint-John Perse) of France. The prize in medicine is shared by Sir MacFarlane Burnet of Australia and Peter Brian Medawar of Great Britain. The peace prize is not awarded this year.

TUNISIA

Dec. 30—President Habib Bourguiba voices his support of de Gaulle's proposals for Algerian autonomy. (See also *France Overseas, Algeria*.)

TURKEY

Dec. 24—Premier Cemal Gursel accepts the resignation of Finance Minister Ekrem Alican.

U.S.S.R., THE (See also *Congo, Cuba and Laos*.)

Dec. 1—The U.S.S.R. announces that it has launched its second 5-ton satellite into orbit. The space ship carries two dogs and other animals. The space ship rotates around the earth every 88.6 minutes. At

its closest point, the ship is 116 miles from earth; at its furthest point, 159 miles.

It is announced that the 3-week old secret summit meetings in Moscow of over 80 delegates from foreign Communist parties has ended.

Dec. 2—The space ship, which the Soviet Union planned to bring back to earth safely, plunges out of control.—It burns up as it re-enters the earth's atmosphere.

Dec. 5—The declaration of the Communist party leaders meeting in Moscow last month is published. The declaration reaffirms Moscow's policy of peaceful co-existence and emphasizes the Communist desire to avoid war. The statement declares that world revolution is not needed to establish world socialism.

Dec. 6—Communist Chinese Chief of State Liu Shao-chi is honored at a gala performance of the Bolshoi Ballet. In an editorial today in *Jenmin Jih Pao* (the Communist Chinese party organ), the Communist Chinese declare that they regard the declaration of the summit meeting as historic, but that they intend to pursue their ideology: Communist China insists that world revolution is necessary to create a world socialist state.

Dec. 8—The U.S.S.R. declares that it plans to grant loans to the U.A.R. for "100 industrial, agricultural and other undertakings." It is reported that a First Deputy Premier, Anastas I. Mikoyan, announced the loans at a reception for U.A.R. Vice-President Abdel Hakim Amer in Moscow.

Dec. 11—*Tass* (official Soviet Press agency) publishes a statement denouncing the British base at Holy Loch in Scotland where U.S. atomic submarines are based. The statement warns that any crisis involving the submarines will bring retaliatory attacks against Britain.

Dec. 20—The sixth session of the Supreme Soviet hears the budget plans for 1961. Defense spending goes down slightly as compared with 1960. Expenditures for science are increased 15 per cent over 1960 (a total of some 4 million new rubles).

Dec. 22—The Supreme Soviet approves the budget.

Dec. 23—The Soviet Union announces a loan of 43 million new rubles to North Vietnam; the signing of a 5-year trade treaty is also disclosed.

Dec. 29—Minister of Agriculture Vladimir V. Matskevich is ousted. He is replaced by Mikhail A. Olshansky.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (See also *Israel*.)

Dec. 23—President Gamal Abdel Nasser tells Cairo crowds that if he discovers that Israel is building an atomic bomb, he will declare war on Israel at once.

UNITED STATES

Agriculture

Dec. 30—President-elect John F. Kennedy reveals plans for a meeting with farm leaders early in January to work on a farm program.

Civil Rights

Dec. 30—The eviction of some 300 Negro share-croppers from land in Haywood County, Tennessee, is enjoined by action of the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Staff Director of the Federal Civil Rights Commission Gordon M. Tiffany recommends to the President that the government should follow strictly the constitutional provision that states that refuse to let Negroes vote should lose seats in the House of Representatives.

The Economy

Dec. 4—Kennedy selects an 11-man committee to study methods of alleviating conditions in chronically depressed areas.

Dec. 6—The Treasury reports a \$1,224,-047,421.64 revenue surplus for fiscal 1960.

Dec. 12—The Labor Department reports rising unemployment in November, 1960. The largest unemployment figure for any November after 1940 is reported: 4,013,000.

Dec. 22—The Internal Revenue Service reports that a record 60.3 million persons filed individual income tax returns for 1959.

Dec. 23—The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that the November, 1960, price index rose again, the sixteenth rise in the last 20 months.

Dec. 27—Bureau of the Budget Director Maurice Stans estimates that by 1970 government income will rise to \$120 billion, in a recent speech now reported from Washington.

Foreign Policy

Dec. 1—It is reported from Washington that discussions with the West Germans in

Bonn about the U.S. balance of payments problem have been resumed.

Dec. 2—President Eisenhower authorizes use of up to \$1 million from his special contingencies fund to aid Cuban refugees in the U.S.

Dec. 7—President Eisenhower terminates the special Caribbean patrol that has been protecting Guatemala and Nicaragua.

Dec. 8—At the close of talks at Crown Point, Tobago, it is agreed that the U.S. will keep its naval base at Chaguaramas on Trinidad for 17 years; this is the only active U.S. naval base in the south Caribbean.

Dec. 15—Kennedy confers with British Ambassador Sir Harold Caccia in Washington; he expresses the hope that he can talk to British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan "in the not too distant future."

Dec. 21—The Department of Commerce reports that foreign aid in fiscal 1960 reached a post-war low of \$4.1 billion.

Dec. 22—The Department of Agriculture reveals that sugar normally bought from Cuba is now being purchased from the Dominican Republic, Peru, the Philippines and Mexico.

Dec. 23—Russian Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko says he hopes Russian-U.S. relations will improve under the Kennedy administration.

Dec. 31—The U.S. warns that foreign Communist intervention in Laos will be viewed very seriously in Washington. (See also *Laos*.)

Government

Dec. 1—President-elect Kennedy names Connecticut Governor Abraham Ribicoff as Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.

Dec. 2—President-elect John F. Kennedy chooses David E. Bell to be Budget Director.

Dec. 3—Kennedy names North Carolina Governor Luther H. Hodges as Secretary of Commerce.

Dec. 7—Kennedy names Arizona Representative Stewart L. Udall as Secretary of the Interior.

Dec. 8—General Electric, Westinghouse Electric and 17 other electrical manufacturers plead guilty to criminal anti-trust charges.

Kennedy asks Adlai Stevenson to serve

as U.S. representative to the U.N., with Cabinet rank; Stevenson's decision will be deferred until next week.

Kennedy says he will ask Congress to establish a Department of Urban Affairs on a Cabinet level.

Dec. 12—Dean Rusk, president of the Rockefeller Foundation, is named Secretary of State; Connecticut's Chester Bowles is to be Under Secretary of State. Stevenson accepts the U.N. post.

Dec. 13—Robert S. McNamara, president of the Ford Motor Company, is named Secretary of Defense.

Dec. 14—The Illinois electoral board unanimously certifies Kennedy's victory in Illinois, with 27 electoral votes.

Dec. 15—William Robert Valentine, Jr., a Negro, is named intergroup relations adviser by the Federal Housing Administration.

Eisenhower is pronounced in excellent health after a check-up at Walter Reed Medical Center.

Labor lawyer Arthur J. Goldberg is named Secretary of Labor; Minnesota's Governor Orville L. Freeman is named Secretary of Agriculture.

Dec. 16—Republican Douglas Dillon is named Secretary of the Treasury; Robert Kennedy is named by his brother as Attorney General.

Dec. 17—Kennedy completes his Cabinet with the choice of California insurance executive J. Edward Day as Postmaster General.

Dec. 18—Atomic Energy Commission chairman John McCone reveals plans to resign when the Kennedy administration takes over.

Dec. 19—Kennedy confers with Vice-President elect Lyndon Johnson, House Speaker Sam Rayburn and Senator Mike Mansfield to discuss the new congressional program.

The Electoral College elects John F. Kennedy President of the United States, voting 300 to 219, confirming the popular vote of November 8.

Dec. 20—Kennedy asks Lyndon Johnson to be chairman of the Committee on Government Contract Compliance and to chair the National Aeronautics and Space Council.

At Kennedy's suggestion, Massachusetts

Governor Foster Furcolo names Benjamin Atwood Smith 2nd, of Gloucester, to fill Kennedy's Senate seat; Smith was Kennedy's college roommate.

Dec. 21—Kennedy names Roswell L. Gilpartic Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Dec. 22—Kennedy formally resigns his Senate seat.

Herbert F. York agrees to remain as Defense Department Director of Research and Engineering for a "limited period."

Dec. 23—Kennedy names Minnesota Professor of Economics Walter Wolfgang Heller as Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers.

Dec. 24—Kennedy chooses Paul H. Nitze as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs. Nitze, a former Republican, was formerly Director of the State Department policy planning staff.

Dec. 27—John B. Connally, Jr., is named Secretary of the Navy; Rex M. Whitton is named Federal Highway Administrator.

Dec. 28—Eugene M. Zuchert is named Air Force Secretary; Professor Archibald Cox of the Harvard Law School is named Solicitor General.

Kennedy is named official winner of Hawaii's 3 electoral votes after a recount in 240 districts.

Dec. 29—Robert V. Roosa of New York is named Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs; James Landis is to join the White House staff on a temporary basis.

Dec. 30—The Interstate Commerce Commission agrees to endorse a \$3.5 million loan to the New Haven Railroad, to keep the railroad from bankruptcy.

Dec. 31—Robert C. Weaver of New York City's Housing and Redevelopment Board is named Housing and Home Finance Administrator. Weaver will hold the highest federal administrative post ever assigned to a Negro.

Kennedy names Dean McGeorge Bundy of Harvard as a special assistant for national security affairs.

Labor

Dec. 7—A Florida grand jury indicts Teamsters' President James Hoffa and two others on charges that they misused more than a half million dollars in Teamsters' funds.

Dec. 22—Eisenhower names Secretary of

Labor James P. Mitchell to head a 15-man commission looking for a solution to disputes between labor and management over railroad work rules. Other members of the commission are named.

Military Policy

Dec. 4—The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's first try at a scout rocket satellite launching fails.

Dec. 6—The suggestions for defense reorganization made yesterday by Missouri Senator Stuart Symington are criticized by Army and Navy officials.

The U.S. releases pictures of the atomic bombs dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima 15 years ago.

Dec. 7—A twelfth Discoverer satellite is successfully launched.

Dec. 8—A program issuing English translations of Russian scientific literature is sharply reduced by the Commerce Department because of "lack of public demand." The program was set up in 1957 after the first Russian satellite launching.

Dec. 14—Defense Secretary Thomas Gates' order requesting the military services to review their overseas requirements is published.

An Air Force B-52G jet bomber flies a record nonstop flight—10,000 miles without refueling.

Dec. 15—A sixth U.S. attempt to launch a lunar satellite fails.

Dec. 19—A fire on the aircraft carrier Constitution under construction in the Brooklyn Navy Yard kills at least 47 workers and injures over 150.

An unmanned Mercury capsule travels 235 miles into the Atlantic.

Dec. 20—A Discoverer satellite is placed in polar orbit.

Dec. 23—The Navy orders increased shipbuilding safety measures.

Politics

Dec. 1—After an hour-long conference with President Eisenhower, New York's Governor Nelson Rockefeller refuses to join the President in naming Richard Nixon "the head of the Republican party for the next four years," maintaining that the party needs "collective leadership."

Democratic National Committee Chairman Henry M. Jackson reveals that he plans to resign after Kennedy "is firmly installed in the White House."

Dec. 6—Kennedy and Eisenhower confer in the White House for more than 3 hours; their meeting is cordial and they discuss American foreign policy.

Dec. 15—Official election results are released; Kennedy's popular vote plurality was 112,801 over Vice-President Nixon, in the closest presidential election in 76 years. The total number of those voting for the Presidency reached 68,832,670, almost 7 million more than voted in 1956. (See also *Government*.)

Dec. 19—The Electoral College votes 300-219 (without Hawaii) for John F. Kennedy for the 35th President of the U.S.

Dec. 28—After a recount, Hawaii's 3 electoral votes are formally declared for President-elect John F. Kennedy.

Segregation

Dec. 1—It is revealed in New Orleans that the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals approved a stair-step plan for Dallas public school integration yesterday.

Dec. 21—A Federal District Court holds Louisiana Lieutenant Governor C. C. Aycock and 2 other state officials in contempt for withholding salaries of teachers in 2 integrated New Orleans schools; New Orleans banks are ordered by the court to release funds for teachers' salaries.

Dec. 23—Four New Orleans banks release funds in accord with a federal court order so that teachers and other personnel in the city's integrated schools can be paid. Other teachers are 4 weeks behind in their paychecks because the state legislature is withholding funds. (See also *Supreme Court*.)

Dec. 29—Delaware submits a second plan for desegregating public schools, to be completed by September, 1970. Delaware's first grade-a-year plan was rejected by a U.S. Court of Appeals.

Supreme Court

Dec. 5—The Supreme Court rules 7 to 2 that a bus terminal restaurant that functions as an "integral part" of interstate bus service may not segregate bus passengers who are travelling across state lines.

Dec. 7—Hearings begin to test the constitutionality of state Sunday "blue laws." Jewish merchants in Massachusetts have challenged the constitutionality of the Massachusetts Lord's Day Act.

Dec. 12—Ruling 5 to 4, the Court finds that

a state may not require its public school teachers to list all the organizations to which they have belonged in the last 5 years. The Court issues a one-page order ruling that Louisiana's obstructionist laws against desegregation are illegal. (See also *Segregation*.)

Dec. 19—The Court rules 7 to 2 that if witnesses are granted immunity from prosecution they may be forced to give incriminating testimony in federal narcotics cases.

VATICAN, THE

Dec. 2—The Archbishop of Canterbury, The Most Reverend Geoffrey Francis Fisher, becomes the first Anglican archbishop to call on a Pope. Dr. Fisher visits with Pope John XXIII for over an hour.

VENEZUELA

Dec. 1—A Leftist call for a general strike is unheeded. However, in anti-government clashes during the last week, it is reported that a total of 9 persons have been killed.

Dec. 2—A band of Leftist students entrenched at the Central University is successfully routed by government troops.

YUGOSLAVIA

Dec. 2—Yugoslavia reports that it has commenced talks with the neighboring states of Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria (all Communist bloc states) on minor boundary problems.

Dec. 26—President Tito, at a special session of parliament, condemns the West, which he charges is mainly responsible for world tensions because of its power politics. He also criticizes the Communist summit meeting communiqué as a "rotten compromise."

Dec. 27—Finance Minister Nikola Mincev announces economic reforms, including the establishment of a uniform tariff. The dinar will be standardized at 750 to the dollar, invalidating the former multiple rate of exchange. It is also reported that the International Monetary Fund, Western states and the U.S. have pledged a \$275 million loan to aid the reform program. The Parliament approves a new Five Year Plan.

Dec. 28—The Parliament approves the national budget and the economic reform plan.

These CURRENT HISTORY issues are available for quantity purchase

Use this check list to order for your classes . . .

Problems in World Affairs

- Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy (9/57)
- The World of Islam (6/57)
- France in Africa (2/58)
- West Europe Today and Tomorrow (11/56)
- France's Foreign Policy (5/55)
- Report on Germany (4/56)
- Canada (7/55)
- The Mediterranean World (8/55)
- Great Britain: Education at Mid-Century (9/58)
- The Far East in the Free World (7/56)
- Tensions in the British Community (6/58)
- The Soviet Union since Stalin (1/56)
- Problems of American Foreign Policy (3/56)
- India Between East and West (3/59)
- Tensions in East-Central Europe (4/59)
- France and the Fifth Republic (5/59)
- New States of Africa (7/59)
- Government and Labor Abroad (8/59)
- American Foreign Policy and the Communist World (10/59)
- Russian Foreign Policy and the Western World (11/59)
- Communist China as a World Power (12/59)
- West Germany as a World Power (1/60)

- Latin America in Revolution (3/60)
- U. S. Military Policy and World Security (4/60)
- Progress in the Middle East (5/60)
- World Federalism and Free World Security (8/60)
- Russia and Continuing Coexistence (11/60)
- China and Continuing Coexistence (12/60)
- West Europe and Continuing Coexistence (1/61)
- Africa (2/61)
- Southeast Asia (coming 3/61)
- Latin America (coming 4/61)

Problems of American Democracy

- United States Through Foreign Eyes (12/56)
- Dilemma of Empire (12/55)
- American Farm Leaders (6/55)
- Disarmament and Defense (10/57)
- Changing American Politics (8/56)
- Public Power in the U. S. (5/58)
- Education in Crisis (9/55)
- Security in a Free Society (10/55)
- Immigration and the American Ideal (11/55)
- Government and Labor in the U. S. (9/59)
- The American Economy (7/60)

Our Special Group Rates . . .

Because these studies are so helpful, we are now offering them at special reduced rates for group use:

In orders of 5 or more copies of different issues, copies are available at 65¢ each; in orders of 5 or more copies of the same issue, at 50¢ each; 10 or more of the same issue, at 35 cents; 30 or more of the same issue, at 30¢ each; 100 or more of the same issue, at 25¢ a copy. Single copy price, 85¢. Special discounts on orders over 200.

We also offer reduced rates for student subscriptions: in orders of 10 subscriptions or more, your students may subscribe for 9 months at \$3.15; or for 12 months at \$4.20; in orders of 30 or more, our 9 month rate is \$2.70; 12 months, \$3.60; in orders of 100 or more, our 9 month rate is \$2.25 and our 12 month rate is \$3.00. The cost of a single subscription is \$5.25 for 9 months; \$7.00 a year. See our special introductory offer on reverse side.

CURRENT HISTORY

1822 Ludlow Street

Philadelphia 3, Penna.

CH 261-3

I understand that I may order copies of these coordinated issues in quantity at special reduced rates. Please send me the issues I have indicated, in the quantities I have marked.

Name Check enclosed Bill me

Address

City State 1 Year \$7 plus 3 free issues 2 Years \$13 plus 3 free issues

Keep Up To Date!

See what a **CURRENT HISTORY** subscription offers YOU!

****Month after month, our timely studies will keep you informed on vital topics.**

INTERESTING and KNOWLEDGEABLE REPORTS will round out your background information on such crucial matters as . . .

**FREE WORLD SECURITY
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
PROGRESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
COMMUNIST CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY**

**RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY
THE COLD WAR*
THE AMERICAN ECONOMY
WEST GERMANY AS A WORLD POWER**

Subscribe now to **CURRENT HISTORY**. EXCLUSIVE AND ORIGINAL STUDIES will provide you with invaluable, factual material that you can rely on for accuracy. Nowhere is such material duplicated. Nowhere are similar studies available at such low cost. **CURRENT HISTORY**'s continuing reference volumes are *one-of-a-kind*!

COORDINATED ISSUES contain seven or eight articles each month devoted to a pertinent topic in world affairs. Each of our contributors is a specialist in his field, who brings you his first-hand knowledge, background, impressions. Each article in an issue focuses on a different aspect of the subject for complete coverage of the complex problems of today's world.

CHRONOLOGY — The Month in Review offers a day-by-day account of the important events in all the countries of the world, both large and small. This is the only monthly chronology of its kind being published in the United States.

DOCUMENTS — Our documents section reprints the texts of important treaties, laws, diplomatic notes, speeches, to provide original source material. See how this material increases your understanding of how history is made.

BOOK REVIEWS — Comments on current books of interest to our readers bring you concise notes evaluating the latest publications in the field of history and politics.

AS A SPECIAL INTRODUCTORY BONUS, we will give you 3 free issues. Today, as Americans travel throughout the world, their need for background information on the problems of our century has increased one-hundred-fold. Concerned citizens everywhere are awakening to the fact that they must be prepared to meet ever-growing demands upon their insight and understanding.

3 FREE ISSUES

Your subscription to **CURRENT HISTORY** will include three coordinated studies FREE—Chosen from our List of Available Issues (see reverse side)—plus the next 12 issues for the usual yearly subscription price. Don't forget to select your 3 free gift copies from our list on the other side of this cover!

A GIFT FOR YOU WORTH \$2.55 Sign up today!
From **CURRENT HISTORY** • 1822 Ludlow Street • Phila. 3, Pa.

Name Address

City Zone State

Send me the following 3 gift copies:

12 months at \$7 plus 24 months at \$13 plus Bill me
3 free issues 3 free issues Check enclosed

Add 25¢ for Canada; 75¢ for foreign, including the Philippines.

CH 261-4